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ABSTRACT
HANS URS VON BALTHASAR: JESUS CHRIST THE CONCRETE FOUNDATION OF 
FAITH
Robert Emmett Burns
University of Dayton, 199^
Advisor: Rev. Johann G. Roten, S.M., S.T.D.
This thesis examines Hans Urs von Balthasar's theology of
the act of divine faith in Jesus Christ, and God in Christ. The
central question for fundamental theology as posed by Balthasar 
is "How does God's revelation in Christ confront man in history? 
How is it perceived?" Can one have actual knowledge of Jesus 
Christ, and God in Christ, in the act of divine faith? Chapter I 
examines the history of the epistemology and theology of the act 
of faith during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Chapter 
II analyzes Balthasar's writings concerning the manner in which 
God in Christ is perceived in the act of faith. Chapter III, 
considers the question of nature and grace as found in Balthas­
ar's writings, particularly his use of "analogy of being." 
Chapter IV is a critical analysis and conclusions about founda­
tions for the act of faith and theology.
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INTRODUCTION
Christian faith presupposes that we can "know" Christ, in 
some sense. If theology is "faith seeking understanding," then 
Christology is faith-knowing of Christ seeking understanding. 
Christology then must suppose that we can come to some knowledge of
Christ which is relevant to our lives as we live them in this
century. Our initial faith-knowing of Christ is already an 
understanding. So we need to define exactly what we mean by "faith­
knowing" and "understanding." What kind of faith-knowledge of 
Christ do we think we have (and can we have) and what kind of 
deeper understanding are we seeking? How can we come to this 
knowledge?
These questions can only be asked and answered in terms of our
own cultural and historical context. Jaroslav Pelikan, quoting
Albert Schweitzer, says of the contextualization of christology:
"Each successive epoch," Schweitzer said, "found its own 
thoughts in Jesus, which was indeed, the only way in which it 
could make him live"; for, typically, one, "created him in 
accordance with one’s own character."1
Each age seems to get the image of Jesus it wants and needs. But 
the image that simple believers live by, may or may not correspond
'jaroslav Pelikan, Jesus Through the Centuries: His Place in 
the History of Culture. New York: Harper & Row; Yale University 
Press, 1985, pp. 2.
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to that which theologians develop.1 *Given the contextualization of 
christology, how is historical continuity and identity with Christ
to be maintained?
Hebrew 13: 8-9 tells us that "Jesus Christ is the same
yesterday and today and forever. Do not be led away by diverse and 
strange teachings." While this can be given a metaphysical and 
theological sense, in what sense is this true in human history? The 
context to which this verse speaks is that of fidelity to correct 
teaching about Christ's identity and significance. Revelation in 
Christ occurred in a Jewish context of meaning to which Jesus of
Nazareth addressed himself and in which he was received. The
context of meaning had developed over centuries as revealed in the 
Old Testament. Assuming the truth of the revelation which took 
place in Christ in that meaning context, how can that truth be 
passed on in new historical and cultural contexts?3 Can historicism 
and relativism be avoided? The fact of continuity and discontinuity 
in Christian tradition and in history and culture generally is 
evident. Historical and cultural contexts are not self-enclosed
systems or intergenerational and intercultural exchange would not 
be possible. But, particularly with respect to the Christian 
tradition of Christ, what are the criteria by which identity and 
continuity are to be maintained? What can be the basis for
1 See Gerard S. Sloyan, The Jesus Tradition: Images of Jesus in
the West. Mystic, Conn.: 1986. Sloyan traces the images which have 
been vital in the lives of great spiritual teachers and believing 
people.
3I am assuming that real truth can be communicated through a 
contingent historical context of meaning.
3certitude in answering these questions? How can we understand 
Christ's universal significance throughout history and for all 
peoples? How can there be different images of Christ in different 
times and cultures while, in the historical sense, He remains the 
same from age to age? What is there about Christ that can be and is 
universally true for all humanity in every age?
These questions necessarily assume that there is something 
about humanity which is universally true in every time and place. 
It assumes a Christian anthropology based on Christ’s humanity. It 
assumes that there are some fundamental, existential and universal 
human conditions, and questions about human existence and destiny 
which transcend historical and cultural contexts, to which Christ 
is the answer.1 He is the answer both in the sense that he has 
humanly lived through those fundamental conditions and questions 
and revealed the truth about human reality in every age, and in the 
sense that he has lived and revealed the truth about humanity's 
transcendental questions - the truth about ultimate destiny, and 
the relationship between life now and life eternal.
*"The Gospel, and therefore evangelization, are certainly not 
identical with culture, and they are independent in regard to all 
cultures. Nevertheless, the Kingdom which the Gospel proclaims is 
lived by men who are profoundly linked to a culture, and the 
building up of the Kingdom cannot avoid borrowing the elements of 
human culture or cultures. Though independent of cultures the 
Gospel and evangelization are not necessarily incompatible with 
them; rather they are capable of permeating them all without 
becoming subject to any one of them." Pope Paul VI, On Evange1iz- 
at ion in the Modern World: Apostolic Exhortation Evange1i i 
Nunt iandi. Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 
1976, par.20, pp. 16-17.
It
But, he has done all that in a particular meaning context. God 
has truly become flesh in the context of Judaism, and by doing so 
he has permanently become part of human history in a human way, and 
the revelation in Christ is now passed on in a human historical 
way, subject to its finite and contingent nature, albeit with the 
aid of the Holy Spirit. Does human historical reality, in its 
metaphysical, ontological and epistemological dimensions, permit 
the continuity and identity of truth in any objective and universal 
sense? Put another way, is there an epistemology of human religious 
knowledge and an ontology of human language which can provide the 
philosophical grounding for such continuity and identity? How can 
Revelation which took place nearly two-thousand years ago speak to 
the present? How can Jesus of Nazareth, Risen Lord and Christ, be 
known through faith in a way that is relevant to today?
In the dialectic between past and present, text (and tradi­
tion) and present faith experience, the historical Jesus and the 
Jesus of faith, is the only arbiter of truth the Archimedean lever 
of human subjective experience, and therefore the authority of the 
human subject? Are the structures of human subjectivity the basis 
for certitude in matters of Revelation? Or, if faith is based on 
Cod's authority, is certitude a particular dimension of the act of 
faith itself, which certitude comes from Christ, the immediate 
object of faith? If so, how do we encounter and receive certitude 
from Christ, the immediate object of faith? How can we have 
certitude with respect to a contingent historical event that we 
know only second-hand?
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These are some of the central questions of our age which 
underlie development of doctrine and inculturation issues. How one 
resolves these questions of continuity, identity, and certitude 
with respect to Christ, the object of faith, will determine one’s 
theology of revelation and of the act of faith, or vice versa. A 
theology of revelation and of the act of faith are correlatives. 
Vhat one believes to be the elements of a theology of revelation 
will determine what one believes to be the elements of the act of 
faith. Further, one's theology of development of doctrine directly 
depends on one's theology of revelation. For example, if one holds 
to a propositional conception of revelation and faith, one's theory 
of doctrinal development will be logical, rather than transformis- 
tic or theological J Finally, one's theory of cultural correlation 
will depend in part on how one resolves these prior issues, as 
doctrinal development is one essential dimension of cultural
correlation.
In this thesis my overall objective is to show how Hans Urs
von Balthasar's method, and his theology of revelation and faith
which is the basis for his christology, provides a way to respond
to the question of how we can know Christ in this age. The
objective can be summed up with the question: How does Hans Urs von
Balthasar propose we can know Christ in our age?
For each age, the life and teachings of Jesus represented an 
answer (or, more often, the answer) to the most fundamental
5J.H. Valgrave. "Doctrine, Development of.” New Catholic 
Encyclopedia. Vol. k. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 940-944, 
at 941.
6questions of human existence and of human destiny, and it was 
to the figure of Jesus as set forth in the Gospels that those 
questions were addressed?
Behind the intellectual positions taken by the scholars of each
epoch are some fundamental assumptions.
There will be some fundamental assumptions which adherents of 
the variant systems within the epoch unconsciously presuppose. 
Such assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know 
what they are assuming because no other way of putting things 
has ever occurred to them. With these assumptions a certain 
limited number of types of philosophic systems are possible?
Cor relatively, "the way any particular age has depicted Jesus is 
often a key to the genius of that age."
How should we in our age proceed to know and understand 
Christ? What do we mean by faith-knowledge of Christ? Immediately 
we are faced with the question of methodology. Where do we start 
and how do we proceed? What questions must our method address to 
achieve our goal of knowing and understanding Christ in a way that 
is relevant to our contemporary setting? Christ challenged the 
assumptions of his age. Or, would it be more accurate to say that 
he challenged some fundamental human assumptions which simply take 
different cu1tural-historical forms in different times and places? 
How does our method allow Christ to challenge us and our questions 
and assumptions? How can we ask the questions to which Christ is 
the answer? We have to keep in mind that Israel's rejection of 
Jesus is paradigmatic of humanity's rejection of Jesus and the 
revelation which he is of human and transcendental reality. Is our
‘Pelikan, p. 2.
’ibid., p. 2, quoting Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the 
Modern World. New York: Mentor Editions, 1952, pp. 49-50.
7epoch open to Christ? Does our method put us in a fundamental 
posture of being taught and receiving from Christ, or does it put 
us in the fundamental posture of determining and authenticating 
Christ? Is our method or our form of christology determined by the 
content of the gospel, or does it shape and determine the gospel's 
contents?* If Christ is the Revelation of God who is universally 
significant in all times and places, what kind of method is 
necessary to assure that Christ's universal significance is 
appropriately proclaimed in our age in continuity with the past?
Who or what is the source of our certitude about Christ?
We are not the first generation of Christians to be faced with 
these questions. As previously indicated, different periods of 
Christian history have raised different questions with respect to 
what is known and understood, and what the particular historical 
period wants and needs to know about Christ. But, such a search in 
each period must have proceeded according to some method, uncon­
*For the argument that content does indeed determine form and 
therefore method see Colin E. Gunton, Yesterday & Today: A Study of 
Continuities in Christology. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Pub. Co., 
1983. "The content of Christian belief, at least until the time of 
the Enlightenment, was expressed in words that were for the most 
part common to all times -except the very earliest- and parts of 
the Christian world. The form of talk about Christ was that of the 
language of Nicaea and Chalcedon, which formed a centre for the 
Christology of most major Christian theologians, certainly in the 
West. From the time of Schleiermacher there has been a division 
between those who would express the content in a different form and 
those who believe the old forms to be indispensable in certain 
respects if the content is to be retained. The argument of this 
book is to be that certain changes of form entail also a change in 
content: and that it is very difficult to maintain a real continu­
ity with earlier ages unless we can at ieast in some ways affirm 
their words as our words, even though necessarily we shall not use 
and understand those words precisely as they did. Ibid., p. 5.
8scious and implicit though that method might be. Fundamental 
assumptions determine method.
In the first chapter, I plan to explore the historicai context 
which gave rise to the theological questions which Balthasar and 
other theologians, particularly the Transcendental Thomists, were 
trying to solve. Then, in Chapter II, I will present Balthasar's 
approach to the initial act of faith in Christ. This will involve 
his epistemology, and by way of comparison that of the Transcenden­
tal Thomists. This chapter will then move on to examine his 
theology of the act of faith-knowing as a perception of the 
"legible form" of Christ, or what he calls his "theological 
aesthetics.” As we examine the fundamental assumptions in the 
theology of Balthasar, we will also be looking indirectly and 
secondarily at the assumptions of the theology of our age, partic­
ularly those of Transcendental Thomism. In Chapter III, I will 
address the question how it is possible for us to participate in 
God's life of knowing and loving Himself, which was assumed in 
Chapter II. This is the problem of nature and grace. Here, I will 
examine Balthasar's use of "analogy of being" to understand the 
problem of nature and grace. Chapter IV will contain a critical 
analysis and conclusions to be drawn about how Christ can be known 
by faith today according to von Balthasar.
My own approach to Balthasar's thought is systematic in 
method, whereas Balthasar's approach to theology is more synthetic 
than systematic. In fact, I agree with Balthasar that a completely
sytematic approach to theology is impossible because God is the
9object of Revelation. A diversity of theologies, as evidenced by 
the Gospels, is necessitated by the nature of the object of 
Revelation. But the question is whether all theologies are equally 
true in method and content. Or, do they all equally understand the 
reality contained in Revelation? That reality, God, is one. Somehow
all that is diverse and true of God in Revelation must have a
unity. Consequently, the question becomes one of method. What 
fundamental aspects of Revelation determine proper theological 
approaches to God, the object of Revelation? If there are such 
fundamental aspects which determine a proper approach to Revela­
tion, how can and do they lead to diverse theologies? While I can­
not do so in this thesis, one might ask what, if any, are the 
similarities in method of the Gospel writers in their approach to 
understanding and knowing Christ? It is my belief, that Balthasar 
has identified and conceptualized the methodology of the Gospel 
writers. However, I will not be able to document that belief in
this thesis.
I will be drawing from only a few of Balthasar's works and 
secondary sources. Consequently, my arguments and conclusions must 
be tenative, though I believe the works and sources chosen fairly 
represent his thought.
CHAPTER I
THE HISTORICAL THEOLOGICAL CONTEXT
The Immediate Historical Context
Theologians in each age develop their particular theological 
approaches in response to theological questions to which their age 
gives birth. Usually those questions have a history that can be 
traced to the questions and answers of prior ages. One needs to ask 
from a historical perspective what fundamental problem is Balthasar 
and other theologians of his period trying to solve? The immediate 
context of Balthasar's Christology is that of the 1940's and what 
was called "the new theology" (nouvelle theologie).
The Church in Europe, in the years 1930 to 1950, in the midst 
of a time of crisis and change affecting every aspect of European 
society, witnessed an enormous intellectual and theological 
revival, a return to the sources of Christian Revelation.* This 
upsurge was really a wave that started at the turn of the century 
and was now cresting and about to crash onto the contemporary 
scene. "No small part of this world-wide revival and upheaval in 
theology has been centered in France; in fact, since the turn of
*Marcellino D'Ambrosio. "Ressourcement Theology , Aggiornamento, 
and the Hermeneutics of Tradition," Communio 18 (Winter, 1991), pp. 
530-555, at 530.
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the century the French have spearheaded this theological move­
ment. nllIt was this revival which gave rise to the ’’new theology." 
The fundamental desire that seems to drive the "new theology" is to 
rediscover the authentic Christ, to know him with the certitude of 
faith, and to bring him to the modern world. But we really need to 
go back to the nineteenth century context to see how the problems 
of the 1940*s arose.
General Theological Background- 19th Century
During the nineteenth century Catholic theologians as a whole 
had been in reaction to the rationalism of the eighteenth century. 
They were united in the common aim of trying to show the errors of 
those types of rationalism which either rejected religious belief 
or reduced it to rational, natural belief. They were bitterly 
divided on the philosophical and theological method to be used. The 
battle was between the post-Kantians and the Neo-Thomist scholas­
tics. They were divided on the most fundamental issues of the 
relationship between nature and grace, faith and reason, natural 
versus supernatural knowledge of God, innate awareness of God, and 
revelation and philosophy. In essence the issues being raised were 
about the metaphysical nature of finite and transcendent reality, 
the natural and the supernatural, and correspondingly, the 
epistemological question of human knowledge of transcendent 
reality. To put it more concretely, how did human created reality 
permit Cod's transcendent reality to be revealed in Christ, in a
11 James M. Connolly, The Voices of France. New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1961, p. xi.
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contingent historical/cultural context? Secondily, how could that 
revelation in Christ be known now with cer t i tudell *and in a new 
historical/cultural context, in a way that had continuity and 
identity with the authentic revelation in Christ? These issues were 
critical to a unified approach to the act of faith, the nature of 
theology, theological method, development of doctrine and apologet- 
ics. As we will see, these fundamental questions converged and 
became focused on the question of the nature of the act of faith in 
Christ, and God’s revelation of himself in Christ. Prior to the 
second half of the nineteenth century, Thomism was basically dor­
mant. It had declined along with scholasticism due to its corrup­
tion by Cartesian rationalism during the eighteenth century. When 
neo-Thomism develops in the second half of the nineteenth century, 
what distinguishes it from scholasticism is precisely Neo-Thomism's 
commitment to Thomi sm.13
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, since Catholic 
theologians were basically out of touch with their scholastic 
heritage, in reaction to post-Cartesian rationalism, Kantian 
rationalism, and Hegelian pantheism, they "attempted to restore 
Catholic theology by using new theological methods modeled on the
llHi stor i cal ly the quest seems to have been for objective 
scientific certitude, rather than the certitude of faith. This
involves the issue of whether God's revelation of Himself can be 
known other than with the certitude of faith. I will try to address 
that question in the final chapter of this thesis.
nGerald A. McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth 
Century: The Quest for a Unitary Method. New York: The Seabury 
Press, 1977, pp. 17-19.
Ibid., pp. 27-30.
13
philosophical method of post-Cartesian philosophy."1* The post- 
Kantian theory of knowledge, anthropology, and metaphysics of the 
German idealists, especially Schelling, were the philosophical 
vehicles used. The theology of the "Catholic Tubingen School, the 
metaphysical dualism of Anton Gunther, and the "ontologism" of 
Romini and Gioberti were built upon it."* 15
Post-Kantians differed from Kant in holding that noumenal 
reality could be known by intuitive reason (Vernunf t), though 
discursive reason (Verstand) was limited to objective phenomena. 
The intuitive process of reasoning had two stages. First, intuitive 
reason passively received metaphysical reality (Glaube). Second, 
discursive reason scientifically reflected upon the intuited 
metaphysical reality (Wissen). "Philosophy was understood to be a 
science (ffissenschaft) of faith (Glaube). or a science of revela­
tion." Christologically, Christ and Revelation in Christ could be
uIbid., pp. 2, 13.
l5Ibid., p. 13; regarding "Ontologism" see Ibid., Chapter 4 
and: D. Cleary, New Cathol ic Encyclopedia. Vol. 10. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 701-703; Albert Keller, Sacramentum 
Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology. Vol. 4. New York: Herder and 
Herder; London: Burns ic Oates, Ltd., 1970, pp. 290-292. Transcen­
dental Thomism tries to avoid "ontologism," while retaining some of 
its insights. ". . . the formulas of Ontologism are to be rejected 
insofar as they affirm the perpetual presence of God to human 
reason in the form of an object. Nonetheless, there is a justifi­
able purpose behind this assertion, one which was native to the 
Augustinian tradition and to which Christian philosophy is again 
devoting its attention today. It is the effort to explain how the 
non-objectivated grasp of being, which is characteristic of the 
human mind, is related to the knowledge of God, 'self-subsistent 
being’, and whether this does not imply a non-objectivated 
experience of God prior to and at the basis of all proof of the 
existence of God." Keller, pp. 291-92. As we shall see, it is 
precisely here that Balthasar differs from the Transcendental 
Thomists.
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known subjectively by intuitive reason and Christology would then 
be scientifically derived from that intuitive knowledge.” In 
addition, the metaphysical realities available through intuitive 
reason, in the fashion of Plotinus, composed "an organic universe 
of interrelated forms or souls." This is the model of "faith" and 
"reason" that the post-Kantians proposed. It assumed a certain con­
ception of grace and nature, and in its turn determined "the 
relation between revelation, apologetics, and positive speculative 
theology.... "l? Naturally, this more subjective intuitive approach 
to truth, gave the post-Kantian nonscholastics a greater "sensitiv­
ity to the intelligibility of history, tradition and community," 
and a greater "appreciation of the apologetics of immanence" than 
the Neo-Thomists.”
In the second half of the nineteenth century Neo-Thomism was 
revived to deal with the problems of faith and reason which the 
traditionalist's fideist approach and the more correlationist post- 
Kantian approach of Hermes, Gunther, the Tubingen theologians, and 
the ontologists had failed to resolve.” The Neo-Thomists were 
"reacting against the Cartesian subjective starting point in
1(Balthasar discusses the effects of this approach on method in 
Christology and the unsuccessful attempts of Schleiermacher and 
others to surmount rationalism and idealism in Theodrama, 
Theological Dramatic Theory. Volume III: The Dramatis Personae: The 
Person in Christ, trans. Graham Harrison. San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1992, pp. 59-101.
”McCool, Ninteenth Century. p. 13.
”Ibid.
”lbid., pp. 18-19.
Neo-Thomists took the position
15
epistemology and metaphysics.”1* 
that there was no way to correct and adapt current philosophies as 
they were all "vitiated by the fundamental defect of individual­
istic rationalism." McCool sums up their position as follows:
In modern philosophy reason was individual reason, separated 
from the Church's authoritative communication of Christian 
tradition. The separation of individual reason from the 
Church's authoritative communication of tradition had occurred 
within theology at the time of the Protestant Reformation. 
Descartes had extended it to Catholic philosophy. Rationalism 
and skepticism were the inevitable results of modern philos­
ophy's separation of itself from Catholic tradition. Therefore 
they could never be overcome until philosophy had been 
persuaded to retrace its steps, abandon the modern form which 
it had assumed with Descartes, and rebuild itself anew in 
vital continuity with the sound Christian philosophy of the 
scholastic period.
In reacting against the Cartesian subjective starting point, 
the Neo-Thomists "stressed the sensible origin of man’s conceptual 
knowledge." The intentional forms represented in categorical 
universal ideas, derived subjectively from sensible singular 
things, that were "the correlates of the changeless forms in 
sensible things themse1ves....The intelligibility of being was not 
grounded in the intelligible motion of the knowing mind" as it was 
for the post-Kant ians. "Nor was it grounded in an unobjective grasp 
of the moving mind's infinite Goal." For the Neo-thomists the 
"intelligibility of being was grounded in the contingent intelli­
gibility of sensible things themselves."12 It was a realist 
philosophy as opposed to the idealism of the post-Kantians. The
211 bid. , p . 11.
21 Ibid., p. 19.
Ibid., p. 11.
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Neo-Thomist theory of knowledge was that one came to know God and 
the mysteries contained in revealed truth through "the indirect and 
analogous concepts of a judging intellect." By abstraction and 
analogy one could come to know more what God was not rather than 
what Cod was, as St. Thomas had said. In sum,
Abstraction and analogy rather than direct and intuitive 
knowledge of God distinguished the scholastic approach to Cod 
from the approach of post-Cartesian philosophy and, despite 
its rapprochement with modern thought in the twentieth 
century, abstraction and analogy are still the cognitional 
characteristics of Thomistic metaphysics and theology.11 
The epistemologies of the post-Kantians and Neo-Thomists
differed in several ways. First, they differed on how noumenal 
reality, or theoretical and spiritual truth, is mediated to the
intellect. The Neo-Thomists insisted that humans can know such
reality only indirectly in a mediated fashion, through sensible 
realities. The post-Kantians said that such reality can be known 
directly by intuitive reason before it is conceptualized. Secondly, 
for post-Kantians the sensible realities, concepts, symbols and 
truths of the Christian faith have, at most, an instrumental or 
occasional role in mediating such intuitive knowledge.
The debate between the Neo-Thomists and the other schools 
became so emotional and difficult that the Church authority had to 
intervene.11 In 1870, The First Vatican Council, a Council on Faith 
and the Church, promulgated the doctrine of papal infallibility and 
approved the Apostolic Constitution Dei Filius. which "clarified
23Ibid., p. 10.
Ibid.
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and reaffirmed the elements of the Church's traditional teaching on
revelation and faith which had been obscured or called into 
question by nineteenth-century philosophers and theologians.”* 15 *
This was followed in 1879 by Leo XIII's disciplinary document, 
Aeterni Patris which "proclaimed the Church's official option for 
the Aristotelian method of St. Thomas in her philosophical and 
theological instruction. "l< The combined effects of these two 
documents, and Leo XIII's efforts to implement them, particularly 
Aeterni Patris. shaped the history of Catholic theology in the Neo- 
Thomist form until the Second Vatican Council.17 * * * *
The structure and content of the Constitution Dei Fi1ius is a
significant reflection of the issues "which had been obscured or 
called into question by the nineteenth century philosophers and 
theologians. Dei Fi1ius starts with the metaphysical issues. It 
clearly teaches that God is the creator from nothing of all created 
reality and is distinct from the world both in reality and 
essence.11 It thus reaffirmed Pius IX's condemnation of pantheism 
in the Sy1labus of Errors promulgated in 1864.15 Specific Canons 
anathematize those specific forms of pantheism which hold that
15Ibid., p. 216.
15Ibid. , p. 2.
’’ibid., p. 236-240.
uHenry Denziger, Denziger: The Sources of Catholic Dogma.
trans, by Roy J. Deferrari from the Thirtieth Edition of Enchiri­
dion Symboiorum. St. Louis, MO. and London: B. Herder Book Co.,
1957, 1782-1783; DS 3001-3002.
2’lbid., 1701; DS 2901.
18
created realities emanate from the divine substance, or that the 
divine essence becomes all things, or that God is universal or 
indefinite being.30 In Chapter 2 the Council takes up Revelation. 
It affirms the fact of positive supernatural revelation, the 
necessity of revelation given the supernatural end of humanity, the 
sources of revelation in scripture and Tradition, and the necessity 
of interpreting scripture in accord with the mind of the Church.31 *
Chapter 3 addresses the epistemological dimension of truth by 
taking up the issue of faith. The Council first defines faith as a 
supernatural virtue which requires grace to believe revelation on 
God’s authority, rather than on the intrinsic truth of revela­
tion.33 However, it then affirms that faith is consonant with 
reason, and that it is itself a gift of God, including the 
preliminary faith needed for justification.33 It then declares that
30Ibid. , 1804; DS 3024.
31Ibid., 1785-1788; DS 3004-3007.
3l". . . faith, which is 'the beginning of salvation,’ the
Catholic Church holds to be a supernatural virtue. By it, with the 
inspiration and help of God’s grace, we believe that what He has 
revealed is true, not because of its intrinsic truth seen by the 
light of natural reason, but because of the authority of God 
revealing it, who can neither deceive nor be deceived;" (my 
emphasis) Ibid., 1789; DS 3008. But the question remains as to how 
we perceive God’s authority at work in persons or events. Vatican 
I points to the manifestation of God’s power and knowledge in 
miracles and prophecy, but these are "exterior proofs" given to 
reason so that "the obedience of our faith be nevertheless in 
harmony with reason." These "divine facts" are "joined to the 
interior helps of the Holy Spirit" and "manifestly display the 
omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God." Consequently, "they are 
the most certain signs of the divine revelation, adapted to the 
intelligence of all men." (DS 3009)
33Ibid., 1789-1791 ; DS 3008-3010.
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divine and Catholic faith requires belief that revelation is to be 
found "in the written word of God and in tradition, and those which 
are proposed by the Church, either in a solemn pronouncement or in 
her ordinary and universal teaching power...."u There is a duty to 
embrace the true faith and persevere in it. God gives the Church as 
an external aid and supernatural virtue as an internal aid to come 
to true faith and persevere in it.55
Finally, in the fourth Chapter the Council addresses the 
thorny question of the relationship between faith and reason, 
natural and supernatural knowledge of God. It affirms the two-fold 
order of knowledge, distinct both in principle and in their object.
It then teaches that faith is above reason and leads reason to
penetrate revealed mysteries by the analogy of being and the
analogy of faith, without there being any contradiction between
what is reasonable and what is proposed by faith. In a key section
it describes the reciprocal relationship between faith and reason:
... not only can faith and reason never be at variance with 
one another, but they also bring mutual help to each other, 
since right reasoning demonstrates the basis of faith and, 
illumined by its light, perfects the knowledge of divine 
things, while faith frees and protects reason from errors and 
provides it with manifold knowledge.
Scholastic theology had a strong influence in the shaping of 
Dei Filius' approach to faith and reason, and its assumptions about 
grace and nature. These issues were a major source of the conflict
HIbid., 1792; DS 3011.
’’ibid., 1793-1794, DS 3012-3014.
HIbid., 1799; DS 3019.
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between the post-Kantians and the Neo-Scholastics. They were 
embattled over which approach could best handle the Catholic 
teaching on these issues. Of course, the underlying presuppositions 
regarding theory of knowledge, anthropology, and metaphysics had to 
be clarified in the process.* 3’
The Constitution rejected both the fideist positions of 
traditionalists and semi-rationalist positions of some nonscholas­
tic theologians. It rejected the fideist position that no knowledge 
of God was possible apart from revelation31 and defended the 
reasonableness of the assent of faith against the "blind leap” 
approach of the Protestant pietist tradition.33 Scholars maintain 
that the post-Reformation thesis of a "pure nature," devised to 
protect the gratuity of grace, influenced both the drafting of the 
constitution and its subsequent interpretation. The constitution 
could be read as assuming this particular theology of the relation­
ship between nature and grace. It is said to have "encouraged the 
development of a nonhistorical Aristotelian scientific theology in 
the post-conciliar church."33
37McCool, Nineteenth Century. p. 14.
3,"Fideism" seems to have become one of those pejorative terms 
used to dismiss the viewpoint of anyone who approaches Revelation 
from a faith perspective. For a historical definition see S.A. 
Matczak, "Fideism." New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 5. New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 908-910; and, Paul Poupard, "Fideism." 
Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology. Vol. 2. New York: 
Herder and Herder; London: Burns & Oates, Ltd., 1970, pp. 335-337.
’’ibid., pp. 216, 217, 220.
“ibid., p. 221.
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This scientific theology assumed two distinct ways of knowing, 
based on the abstract, non-existential, possible distinction 
between pure nature and supernature. First, there was the natural 
knowledge of God one could have through reason. Second, was the 
supernatural knowledge one could have through grace. The result of 
these assumptions about how one might come to faith led to a 
scientific apologetics based on proof of the divine origin and 
truth of the gospel by signs and wonders and rational historical 
argument. Once one had come by grace of the Holy Spirit to the 
assent of faith and been justified, one was provided with the first 
principles which could then be developed rationally by speculative 
reasoning/1 McCool sums up the effect of scholasticism’s ascendan­
cy by way of Dei Fi1ius and Pastor Aeternus as follows:
Therefore the definitive victory of the neo-Thomists over 
their post-Kantians rivals in the closing quarter of the 
nineteenth century resulted in a tension between Roman 
Thomistic theology and subjective, historical modern thought 
that led to the painful confrontation of the modernist crisis, 
and which Maritain endeavored to resolve through his brilliant 
development of the Thomism of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas 
before it broke out again in the controversy over the New 
Theology a decade before the opening of the Second Vatican 
Counc i1 .“
The crucial question is how one comes to make the act of judging as 
true, that which is present in the object of faith, God in Christ. 
Does the certitude of faith precede, come with, or follow the 
judgment of faith which comes from God's authority? Precisely how 
does God's authority become the motive of faith? This is not clear.
“ibid., p. 223.
“ibid., p. 13.
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Scholastic theology held that the formal object of faith is 
God Himself or First Truth/3
In the actual economy of salvation in which man is elevated to 
the supernatural order, the first thing that he knows super- 
naturally is God Himself, the First Truth in essendo, that is, 
His divinity, His innermost life .... Although First Truth 
and the Deity as It is in Itself are abstract theological 
expressions of a kind that theologians often prefer to 
concrete ones because of their exactitude, they nevertheless 
mean God in the concrete, subsisting in three Divine Persons, 
as these, together with the sum of all divine perfections, 
have been revealed to man. Consequently God, the First Truth 
ontologically, is not only the First Truth believed . . . but 
also the formal object of faith in all the truths and myster­
ies that have been revealed. For, as St. Thomas Aquinas 
pointed out, "nothing comes under faith except in relation to 
God" .... This is the commnon and constant doctrine of the 
Church. The first article of faith, with which in one form or 
another all the symbols begin and on which all the other 
articles are based, is: I believe in God, One and Triune."
In the act of recognition of God that is central to the act of
faith and the motive for it, both the intellect and the will are 
involved, but the intellect submits to God’s se1f-disclosure by an 
act of the will. In other words, because of the nature of the 
object (God), the intellect is incapable on its own of making the 
act of judgment of God's credibilty which intrinisically satisfies 
it. God as object will always be greater than the intellect can 
know or comprehend sufficiently to intrinsically satisfy it. The 
human finite intellect has an infinite capacity which allows it to 
know God but can make a judgment of credibility which intrinsically 
satisfies it, only by evidence which it sees with respect to a * 5
>3This discussion is based primarily on the article by T. 
Urdanoz, "Faith. 3. Theology of." New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol.
5. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 798-799.
Ibid., p. 798-99.
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created reality. The intellect in judging who it is who is 
expressing their person in Jesus' life-form, is first of all 
judging a "who" and not a "what." Who is Jesus, not what is the 
ontological nature of God's being is the question. A functional 
judgment (who) is being made of an ontological object. While 
Catholic theology recognizes the subjective dimensions of faith 
(fides qua), "[i]ts concept of faith is primarily objective, 
looking more to who and what is believed.God Himself, as the 
ultimate inner motive of faith, "is to be understood as distinct 
from the objective evidence on which natural, and even religious, 
knowledge of truth may be based.
The Scholastic view was that the mind conformed itself by the 
power of the will to the reality of God's authority present in 
Christ through the weight of the divine objective evidence as seen 
in the light of grace. Faith knowing of Christ through sensible 
reality was upheld, but based on a supernatural faith-knowing which 
was graced assent to propositions about Christ on the authority of 
God, as perceived in the evidence God gave of Christ's divine 
nature and origin. As we will see later, Balthasar calls this 
approach "supernatural rationalism." There was no adequate 
theological and philosophical explanation available to explain how 
a personal faith-experience of Christ's personal reality could be 
mediated by the Word and the Spirit, through historical Revelation
‘’ibid., p. 798.
“ibid., p. 799.
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as borne through history by the Church to the present. Important 
theologians of the twentieth century, to which we now turn, attempt 
to resolve this issue primarily through the approach of Transcen­
dental Thomism.
General Theological Background- 20th Century
According to Gerald McCool the history of twentieth century 
scholasticism can be divided into four stages. The first is the 
period from the turn of the century up to World War I. Second is 
the period between World War I and II. The third is the period 
between World War II and Vatican II. The final period is that after 
Vatican 11 ?’
At the turn of the century, prior to McCool’s first stage, the 
Neo-Thomist Scholastic revival had taken a strong hold on the 
direction of Catholic theology. In its conflicts during the 
nineteenth century it had been forced to clarify its epistemology, 
metaphysics, anthropology, and methodology in a way that gave it a
greater systematic coherence and unity. But there was more to be 
done: "scholasticism and the philosophical theology of St. Thomas 
had yet to be clearly distinguished from each other." In addition, 
they had not yet seen that the approaches of Thomas and Bonaventure 
were not compatible, nor had they seen that Thomas* epistemology 
and metaphysics were essentially different from that of his
uIbid., pp. 241-242, and Gerald A. McCool, S.J. "Twentieth- 
Century Scholasticism." The Journal of Religion (1978), pp. S198- 
S221, at S198-199.
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commentators, Cajetan and John of St. Thomas?* Basically, the Neo- 
Thomists had not done their historical homework. This deficiency
would radically affect the terms of the future controversy over
"the new theology." McCool sums up what was missing as follows:
The radical uniqueness of Thomas' metaphysics of existence was 
largely ignored. As a result, the distinctive character of 
Thomas' philosophy of man and God was also missed. The special 
role which abstraction and the judgment play in Thomas' 
epistemology was not appreciated. Neither was the distinction 
between ratio and intellectus in Thomas' metaphysics of 
knowledge.... Furthermore, the intelligible connection which 
links Thomas' metaphysics of God to his personal religious 
experience was not observed, much less exploited. In this 
misleading presentation Thomism could not fail to give the 
impression of being a highly rationalistic system....
... The writing and teaching of scholastic philosophers 
and theologians displayed a markedly negative attitude toward 
anything like a philosophy of intuition. Yet philosophies of 
intuition were the spearhead of the philosophical revolt 
against positivistic scientism in the early 1900s?*
Any hope for some rapprochement between Neo-Thomism and modern 
philosophy was dashed with the advent of Modernism in the first 
period before World War I. In their attempts to find a way to bring 
the knowledge of Christ through Revelation to the modern world, the 
modernists denied that scholasticism was capable of expressing 
revelation in the way which the modern world needed. This posture 
"struck at the heart of Leo XIII's program for theological, 
educational, and social reform."* 5* The Church reacted strongly to 
the new approach to exegesis, theology and doctrine. The Biblical
Commission rendered severe decrees to restrict the use of scientif­
**McCool, Nineteenth Century. pp. 20, 243. 
•’ibid., p. 244.
5* I b i d . , p. 247.
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ic methods. Modernism was condemned by the encyciicai Pascendi and 
the decree Lamentabi 1 i. The Magisterium saw two dangerous errors at 
the heart of Modernism. "First was the metaphysics of "becoming.* 
The modernists had abandoned the metaphysics of being .... They 
had replaced it with the evolutionary temporality of Hegel and 
Bergson." Secondly, "they had given up the scholastic notion of 
truth." The scholastic view was that truth was arrived at by the 
judgement of the mind conforming itself to reality. "The judgement 
of the mind unites a stable universal to a changing singular by the 
"is* of the objective affirmation. The scholastic epistemology of 
the conceptual judgement... also shows that being, esse. is the 
efficient and exemplary cause of truth?1 The problem with this 
approach was that it could explain the judgment of the mind 
conforming itself to reality only in a propositional, highly 
rationalistic manner. At the most fundamental level, the crucial 
question was how the reality of Christ, and God in Christ, could be 
present to the mind in each age with God's authority so as to 
permit the act of faith. Modernism sought to apply the idealist and 
romantic subjective solution.
After Modernism, Thomism was viewed as the bulwark to defend 
the Church against modern errors in epistemology and metaphysics. 
Thomism now defined itself against "positivism, German Idealism, 
and Bergsonian philosophy." At issue were the "metaphysics of being 
and the epistemology of the concept." The epistemology, metaphysics
Ibid., p. 248.
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and theology of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas became the prevail­
ing basis of seminary education.
The Thomist revival in France took its initial impetus from 
Cardinal Mercier (1851-1926) of Belgium. Shortly after Aeterni 
Patris he established a higher Philosophical Institute at the 
University of Louvain. But Thomism in France really flourished in 
the second Scholastic period between WW I (1914-18) and WW II 
(1939-45), due to the work of Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson and 
Pdre Antonin-Gilbert Serti1langes.n
The Neo-Thomist school produced theologians of great ability. 
Such names as Cardinal Billot, de la Taille, Garrigou-Lagrange, 
Gardeil, Lebreton, Grandmaison, and Marin-Sola testify to the 
profound influence the French Neo-Thomists had on the Church. 
Ambroise Gardeil (1859-1931) focused his interest on the theory of 
knowledge. His "aim was to defend, and repr istinate, Thomism in 
relation, first and foremost to Kant's critiques, but also with an 
eye to the voluntarist and pragmatist tendencies of the latest 
philosophy of the day.* 53 Of course Blondel was the most important 
representative of those with the voluntarist tendencies whom 
Gardeil called Neo-Scotist. In opposition to the Modernists like 
Loisy and Tyrrell, Gardeil developed his theory of the development 
of dogma. His theory was, of course, based on his epistemology and 
consequent theology of the act of faith and theology of revelation.
53Ibid., pp. 20-22; McCool, Nineteenth Century. pp. 251-255.
53Aidan Nichols, O.P. From Newman to Congar: The Idea of 
Doctrinal Development from the Victorians to the Second Vatican 
Counci 1. Edinburgh: T. it T. Clark, 1990, p. 156.
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Basically, it depended on the Neo-Thomist view that truth is the 
conformity of the mind to reality, the ability of the mind to make 
"absolute affirmations."5* In opposition to the post-Kantians and 
Modernists he acknowledges the reality of intuition but holds that 
"our intuitive powers are only actualized through being receptive 
to a reality other than themselves."* 55 In other words, he does not 
admit direct intuition of metaphysical realities, only a mediated 
intuition through sensible realities. The experience of revelation 
by the Apostles then has to have an objective cognitive content. 
Despite the fact of interior inspiration, their experience is truly 
revelation because it has its "guaranteed normative bearing." God's 
revelation "must come to light above all in our faculty for making 
absolute, universally valid, affirmations about the real." It 
leaves them in possession of "a determinate truth which i s 
indefinitely transmissible."55 The key point, for our purposes, is 
to notice the way in which his Neo-Thomistic epistemology, while 
retaining the necessary connection with reality and importance of 
propositional truth, sought a via media to recognize the role of 
the intuition and subjective religious experience of God in Christ. 
The religious experience of the Apostles provided them with first
order or second order truths such as one finds in the Creeds. Later
reflection moves to different kinds of concepts to explain and
formulate the first and second order affirmations. Marin-Sola also
5*Ibid., pp. 161-162.
55Ibid., pp. 162-163.
551 bid. , p . 164.
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acknowledged that there must be an "affective way" as well as a 
logical way for dogma to develop.* 5’ The strict Neo-Thomists, called 
the "Logicists," operated on a "concepts only" theory of knowledge, 
and held that dogma not only must have a logical connection with 
early dogma and revelation but that it could only develop logically 
also.5* The Logicists were opposed both by Gardeil and his contem­
porary, Leonce de Grandmaison. Both these Neo-Thomist's were 
willing to recognize the role of intuition in some limited form.55 
Unfortunately, they were unable to ground the role of the intuition 
in anything other than cognition of first principles. This is the 
problem that I believe Balthasar's approach solves.
Despite the fact that after Modernism the Thomism of Cajetan 
and John of St. Thomas became the prevailing theology taught in 
seminaries, there were those who were still unconverted. Prior to 
the condemnation of Modernism in 1907, from about 1890 Henri 
Bergson had become a dominant figure on the French scene.” His 
"evolutionary and vitalistic theories influenced a host of his 
contemporaries, and he prepared the way for the ... popularity of 
Existential ism. "(> In this first period before WW I, in France, 
Blondel published in 1896 his Letter on Apologetics which explained 
the methodology used in his thesis, L'Act ion. "Blondel's apolog­
”lbid., p. 183.
’’ibid.
’’ibid., pp. 186-187.
5*Connolly, p. 25.
51 Ibid.
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etics of immanence presented Christian revelation as the only 
meaning-giving answer to the dynamic exigencies of the human will. 
Thus it provided a point of contact with a philosophical community 
whom the Church’s traditional apologetics could not even inter-
In 1908 Pierre Rousselot published L’ Intellectualisme de S. 
Thomas which showed that St. Thomas' intellectus. was an intuitive
function of the mind. It was an "essential element in St. Thomas'
own epistemology and metaphysics. Far from being the highest object 
of human knowledge, the concept of the ratio, the discursive 
intellect, in St. Thomas' opinion was no more that the deficient 
substitute for a missing intuition.'43 Rousselot believed that a
(lIbid., p. 250.
<3"Thus the 'three acts of the mind' are (1) understanding a 
quiddity, form, essence, nature, or 'whatness'. . . by 'simple 
apprehension' (which is not yet either true or false); (2) 
judgment, composing or dividing two such concepts (judgments alone 
are either true or false); and (3) reasoning, proceeding from one 
judgment as premise to another as conclusion. Acts of reasoning are 
not either true or false; they are logically valid (if the 
conclusion necessarily follows from the premises) or invalid (if it 
does not)." Summa of the Summa. edited and annotated by Peter 
Kreeft. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990, p. 328. Intellectus or 
understanding is the simple apprehension by abstraction of the 
universal form from the sensory phantasm according to St. Thomas. 
But the simple fact of existence or "esse" seems to be an intuitive 
act of judgment that is direct and immediate without abstraction. 
It is a judgment of an act not a form. I can judge that something 
"is" without knowing what it is. In fact, the act of abstraction 
depends on such a prior judgment, as the act of being gives reality 
to a form. If we move to the level of persons, what is the nature 
of the understanding and judgment by which I know another through 
their conscious and unconscious self-expression? Here another type 
of "form" which expresses the essence of their personhood, while 
concealing it from direct and immediate perception, appears. But it 
would seem that an intuitive ability of the intellect is operating 
in our judging the meaning and significance of another's person­
hood. Since, each person is unique by definition, intuition by
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clear understanding of St. Thomas’ view of the intuitive mind could 
resolve the apparent conflict between an objective, scientific 
apologetics, and the dogma that the whole act of faith, both the 
initial assent, conversion, and justification depended on grace. 
Rousselot’s proposed solution, found in Les Yeux de la foi. 
maintains that the intellectus. the intuitive mind, can be modified 
freely by the will before one makes a judgment on the level of the 
rat io. This is a description of the process by which rationaliza­
tion or denial might take place and would profoundly effect the 
ability of the mind to "allow an intelligibility to appear to it on 
the level of the judgment." A related concept that was important to 
the act of faith, the theology of revelation, and the development 
of dogma was Rousselot's concept of loving knowing or sympathetic 
knowledge.* 4* This is "a movement of the intel lectus ♦ . . ♦ The 
influence of connaturality and the attitude of sympathetic love" in 
the process of faith, "can account for the reasonableness and 
freedom of the supernatural act of faith."45 If he were right,then 
the gap between Thomistic theology and those based on philosophies 
of intuition was smaller than Thomists were willing to acknowl­
edge.44 Rousselot's thought will surface in Henri de Lubac's work
abstraction of a universal seems self-contradictory. I believe this 
has important implications for the act of faith, the act by which 
we recognize the formal object of faith, God in Christ.
4*Nichols, From Newman to Congar. p. 198.
45Gerald A. McCool, S.J., From Unity to Plural ism: The Internal 
Evolution of Thomism. New York: Fordham University Press, 1989, p. 
77.
Ibid., pp. 250-251.
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which contributed to the New Theology controversy after WWII, and 
also in Balthasar's thought.
Rousselot died tragically in WW I. But the influence of 
Rousselot and Blondel "remained a powerful force among the French 
Jesuits."* In his thought Rousselot had been influenced consider­
ably by another Jesuit, Joseph Marechal?1 In the period of 
scholasticism between WW I an WW II three distinct streams of 
Thomism emerged; those of Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson and 
Joseph Marechal.
Jacques Maritain brilliantly developed traditional Thomistic 
metaphysics in his "Creative Intuition which was an in-depth study 
of the role of the imagination in a Thomistic theory of knowl­
edge.While Maritain maintained the epistemology of the concept, 
he also respected the nonconceptual knowledge of the artist and 
mystic. "No other Thomist ... realized more completely Leo XIII's 
hopes for scholasticism as a unifier of human exper ience.
Etienne Gilson was fascinated by medieval philosophy. His many 
years of research led him to the conclusion that a common scholas­
tic philosophy had never existed in the Middle Ages. The epistemol­
ogy and metaphysics of Bonaventure, Thomas and Duns Scotus were so 
opposed as to require distinct theologies. Gilson himself preferred 
Thomas. Gilson discovered that in Thomas' thought the notion of
^McCool, Nineteenth Century. p. 251. 
uMcCool, Unity to Pluralism, pp. 61-63. 
^McCool, Nineteenth Century. p. 253. 
,#Ibid., p. 253.
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being is acquired through a double operation of the judgment and
could not be grasped through an intuition of the imagination as
Maritain thought.71 The first judgment in Thomas' thought is that
something is. It is a judgment of existence, a judgment that
something has esse. has being. This judgment that something has
being is the judgment of an act, for being is not a form. Rather it
is the act which confers reality upon form. This insight led him to
the conclusion that Thomas' philosophy is not a Christianized
Aristotelianism. It is "an integral part of a theology which must
begin with the Christian God and descend to his universe following
the theological order."71 The Thomism of Gilson was fundamentally
at odds with the Thomism of Maritain. But it was even more opposed
to Blondel*s phenomenology of the human spirit.
Blondel was trying to show that the dynamic exigence of the 
human spirit must lead a philosopher to affirm God's exis­
tence.... Should he deny it, his very denial would entail a 
lived contradiction between his verbal denial and the vital 
drive of the human spirit. Gilson denied that any such lived 
contradiction could be proved.73
Influenced by Blondel and Rousselot, Marechal constructed a 
five volume dialogue (Le Point de depart de la m£taphysique)
between St. Thomas and Kant. His thesis was that had Kant been
consistent in his own method, and remembered that the mind's act of 
knowledge was not static, but was instead a dynamic operation with 
a tendency toward an end, he would have ended up with a metaphysics
71Ibid. , pp. 253-254
7IIbid. , P- 255.
73Ibid. , P- 256.
34
identical with that of St. Thomas. For, according to Marechal, the
end of the movement of the mind in knowing, is the existence of
Unlimited Being, as its a priori condition of possibility. Thus he
would have come to the starting point of a realistic metaphysics.
It would have been identical with that of Thomas Aquinas
...for the a priori condition of possibility for every 
speculative judgment is the existence of the Infinite Pure Act 
of Esse as the term of the mind's dynamism. . . . The extramental 
correlate of the objective judgment must be matter, form, and 
existence... But matter, form, and existence are the metaphys­
ical constituents of the sensible singular in the philosophy 
of Saint Thomas.’*
So, in the period between the wars three distinct Thomisms 
emerge. Each differed from the other about the role of the judgment 
in epistemology, the abstraction of being, and the nature of 
Thomas’ philosophical theology.’5
"The New Theology"
In 1943 Pope Pius XII issued "monumental encyclicals that 
contributed force, direction and encouragement to the religious 
movement in France: the theological Mystici Corporis Christi and 
the scriptural Divino Afflante Spiritu. The French received these 
as encouragement and a "breath of fresh air."’* The different 
streams of French thought, the theological renewal, existentialism, 
post-Hegelianism, the influence of Marxism and Socialism, and the 
post war conditions of the time were combining to create a mandate
’*Ibid., pp. 256-257.
’’ibid., p. 257.
’^Connolly, p. 175.
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for the Church to open to the world. Connolly describes the situa­
tion as follows:
The best description of the French Church after the war would 
be to state that she was seized by the missionary spirit. As 
the onus of the occupation was lifted, the French Church stood 
marked by certain qualities: a theological movement rooted in 
the sources of theology, and preoccupied with those notes 
sounded by the Magisterium; a dynamic Catholic Action move­
ment, many of whose members had shared the wartime horrors 
with non-Catholics; some extremely capable and enlightened 
members of the Episcopate, Lienart of Lille, Gerlier of Lyon, 
Weber of Strasbourg and Suhard of Paris; men in authority of 
a fairly liberal turn of mind; and, finally, thinkers and 
writers of great intellectual caliber, open to the intellectu­
al currents of the modern world.”
The "new theology" controversy emerged out of this context. 
Already, in February 1942, the term "nouvelle theologie" had 
appeared in an article by Mgr. Parente in the Osservatore Romano in
relation to two Dominican writers.
In 1941 the Jesuits at Fourvidre, near Lyons, started the
series Sources Chretiennes. "a series of Patristic translations
with the original texts, printed with notes and an extended 
introduction."” In the same year they also started, Theologie: 
Etudes publiees sous la direction de la faculte de theologie S.J. 
de Lyon-Fourvifere. "a series of monographs covering a variety of 
subjects from the patristic studies of Danielou and Mondesert to 
the historical perspectives of de Lubac and the speculative 
analyses of Fessard and Mouroux."” This effort was building on the
’’ibid., p. 177.
’’Robert F. Harvanek, "Philosophical Pluralism and Catholic 
Orthodoxy." Thought 25 (March 1950)96: 21-51, at 23.
’’ibid., p. 24.
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liturgical and biblical revival which had been in progress since 
the 1890's. It had been provoked by the profound awareness of the 
need to find a way to relate Christianity to the modern world. 
Danielou and the others involved saw a profound correspondence 
between patristic theology and "pivotal modern categories as 
history, human solidarity, and personal subjectivity" which they 
saw as forming "the warp and woof of patristic thought.
While France was the center of this theological activity, the 
"new theology" was not limited to France. It included such Belgian 
and German thinkers as Emile Mersch, Dorn Odo Casel, Romano 
Guardini, Karl Adam, and Dorn Anselm Stolz. In France it was led 
primarily by the Jesuits at Lyons and the Dominicans of Le 
Saulchoir. It included Henri de Lubac, Jean Dani€lou, Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, Yves Congar, Marie-Dominique Chenu, and Louis Bouyer.11 
Those involved differed in many respects and did not share one 
theological system.
What united this diverse group were the convictions that I) 
theology had to speak to the Church's present situation and 
that 2) the key to theology's relevance to the present lay in 
the creative recovery of its past. In other words, they all 
saw clearly that the first step to what later came to be known
as aggiornamento had to be ressourcement-- a rediscovery of
the riches of the Church's two-thousand year treasury, a 
return to the headwaters of the Christian tradition.11
For them return to the sources was a creative hermeneutical
exercise in which the burning questions of the present were asked
“d'Ambrosio, pp. 539-540.
“ibid., p. 531.
“ibid., p. 532.
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of the past.*5 This ressourcement was not simply theological 
historical scholarship, but an attempt to return to the sources of 
the Church's vitality, to the "fountain-head of dynamic spiritual 
life which never runs dry."’* Their goal was the revitalization of 
the life of the Church and "a recentering in the person of Christ 
and in his Paschal mystery." They wanted to establish "a spiritual 
and intellectual communion with Christianity in its most vital 
moments as transmitted to us in its classic texts, a communion 
which would nourish, invigorate, and rejuvenate twentieth-century 
Catholicism."*5 Here, we see clearly the search for a way to 
rediscover the faith-knowing of Christ evidenced in the patristic 
sources, and the search for a way to explain that faith-knowing in
contemporary terms.
The return to the sources did not mean that these theologians 
rejected or despised St. Thomas or the medieval period. Indeed many 
were committed Thomists, but not committed in the same way the neo­
scholastics were. Several of the Lyons Jesuits were committed to a 
critical re-investigation of the Scholastic tradition. They stood 
on the shoulders of their predecessors like Rousselot and Mardchal. 
The debate initiated by these theologians had been carried forward 
by J.F. Bonnefoy, R. Draguet, and L. Chariier. What they found was 
that the rigid, non-historical and rationalistic character of much
131 bid.
’* I b i d. , p. 537. 
’’ibid., p. 538.
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neo-Scholastic thinking and "conclusion" theology did not genuinely
reflect St. Thomas. Thomas emerges as one who was "in substantial
continuity with the positive theology of the Fathers."” Neo-
Scholastism, on the other hand, had modified St. Thomas through
commentators like Cajetan, and John of St. Thomas. His thought had
been further corrupted by Neo-Thomism which had added "heavy doses
of Suarezianism and Baftezianism (not to mention [Christian] Wolff
and Descartes)."17 What the ressourcement theologians sought was
not a restoration or repristination of St. Thomas or patristic
theology, but a capturing of their spirit and methodology.”
What Thomas and the Fathers had done was to distill the 
essence of the tradition for their respective generations. In 
their organic conception of the unity of theology and life as 
well as in their hermeneutical effort to rearticulate tradi­
tional doctrine in the language of their contemporaries, these 
classical theologians offer today's Church a paradigm of 
authentic theological method.”
The debate with the Neo-Thomists which eventually led to 
Humani Generis began in earnest in 1946, with Danielou's publica­
tion of a provocative article: "Les Orientations Presentes de la 
Pensee Religieuse." In this article Danielou attempted to describe 
the current theological situation and the kind of theology which 
the times demanded. It reflects the discontent which many French 
theologians felt in the 1940's. He indicts scholasticism for being
“ibid. , PP . 542-543.
”lbid. , P. 543. quoting Gilson. Letters, 33 n. 6.
”lbid. , P- 545.
”I bid. , P- 547.
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disengaged from the currents of contemporary thought. In fact, they 
were mired in Greek philosophical categories which were incapable 
of engaging the modern world. Scholastism lacked any historical 
sense, while history from Hegel to Bergson has been a central 
category of modern thought. "In an existentialist world, it remains 
resolutely essentialist and objectivist, oblivious to human 
subjectivity.... [It] is cut off from the daily life of the people 
of God....and is thus incapable of offering them spiritual and 
doctrinal nourishment."
This article stimulated a vigorous attack by the Neo-Thomists
in the Revue Thomiste in Paris and the Angelicum in Rome. It became 
clear that the "real point at issue was the nature of the develop­
ment of doctrine, philosophical and theological, and the position 
of St. Thomas within that development."’1 The rebuttal articles 
sought to defend the identity of the modern Thomist theology of the 
Garriqou-Lagrange and Maritain school, with that of St. Thomas him­
self. What the Neo-Thomists feared was that the "new theology" was 
headed toward theological relativism.’2 What the crux of the debate 
revolved around were issues of nature and grace which involved St. 
Thomas' metaphysics, anthropology and epistemology. It had become 
evident that the pure nature, supernature concepts of the Neo- 
Thomists, foundational to their two-order theory of knowledge, 
theology of the act of faith, logicist doctrinal development, and
MIbid., pp. 534-535.
^Harvanek, p. 25.
Ibid.
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scientific apologetics, were not to be found in the medieval 
Doctors or the Fathers.’3
Two important works became the focus of the debate. In 1944 
Henri Bouillard had published a remarkable study on St. Thomas' 
theology of justification, Conversion et grace chez S. Thomas 
d'Aquin.” And, in 1946, the same year as Danielou's article, Henri 
de Lubac published Surnature1.” Bouillard’s study was purely 
historical, but in investigating St. Thomas' views on justification
Bouillard included some reflections on the historical nature of
theology. In comparing St. Thomas' view on justification with those 
of the Fathers, Bouillard noticed the Aristotelian character of 
Thomas' thought which was absent in the Fathers. He concluded that 
the "history of theological notions shows...that the constant and 
invariable affirmation of a truth...is found expressed in different 
notions and schemes in different times and places." There is, 
however, in the evolution of theology "an absolute of affirmation,
an absolute which determines and modifies new notions to fit its
meaning." These affirmations include scripture and Tradition, and 
the principles and truth necessary for dogma.
De Lubac*s work is a marshalling of the evidence that "none of 
the Fathers or medieval Doctors ever proposed the possibility of a
’JMcCool, Unity to Plural ism, pp. 200-203.
wHenri Bouillard. Conversion et grace chez S. Thomas d'Aquin. 
Paris: Aubier, 1944.
’’McCool, Unity to Plural ism. p. 203.
’‘ibid., pp. 26-27.
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'state of pure nature.'" Patristic or medieval theology contains no 
idea of a theoretical double finality for human nature, one purely 
natural and the other supernatural. The image of God as found in 
the Fathers and medieval Doctors means the actual image of God in 
which we were created, not a possible image of pure nature. 
Likeness to God meant human nature as deified by grace and having 
an existential desire for the Beatific vision. But de Lubac also
points out that the gratuity of that grace is insisted on by the
Fathers and Doctors. Humans have a desire for the Beatific vision
because that is the end for which they are created, but the actual 
gift of that grace is still a gift and not something received
because one is entitled to it.
De Lubac' s claim that for St. Thomas the only actual end of 
humans is a supernatural one was verified by other Thomists, and
Bouillard's claims were not all that radical. But these books were
provocative and disturbing to conservative Neo-Thomists. Bouill- 
ard's study, while historical, suggested that changing concepts 
preserved immutable truth. Thus, he "proposed an epistemology and 
metaphysics that introduced history and evolution into the very 
structure of theology itself." It was one thing for Gilson to show 
historical development and pluralism in the Middle Ages, but it was 
another for Bouillard to claim such development was necessary as a 
matter of principle.”
,?McCool, Uni ty to Pluralism, pp. 203-204.
Ibid., pp. 210-211.
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De Lubac was accused of Baianism and denying the gratuity of 
grace and the supernatural order. Jean Marie Le Blond had reminded 
the Neo-Thomists that even on their own assumptions regarding 
analogy of being and matter and form, theological pluralism should 
be possible. The Neo-Thomists denied that St. Thomas’ thought 
contained any distinction between signification and representation 
in the judgment that could provide the basis for pluralism. For 
them only one conceptual framework was possible.
The debate raged back and forth between the "new theology" 
theologians and the Neo-Thomists. The principal adversaries were M. 
Michel Labourdette, the editor of the Revue Thomiste. Garrigou- 
Lagrange in the Angelicum. and Guerard des Lauriers in L'Ann6e 
TheologiqueHowever, the Neo-Thomists were influential in Rome. 
In 1946, Pope Pius XII, mentioned the "new theology" in an address 
to the General Congregation of the Society of Jesus. Likewise, in 
an address to the General Chapter of the Dominicans, it was brought 
up again.* 10
The "new theology" debate came to a swift end. In 1950, Pius 
XII issued his Encyclical, Humani Generis. It warned theologians 
against the dangers of historicism and relativism. The Dominican 
and Jesuit superiors silenced their theologians and transferred 
some to other places. The effect was temporary, however. De Lubac 
and Congar were very influential at Vatican II, Chenu "remained an
^Harvanek, p.27.
1OH. Rondet. "Nouvelle Theologie." Sacramentum Mundi: An 
Encylopedia of Theology. vol. 4. New York: Herder and Herder; 
London: Burns & Oates, Ltd., 1970, pp. 234-235, at 234.
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internationally respected historian or medieval theology, and 
Bouillard had a "distinguished teaching career at the Institut 
Catholique in Paris." Danielou and de Lubac eventually were made 
Cardinals in recognition of their contributions to theology.
McCool sums up the situation after Vatican II:
During and after the Second Vatican Council, the "new theolo­
gians" were counted among the leading theologians in the 
Church and their disciples became the leaders of the genera­
tion of theologians who succeeded them. Hans Urs von Balthasar 
was a student of de Lubac' s. Karl Rahner emerged from the 
tradition of Marechal, and Bernard Lonergan, who claimed to 
have learned Marechaliansm "by osmosis," carried on the 
tradition of Rousselot's intellectualism by grounding his new 
method in theology on the act of understanding, the immediate 
act of insight which Rousselot claimed was St. Thomas' ideal 
act of intellectual knowledge. As the history of theology 
after Vatican II was to show, the future lay with the "new 
theologians," and the form of Thomism which Le Blond used to 
vindicate the place of history and pluralism in theology is 
the form of Thomism which survived the demise of the Neo- 
Thomist movement in the theologies of Rahner and Lonergan.
The "new theology debate" was the culmination of the 
development within Thomism itself which gradually led to its 
decrease as a single organized movement. The emergence of 
pluralism in its epistemology and metaphysics challenged its 
internal coherence as a unitary speculative system.181
Conclusions
The central problem since Vatican I has been the problem of 
the role of faith and reason in the act of faith in Christ, and in
God in Christ. Of course, this involved on the foundational level 
the nature of the relationship between God and created reality. How 
could human beings receive and perceive revelation in Christ? By 
faith or by reason, or by both? If both, what were the respective
roles of faith and reason? What was the nature of the faith
1,lMcCool, Uni ty to Plural ism, p. 225.
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perception? Was it simply subjective and intuitive, or was 
mediated in some way by historicai reality? What established the 
authority of God which was the motive for faith? Did one have any 
knowledge of God in and through the act of faith, or did one just 
have to surrender to God's evidence if one were to act in a 
rational and prudent manner? Did intuition or religious experience 
have any role to play in the act of faith? As we have seen, these 
issues converged in the "new theology" controversy especially 
around the question of the relationship of nature and grace.
Theologians struggled to found faith in Christ and Revelation 
on some kind of intuitive knowledge, so as to avoid a purely 
rationalist, fideist or positivist approach which made God 
extrinsic to creation. These attempts culminated in the development 
of Transcendental Thomism especially through Karl Rahner and 
Bernard Lonergan. They tried to avoid immanentism by tieing 
subjective knowing to the structures of the human spirit while 
maintaining the importance of the role of objective reality in 
bringing knowledge to consciousness. On the subjective side the 
dangers were idealism and ontologism. On the objective historical 
side, the danger was historical relativism or making the historical 
simply the occasion or instrument of faith-knowing.
I believe Hans Urs von Balthasar's approach to these issues 
provides a more adequate solution. I want to continue now with the 
manner in which he approached these same problems.
CHAPTER II
HOW CAN WE KNOW GOD IN CHRIST?
Balthasar's Epistemology
Balthasar's Starting Point
Balthasar has said that his starting point philosophically 
is the concrete contingent finitude which human beings experience 
as a real phenomenon. "I am, but I could not be."1’2 This is the 
fundamental enigma of humanity, finite beings open to infinite 
Being. Attempts to leave behind St. Thomas' "real distinction" 
between 'esse' and 'existence', between the infinite and the 
finite lead to the conclusion that all being is infinite and 
immutable (Parmenides) or that all is movement, becoming (Heracl­
itus).1,3 The first is "the solution of Buddhist mysticism," the 
second "contradicts itself: pure becoming in pure finitude can 
only conceive of itself in identifying contraries...." Conse­
quently, "it is necessary to commence from an inescapable duali­
ty: the finite is not the infinite.... The question is then 
inevitable: Whence comes the division? Why are we not God? Two 
attempted solutions lead to pantheism. One posits a fall, a
l42Hans Urs von Balthasar. "A Resume of My Thought." Hans Urs
von Balthasar: His Life and Work. ed. David Schindler. San 
Francisco: San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991, p. 1.
103 Ibid., p. 2.
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decline. Salvation is a return "of the sensible finite into the 
intelligible infinite." The other reasons that the infinite God 
needed the finite world to perfect himself, to actualize all of 
his possibilities, or to have an object to love. But if God has 
no need of the world... Why does the world exist?"100
"No philosophy could give a satisfactory response to that 
question.... But, in fact, the true response to philosophy 
could only be given by Being himself, revealing himself from 
himself. Will man be capable of understanding this revela­
tion? The affirmative response will be given only by the God 
of the Bible.... And this posits a counterpart: to be able 
to hear and understand the auto-revelation of God man must 
in himself be a search for God, a question posed to him.
Thus there is no biblical theology without a religious 
philosophy. Human reason must be open to the infinite.* 105 
God's Revelation requires that human beings be able to
perceive and respond to God's se1f-discIosure, and therefore a 
philosophy and a theology of man, an anthropology, is necessary. 
Thomistic metaphysics approached the question of "being" in 
Aristotelian fashion, analyzing the nature of the cosmos, of 
which man was a part. Balthasar draws from St. Thomas but ap­
proaches the question of "being" from a more personalist, dialog­
ical perspective. Instead of looking to nature or being in the 
abstract to find how the concept of being reflects the doctrine 
of Creation and Trinity, he looks to personal and concrete being
as the locus of reflection.
l0‘lbid.
IO5Ibid; as we will see, Balthasar bases the philosophical 
distinction between the finite and infinite ultimately on the 
distinction of persons within the Trinity, and the reason for 
creation on the Trinitarian self-emptying love revealed in Christ. 
Now we are exploring how he finds philosophically the phenomenolog­
ical evidence in creation of these revealed realities.
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How do we first apprehend the idea or concept of being? How 
do we perceive and know reality? This question is fundamental to 
the manner in which we know all created reality and therefore how 
we can know the revelation of God's love in Christ. More precise­
ly, how can the love of the Trinity revealed in Christ be known 
through reality in the act of faith, both by the Apostles and us? 
I want to show how Balthasar answers these questions by setting 
off his approach against that of the transcendental Thomists.
The Transcendental Thomist Approach
The transcendental Thomists like Karl Rahner and Bernard
Lonergan, though in different ways, posit some type of a priori 
unmediated pre-apprehension of "Being" by the human spirit which 
is the basis for all other acts of knowing. As previously dis­
cussed in Chapter I, in reaction to Kantianism and rationalistic 
scholasticism, neo-scholastics such as Cardinal Mercier, Maurice 
Blondel, Joseph Marechal, Pierre Rousselot, Karl Rahner, Bernard 
Lonergan and others sought a way to ground the certitude and 
objectivity of truth or knowledge in the intrinsic nature of the 
intellect itself'.1** Influenced by Edmund Husserl and Martin 
Heidegger these thinkers sought a via media between idealism and 
moderate realism by way of a phenomenology of human conscious­
ness. In this philosophy Being is definitely finite and histori­
cal, and lights up the human consciousness, but the question is
'**W.J. Hill. "Thomism, Transcendental." New Catholic Encyclo­
pedia. Vol. 16. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 449-454.
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in what manner? W.J. Hill summarizes the manner in which Rahner
and Lonergan have utilized this phenomenological approach.
From Rahner and Lonergan has come a new metaphysics in which 
the being investigated is that which occurs within con­
sciousness. They tend to view being as more phenomenal in 
kind and closely assimilated to meaning and knowledge.
Coreth writes of "an immediate unity of being and knowing in 
the very act of knowing" .... From this being there is 
extrapolated the being of the cosmos. Lonergan, e.g., looks 
upon being as "whatever is to be known by intelligent grasp 
and reasonable affirmation" . . . , and progresses from the
structures of consciousness as sensation, concept, and 
judgment to the structures of extra-mental being as matter, 
form, and existence .... Phenomenology had effected the 
decisive turn to subjectivity (better expressed in Heideg­
ger's term 'subjectness," Subjektitat, precluding individu­
alism), making man a 'co-constitutor of his world of mean­
ing'. . . . This occasioned a subtle transformation of
metaphysics into philosophical anthropology, which when the 
Christian implications of Marechal's thought are brought to 
bear upon it can be made to function as a fundamental theol-
Thus, it is the finality of human consciousness, as "co- 
constitutor," which "affirms,""confirms," or "performs" being in 
its concrete reality. The historical and finite existence of 
persons and things are the occasions of the manifestation of 
being through and in human consciousness. There is real corre­
spondence between being's manifestation in human consciousness 
and reality, but that correspondence comes about because of the 
structures of human consciousness, not because being informs
consciousness. This differs from Thomism in which the intellect
takes into itself the reality of being and "discovers" being-- 
being informs the intellect. The intellect is a blank tablet
107 Ibid., p. 451.
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until "being" presents itself through the senses. All knowing is 
a posteriori.
Rahner explains the transcendental view by his notion of the 
Vorgriff, which is a "prehension or anticipation by the soul of 
being which, while unconscious, is preconceptual, nonobjective, 
and unthematic in kind; all a posteriori knowledge is an object­
ification and thematization of this. ..." Lonergan explains the 
transcendental view differently but also posits "prior to every 
content, it [being] is the notion of the to-be-known through that 
content . . . . Ontologism is avoided by identifying Absolute
Being with the unconditioned horizon of finite being which only 
points to God. Both Rahner and Lonergan, though again in differ­
ent ways, argue for an a priori transcendental knowledge of God 
through the a priori knowledge of Being. There would seem to 
be some concession here to idealism and a refined ontologism.
Transcendental Thomists posit a priori knowledge of Being by 
a reductive analysis which asks what the a priori conditions for 
the possibility of objective and certain knowledge are. This is 
where they move from moderate realism to critical realism. How 
can the perception of reality take place? What can explain a 
human spirit which is a quest in search of absolute and infinite 
knowledge of Being? This phenomenon of the human spirit's quest
“‘ibid., p. 452.
Ibid., p. 452-53.
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cannot be explained unless one posits an a priori consciousness 
of what it is that the human spirit is seeking.11’
I think it is precisely here that Balthasar differs from the 
transcendental Thomists. As we will see, he believes that the 
Creator/creature dissimilarity, the dialogical and interpersonal 
nature of Revelation, and an adequate explanation of the phenome­
non of the interpersonal and dialogic nature of human relation­
ships requires that human existence be pure receptivity. The 
initial awareness of Being can be, and is discovered a posteriori 
through the phenomenon of the interpersonal, not "co-constituted" 
or performed by means of an a priori consciousness. Consciousness 
of being and self is awakened through the phenomenon of the 
interpersonal and love. Balthasar's epistemology requires that 
Cod's revelation in Christ be received and inform the human
consciousness through human historical reality illumined by 
grace. The act of faith-knowing of Christ, and God in Christ, is 
a participation by grace in God's knowledge of himself in Christ. 
I believe Balthasar would also take the position that the funda­
mental quest of the human spirit, though reason must be open to 
the Infinite, is not, first of all, knowledge of Being, and an 
autonomy based on knowing. Rather, it is primarily the quest to 
receive and give love infinitely, and the freedom from egoism or
nt Ibid.
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self-autonomy necessary to do so.111 *Now, I want to turn to Balth­
asar's approach to the psychogenesis of Being.
Meta-Anthropology: The Interpersonal Revelation of Being
I and Thou
Thomistic metaphysics, like Greek and Aristotelian thought, 
sees humnaity as part of the cosmos, and metaphysics and episte­
mology is developed in the context of the whole of nature of 
which humanity is a part. Balthasar describes his philosophical 
approach in the contemporary context:
For us the cosmos perfects itself in man, who at the same 
time sums up the world and surpasses it. Thus our philosophy 
will be essentially a meta-anthropology, presupposing not 
only the cosmological sciences, but also the anthropological 
sciences, and surpassing them towards the question of the 
being and essence of man.111
Balthasar's philosophy, like that of Rahner and Lonergan will be 
a meta-anthropology, but his methodology will maintain the 
analogy of being113 and follow the theological order, approaching 
the question of Being concretely through the interpersonal. That 
is, he will start from an "analogy not of abstract Being, but of
lllcf. Medard Kehl, S.J. "Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Portrait." 
The Von Balthasar Reader ed. Medard Kehl, S.J. and Werner Loser, 
S.J., trans. Robert J. Daly, S.J. and Fred Lawrence. New York: 
Crossroad, 1982, p. 1-54, at p.33.
luIbid., p. 3.
UJ"Analogy of being," for Balthasar, expresses the doctrine of 
the Fourth Lateran Council, that however great the similarity 
between created reality and God's reality, the dissimilarity is 
ever greater. This concept will be explored in more detail later.
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Being as it is encountered concretely in its attributes (not 
categorical, but transcendental)."111
Balthasar's starting point is that
man exists only in dialogue with his neighbor. The infant is 
brought to consciousness of himself only by love, by the 
smile of his mother. In that encounter the horizon of all 
unlimited being opens itself for him, revealing four things 
to him: (1) that he is one in love with the mother, even in 
being other than his mother, therefore all being is one; 
(2)that love is good, therefore all being is good; (3) that 
love is true, therefore all being is true; and (4) that love 
evokes joy, therefore all being in beautiful.* 115
This is a highly compressed statement which implicitly 
contains a number of conclusions. First, "being" is first a 
concrete experience before it is a concept. It is a primal 
phenomenon, which comes about when one experiences a "thou" for 
the first time. Part of the primal experience of "being" is the 
experience of the "thou" and in that experience of the "thou" is 
contained simultaneously the experience of the "I," the distinct­
ness of my "being" from the "being" of the "thou." But, in that 
same experience, of "thou" and "I" is the experience of the 
oneness or unity of "being." "Being" is shared with others.
Notice that Balthasar, consistent with his view that being and 
love are co-extensive11*, puts the experience of "being" in the 
context of the experience of the love of the "thou." Being, in 
the concrete of the "I"-"thou" experience, is not experienced
1HIbid., p. 3.
115Bal thasar, "Resume of My Thought," p. 3.
ll<The idea that being and love are co-extensive will be 
explained in detail later.
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abstractly in the infant's thought but in the infant's experience 
of the transcendental attributes of concrete "being" which are 
present to the infant in the "thou." These transcendental attrib­
utes of the "being" of the "thou" are the manner in which the 
"thou" is concretely present to the infant, as love which is 
good, true, and beautiful. So in sum, one could say that the 
transcendental attributes of personal being which express that 
"being" are love, goodness, truth, and beauty?17
Another point that Balthasar makes is that the infant 
experiences not just a pure appearance but the reality of the 
mother herself. The mother's essence is experienced indirectly 
and mediately through the form of her appearance, which communi­
cates her being by the "grammar" of her/its transcendental
attributes.
Consistent with the analogy of being, God is the fullness of 
the One (love), the Good, the True, and the Beautiful, even 
though the dissimilarity between the finite transcendentals and 
the infinite is ever greater than any similarity?1* It is by 
virtue of the experience of the "thou" that space and the world
tl70n the transcendentals in general see J.B. Lotz. "Transcend­
ental s." New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 14. New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1967-79, p. 238-241; for an excellent article analyzing the 
transcendentals in relation to "esse" in itself and in relation to 
others, see Mark D. Jordan. "The Grammar of Esse: Re-Reading Thomas 
on the Transcendentals." Thomist 44 (Jan. 1980): 1-26; finally, for 
an excellent article with respect to the interpersonal as the 
starting point of metaphysics, see W. Norris Clarke, S.J. "The 'We 
Are' of Interpersonal Dialogue as the Starting Point of Metaphys­
ics." Modern Schoolman 69 (1992): 357-68.
titBalthasar, "A Resume of My Thought," p. 3.
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exist, not by virtue of the "I.” For it is in the response of the 
child to the mother that the child experiences itself as "I give 
mysel f.
The primal value of my "being," initially experienced as 
being given the gift of myself, can become lost in a positivistic 
culture which simply takes "being" for granted, as material for 
our domination. But, in the primal encounter with the "thou," who 
is an exemplar of Cod, is included a primal encounter with God 
who shines forth in the "wonder of being. "tl* Here we might say, 
in contrast to the transcendentalist approach, that the infant 
has "something like an experience of God" but it is mediated 
through the concrete being of the "thou."in However, this unthem- 
atic experience is governed by analogy of being so that however 
similar the exemplary "thou" is in "being" to God, the dissimi­
larity is ever greater. But the reality remains, that the tran­
scendental attributes of created being do reflect and reveal in
ll,Martin Bieler. "Meta-anthroplogy and Christology: On the 
Philosophy of Hans Urs von Balthasar." Communio 20 (Spring 1993): 
129-146, at 137.
ll,Bieler, p. 138; and see Hans Urs von Balthasar. Theo-Drama: 
Theological Dramatic Theory I I : Dramat i s Personae: Man in God, 
trans. Graham Harrison. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990, p. 
286.
>nBalthasar extends this to all subsequent acts of knowing: "at 
the most fundamental level, the dawn of self-awareness in freedom 
is not the realization that we are simply "there": it is rooted in 
the fact that we are 'gift' and 'gifted', which presupposes a 
'giving' reality. In this sense 'all knowers know God implicitly in 
every mental act', insofar as 'being itself . . . is a likeness of 
the divine goodness'; thus all men naturally tend toward God' 
(Thomas)." Balthasar, TD I 1. p. 391.
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and through themselves, God, who is the fullness of the reality 
which they reflect. Balthasar states it this way:
"This day I have begotten you", says the Father to the Son.
This day I have created you, says eternal freedom to finite 
freedom. The fact that no human "I" can awaken to itself 
unless it is called "thou" by some other "I" is only the 
prelude, within the parameters of the world, to what is 
meant here. For in and through the human "I" there is mani­
fested an Absolute "I", who has from eternity generated an 
equally Absolute "Thou" and, in the Holy Spirit, is One God 
with him. It is precisely this process of generation, this 
giving and receiving of self, and this oneness of both in 
the Holy Spirit that causes the absolute preciousness--we 
call it holiness--of Absolute Being to shine forth in its 
limitless self-affirmation and freedom."1”
It is only on the basis of this "miracle" of the eternal 
generation of the Son by the Father, that the creature in its 
finite freedom, gifted with the gift of self, can "be addressed 
as a 'thou' and so designate itself an "I" vis-a-vis the Giver." 
Further, a finite "I" can only dare to call God "'Thou' if, in 
doing so, it is answering to a 'thou' that comes addressed to
itself from the inner nature of the Absolute--from the divine
Trinity." Finally,
. . . I only appreciate fully that God is my "highest good"
when I learn (in the Son) that I am a "good" to him, af­
firmed by him; this is what guarantees my being and my 
freedom. And it is only when I learn that I represent a 
"good" and a "thou" to God that I can fully trust in the 
imparted gift of being and freedom and so, affirmed from and 
by eternity, really affirm myself too.1” * 123
l”lbid., pp. 286-87; and see pp. 209-10, where Balthasar says 
"communicated being is not oniy in generai an 'image of God' . . .
but it is actually an image of the three-personal God, in whom the 
imcommunicabi 1 i ty of the hypostases is one with the unity of 
'essence' in each of them."
123 Ibid., p. 287 .
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Again and again, through analogy of being, Balthasar finds 
the Trinity, the fullness of Being, reflected in creation and 
particularly in the phenomenon of human interpersonal interac­
tion. It is the Trinity's action in creation, revealed fully in 
Christ, that can be the basis for elimination of the fear and 
anxiety generated in finite creatures by the abyss between the 
Creator and creature. This abyss, without the Trinitarian revela­
tion in Christ, leads to pantheistic mysticism and formalistic
ri tualism.
The creature's metaphysical and theological locus is the 
diastasis of the divine "Persons" in the unity of the divine 
nature. Here the real difference between the creature and 
God no longer needs to occasion any anxiety in the former, 
because ultimately it is grounded in the real difference 
between the divine hypostases, in virtue of which God can be 
the Most Worthy and Most Holy One. ... In the mystery of 
the Trinity, the creature can affirm itself as an act of 
thanksgiving to God.
Balthasar's explanation of the psychogenesis of being is the 
foundation of an epistemology of receptivity in which the being 
of the "Thou," through the being of the "thou," informs the "I." 
This the foundation for his theology of revelation in Christ.
How Can We Know Christ Today?
Jesus: The Figure of Faith
In his short, popular work, Does Jesus Know Us? Do We Know 
Him?115, Hans Urs von Balthasar addresses the contemporary con­
trast between the phenomenon of popular Jesus piety and the
iaIbid., p. 288. 
usSan Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1983.
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efforts of scientific exegesis to find and describe the reai 
Jesus hidden behind the language and concepts of the New Testa­
ment. As Balthasar puts it:
. . . to a degree, people take no notice of the barriers or
simply break through them, in the doubtlessly sound instinct
that no Scribe can diminish the uniqueness and the day-to-
day significance of the figure of Jesus. "I must get to
him," the simple man (am-ha-arez) says, "for he belongs to __ ”•»* me .
What Balthasar is pointing to here is the common instinct that a 
reliable "figure" of Jesus can be attained from the pages of the 
New Testament, which figure is the object of and motive for the 
act of faith, for a life based on that faith, and for theology.
In other words, a perception of the object of faith, the desir­
ability or goodness of the object of faith, and the intelligibil­
ity of that object (A Theological Aesthetics. a Theodrammatik.
and a Theologic).
Scripture and Christology
Central to Balthasar's Christology is the
. . . conviction that only the Scriptures of the New Cove­
nant, taken as witnesses of faith and in their entirety, can 
produce a tangible and credible portrait of Jesus Christ, 
whereas every critical attempt to approach him from a posi­
tion other than that of the faith witnessed to in the Scrip­
tures can only result in a pallid, distorted picture unwor­
thy of belief (and hence devoid of interest).
It is a fact: only the person who is convinced that 
Jesus knows him personally gains access to knowledge of him. 
And only the person who is confident of knowing him as he 
is, can know that he is also known by him.127
Ibid., preface.
tl7Bal thasar, Does Jesus Know Us?. preface.
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These strong statements would appear to be a rejection of 
scientific exegesis, but in fact, Balthasar does not reject 
scientific exegesis. He subordinates it and its methodology to 
the "figure" of Christ which can be found in the New Testament as 
a whole despite its diversity of approaches to the "figure." His 
Christology guides his interpretation of and methodological 
approach to scripture. "All scriptural problems must be ap­
proached through christology: the letter is related to the Spirit 
as the flesh of Christ (we know what that means: his human 
nature) to his divine nature and Person."111 As we shall see, 
Balthasar's whole theological synthesis and methodology, with 
respect to all the central theological questions of Cod and man, 
Creator and creature, nature and grace, revelation and faith, 
faith and reason, theology and philosophy are structured around 
and resolved through reflection on the relationship between 
Christ's divine and human natures, and Christ's divine and human 
freedom. For Balthasar, Christ is both the revelation of the
inner triune life of Cod and the life of true human freedom. For 
him, a complete Christian anthropology is possible only "within 
the context of an overall Christology."
ll,Hans Urs von Balthasar. "The Place of Theology." Explorations 
in Theology. I: The Word Made Flesh. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1989, pp. 149-160, at 149.
ll,Bal thasar, TD III. p. 13.
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Christocentric Theology
Balthasar's theological synthesis is Christocentric and 
theocentric at the same time, for Christ reveals the inner life 
of the Trinity through his human words and deeds. The immanent 
life of the Trinity is lived out and manifested economically in 
Christ's human life.134 Balthasar's Christocentric perspective 
was shaped in dialogue with Karl Barth and in his study of 
Barth's theology.* 131 *His integration of the theology of the Trin­
ity and Christology keeps together the theologia (theology of 
God) and oikonomia (order of salvation), which became separated 
after the New Testament and early patristic period. Early and 
classical scholastic theologies followed the basic historical 
sequence Trinity-creation-fall -incarnation.133
Balthasar's theological starting point is
the very center of Christian revelation--the Word of God 
become flesh, Jesus Christ, God and man--and so we are led 
unreservedly to affirm that here we have a true form placed 
before the sight of man. . . . --the fundamental thing is
l3tDonald MacKinnon. "Some Reflections on Hans Urs von Baltha­
sar's Christology With Special Reference to Theodramatik 11/2 and 
III." The Analogy of Beauty: The Theology of Hans Urs von Baltha­
sar . ed. John Riches. Edinburgh: T. 4c T. Clark Ltd., 1986, pp. 175- 
79.
l3lHans Urs von Balthasar. The Theology of Karl Barth. trans. 
John Drury. New York: Holt, Rinehart 4c Winston, 1971. See espe­
cially "Christ at the Center," pp. 247-270.
13lAlois Grillmeier. "III. Christology." Sacramentum Mundi: An
Encyclopedia of Theology^. Vol. 3 ♦ New York: Herder and Herder:
London: Burns & Oates. Ltd.. 1970, pp. 186-192, at 186-87.
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that here we have before us a genuine, 'legible ’ form, and 
not merely a sign or an assemblage of signs.33 * 135
Christ's Figure as Legible "Form"
Behind Balthasar's emphasis on Christ as 'legible' form lie
the twentieth century controversies over the nature of the act of
faith, and the relationship between nature and grace.11* The
basic question is how is God revealed and perceived in Christ?
How is the object of faith revealed and perceived in the act of
faith? Balthasar puts it this way:
The central question of so-called 'apologetics' or 'funda­
mental theology' is, thus, the question of perceiving the 
form--an aesthetic problem. To have ignored this fact has 
stunted the growth of this branch of theology over the past 
hundred years. For fundamental theology, the heart of the 
matter should be the question : 'How does God's revelation 
confront man in history? How is it perceived?' But under the 
influence of a modern rationalistic concept of science, the 
question shifted ever more from its proper centre to the 
margin, to be re-stated in this manner: 'Here we encounter a 
man who claims to be God, and who, on the basis of this 
claim, demands that we should believe many truths he utters 
which cannot be verified by reason. What basis acceptable to 
reason can we give to his authoritative claims?'135
More precisely, the question is how does God use the human nature 
of Christ, his historical context and salvation history, to 
reveal Himself? And, what kind of process of knowing or perceiv­
ing this revelation is the act of faith in Christ? What kind of
l33Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological 
Aesthetics, I: Seeing the Form. San Francisco: Ignatius Press: New 
York: Crossroad, 1989, p. 153; referred to hereafter as Glory J_.
luJohn Riches. "Balthasar and the Analysis of Faith." The 
Analogy of Beauty: The Theology of Hans Urs von Ba 1thasar. ed. John 
Riches. Edinburgh: T. &. T. Clark Ltd., 1986, pp. 35-59.
l35Bal thasar, Glory J_, p. 173.
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knowledge of Christ or cognitive content is foundational for this 
act of faith, for the life of faith, and therefore for theology?
Balthasar's Christology is founded on an examination of the 
nature of a reciprocal interplay between revelation in Christ 
(the objective reality of the divine presence, divine action, and 
divine cognitive content) and faith (the subjective perception of 
that presence, the living of faith's content, and the articula­
tion of content). Theology mediates between these poles in its 
search for deeper understanding. He refers to this reciprocal 
interplay between these two poles as a "closed ellipse with two 
centers." Balthasar incorporates philosophy and literature into 
the ellipse as pre-theology ,l3<
The foundational examination of the nature or "form" of
revelation in the figure of Christ and its faith perception is 
the subject of the first leg of Balthasar's trilogy, The Glory of 
the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics.137 However, since the percep­
tion of Christ, the object of faith, in the act of faith draws 
one out of oneself into a life in Christ, one thereby becomes 
part of the divine drama of infinite and finite freedom which is 
the essence of Christ's human life. Without leaving behind the 
perception of the object of faith with the "eyes of faith," one 
moves on to a new way of knowing God in Christ by a life con­
13tBal thasar, Does Jesus Know Us?. p. 61; TD III, p. 59, 63.
tJ7The seven volumes of the first leg of the trilogy are: I : 
Seeing the Form. 11 : Clerical Styles. Ill: Lay Styles. IV: The 
Realm of Metaphysics in Antiquity. V: The Realm of Metaphysics in 
the Modern Age. VI: The Old Covenant. VI I: The New Covenant.
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formed to Christ. This is another dimension of the reciprocal 
interaction between revelation and faith. This dimension of life
in Christ is the subject of Theodrama: Theological Dramatic 
Theory.n> The third dimension of the reciprocal interaction 
between revelation and faith is that of God's theology and ours.
Balthasar describes it thus:
How can God come to make himself understood to man, how can 
an infinite Word express itself in a finite word without 
losing its sense? That will be the problem of the two na­
tures of Jesus Christ. And how can the limited spirit of man
come to grasp the unlimited sense of the Word of God? That 139will be the problem of the Holy Spirit.
This is treated in the third leg of the trilogy, Theo log i c. and 
an appendix, Epi logue .1>0
These three legs of the trilogy correspond to three tran­
scendental attributes which all being including personal being 
have through existence and activity. These three attributes of 
being: beauty (self-manifestation), goodness (self-gift), and 
truth (self-expression or intelligibility) are present in Chr­
ist's personal being, actions and words and are the fundamental 
ground of the human perception of the meaning and significance of
l3,This leg of the trilogy contains five volumes only three of 
which have been published in English to date. I: Prolegomena; 1 I: 
Dramati s Personae:Man I n God ; 111: Dramat i s Personae: Persons in 
Christ; IV: The Action (Die Handlung) ; V: The Last Act (Das 
Endspiel).
t3,Bal thasar. "A Resume of My Thought," p. 4.
ul>Theologic contains three volumes which have not yet been 
published in English: 1: The Truth of the World (Warhe i t der Welt); 
I I: The Truth of God (Warhei t Go 11 e s); III: The Spirit of Truth 
(Per Geist der Warhe i t). Epilogue (Epilog) has been published in 
English by Ignatius Press, 1992.
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Christ, and ultimately of the Triune God in Christ. Obviously, 
they are not accidents of personal being but are attributes of 
the substance of personal being itself, which in the case of 
personal being find their unity in that of personhood. Each 
being, but particularly the highest form of finite being, the 
person, is as a being, someone perceptible, desirable or good, 
and intelligible. This will be explored in more depth later.
In Theodrama III, Dramat i s Personae: Persons in Chr ist.
Balthasar outlines his methodological approach to his Chris­
tology. His first task is "to gain access to the figure of 
Christ, which is only possible through pondering the specific 
character and structure of the New Testament sources, the Gospels 
in particular." His next task will be to use the figure of Christ 
obtained from the sources to "ask--by way of confirmation--how is 
it possible for such a figure to be represented; and this will 
explain the condition in which we find the sources themselves." 
Then he will proceed to "a speculative Christology and raise the 
question of the meaning and limitations of the 'Chalcedonian 
model.'" Finally, he will consider the "issue of the inclusion of 
the theodramatic characters in Christ . . . ." With respect to
all of these steps he raises the fundamental question whether the 
concept of theological "form" which was analyzed in The Glory of 
the Lord can "stand up to the attacks of the historico-critical 
method? At this point the struggle for the foundations of dogmat­
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ics, and of all Christian faith, becomes acute and--dramat ic. "lU 
Balthasar’s theology of Christ’s theological 'form' as contained 
in the act of faith and its relation to the historico-critical 
method is foundational to Balthasar’s approach to Christology and 
the act of faith in Christ.
Christology is, after all, "faith in Christ seeking under­
standing." But the first question is what does Balthasar mean by 
"faith in Christ." Since revelation and faith are correlatives, 
what he means by revelation in Christ will determine what he 
means by faith in Christ, and this will determine his methodolo- 
gy. Issues of nature and grace, and metaphysics and epistemology 
underlie questions about the nature of revelation and faith. Most 
fundamental in resolving these underlying questions is the 
question of how one approaches their resolution. This is the 
question of methodology and the proper relationship between 
theology and philosophy, and grace and nature, in coming to know 
reality as it really is, in both its natural and supernatural 
dimensions. Even if one were to deny the relevance of metaphysics 
to theology, that would be a metaphysical position, so the 
question of metaphysics is unavoidable. The crux of the matter 
for Balthasar's Christology is whether Christ's self-expressive 
historical "life-form" can be in continuity with the faith life- 
form of Christ contained in the New Testament and that passed on 
by the Church. First, I will explore Balthasar’s theology of the 
perception of Christ's "life-form" in the act of faith, and then,
UlTD Hi, p. 55-56.
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in Chapter III, move on to the nature and grace issues which are 
involved in knowing Christ.
"The Nature of the Act of Faith:Seeing the Form"
What is the Nature of the Act of Faith?
The available evidence (New Testament, Early Doxologies,
Hymns, and Pagan Perceptions of Christianity) all point to 
worship of Christ along with adherence to Jewish monotheism in 
the earliest Palestinian Jewish ChristianityHow did Jesus' 
contemporaries in the process of interpretation move from simple 
encounter with him or reports about him to a faith which wor­
shipped him and made him Kyrios? In this kind of a judgment the 
question becomes the nature of the intrapersonal dynamics of the 
act of faith. Especially the relationship between certitude 
arrived at by the intrinsic power of reasoning through knowledge 
and judgment; and certitude given as a gift of God to which the 
intellect and will freely chose to submit in reliance on God. As 
we saw earlier, Vatican I made the most important and complete
doctrinal statement on the nature faith and the role of reason.
It intended to respond to the errors of semi rationalism and
fideism.
luRichard Bauckham, "The Worship of Jesus," The Anchor Bible 
Dictionary. Vol. 3 (H-J), ed. David Noel Freedman. New York: 
Doubleday, 1992, pp. 812-819. See generally, Larry W. Hurtado, One 
God. One Lord: Early Christian Devotion and Ancient Jewish 
Monotheism. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988; Paul A. Rainbow, 
"Jewish Monotheism As the Matrix For New Testament Chistology: A 
Review Article," on One God, One Lord: Early Christian Devotion and 
Ancient Jewish Monothei sm. Novum Testamentum 32 (1991)1: 78-91.
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". . . faith, which is 'the beginning of salvation,' the
Catholic Church holds to be a supernatural virtue. By it, 
with the inspiration and help of God's grace, we believe 
that what He has revealed is true, not because of its in­
trinsic truth seen by the light of natural reason, but 
because of the authority of God revealing it, who can nei­
ther deceive nor be deceived' (Denz 3008)." **3
In this definition, the key phrase which needed further 
clarification was "because of the authority of God revealing it, 
who can neither deceive nor be deceived." How was God's authority 
revealed in and through the life-form of Jesus to the Apostles 
and disciples? What is the substantive content being judged about 
Jesus' life-form in such an act of faith, and how does such a 
judgment take place?
Does the Act of Faith Include Knowledge of God?
As discussed previously, Scholastic theology also held that 
the formal object of faith is God Himself or First Truth. But, 
the question was what kind of knowledge of God, the formal object 
of faith, could one have through and in the act of faith? If God 
himself, by his authority, was the motive and basis for faith and 
its formal object, in what way was he known? Or, did faith 
include knowledge of God at all?
The Vatican I definition of faith was arrived at in a
context in which the understanding of nature and grace was 
founded on the idea of "pure nature." As we have seen, the idea
mA.R. Jonsen, "Faith, 2. Patristic Tradition and Teaching of 
the Church." New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 5. New York: McGraw- 
Hill, 1967-79, pp. 796-798, at p. 797.
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of two kinds of knowledge, one natural and the other supernatu­
ral, was derived from this concept.
Thus the mainstream of post-Vatican I Catholic theology has 
attempted to define, often with great precision, the extent 
to which the will's assent to God's authority is directed or 
prepared by rational considerations. It has also considered 
the extent to which in such an act of faith the truth of 
what is revealed is in fact perceived.* 1**
The question crucial to the act of faith was whether the First 
Truth, the formal object of faith, was in fact perceived or known 
in any way in the act of faith. What Balthasar calls "supernatu­
ral rationalism" was an understandable reaction to the Romanti­
cist, Idealist, and Modernist currents of thought which were part
of the neo-Kantian efforts in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.1*5 "Supernatural rationalists" wanted to avoid any 
hint of intuition, religious feeling, or immediate perception 
which tended to naturalize religious knowing. The efforts of 
Blondel, Rousselot, Marechal, and later the "new theology" were 
all attempts to overcome these fears, and the sterility of 
"supernatural rationalism." The act of faith had been reduced to 
assent or faith in God based on the rationality of the proofs 
(signs, wonders, prophecy, Resurrection) which demonstrated God's 
presence and authority, seen of course, by the gift of the light 
of faith. This was backed up by the external authority of the 
Church. Faith and actual knowing had been separated.
***Riches, "Analysis of Faith," pp. 35-36.
l*5Bal thasar, Glory J_, p. 139.
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Faith Gnosis of Cod's Glory in Christ 
Balthasar perceived that it was vital to apologetics to
reintegrate the element of "pistis" and "gnosis" in the theology 
of the act of faith. Faith could not be content to define itself
as propositions accepted on authority. It had to "bring man to an 
understanding of what God is in truth."
. . . the content of this se1f-revelation of God's bears the
name of doxa . . . the analogy suggests itself between
aesthetic and theological revealed reality and its recep­
tion. This, then, already means that the element of authori­
ty, on which theological faith is based as its ultimate 
motive and formal object, must possess a wholly peculiar 
colouring attributable to God alone, and this quality clear­
ly distinguishes the divine authority even from the eccl- 
esial authority which proclaims and enacts it. The divine 
authority belongs to the divine doxa as it manifests itself; 
indeed, authority and doxa are but one in so far as in both 
of them God's divinity approaches the believer.1*4 
God's glory or doxa is of course, the majesty of the Triune
kenotic love revealed in the person, action, and words of Christ, 
particularly in the mysterium paschale. It is the revelation to 
the "eyes of faith" of this love in Christ, which is the authori­
ty of God to which the human heart submits.
The majesty of this absolute love--the central phenomenon of 
revelation--is the source of every form of authority pos­
sessed by the mediators between man and God. The primal 
authority is possessed neither by the Bible . . . , nor by
the kerygma . . . , nor in ecclesiastical office . . . the
primal authority is the Son interpreting the Father through 
the Holy Spirit as divine love. For it is only at the source 
of revelation that authority (or majesty) and love coincide. 
All an authoritative call to submissive faith in revelation
iti Ibid., p. 140.
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can do is to prepare men to see the love of God made mani­
fest, and help them to value that love fittingly.* 1 * * * **7
The Relation Between God and Being in the Act of Faith 
Balthasar's explanation of how that doxa or love of God in
Christ is perceived, first by the Apostles, and now by us, 
depends on his metaphysics of personal "being." As we saw, 
personal being in its transcendental attributes is manifested in 
interpersonal relations. As with all being, by analogy there is a
natural revelation of God in the natural transcendental attrib­
utes of personal being. But, in the union of divine nature with 
human nature in Christ, we have much more than this natural 
manifestation. Absolute Personal Being, who is pure act of being 
in the person of the Word, has now united himself to created 
contingent personal being.
. . . the formal object of theology (and, therefore, also of
the act of faith) lies at the very heart of the formal 
object of philosophy (along with the mythology which belongs 
to it). Out of those mysterious depths the formal object of 
theology breaks forth as the se1f-revelation of the mystery 
of Being itself; such a revelation cannot be deduced from 
what the creaturely understanding of itself can read of the 
mystery of Being, nor, even in the manifestness of the 
mystery of God, can such revelation be grasped by this 
intellect without the divine illumination of grace. . . .
But it is no less a Word from God, an intelligence concern­
ing Being itself and thus, at the same time philosophy.1*1
**7Hans Urs von Balthasar. Love Alone. New York: Herder and 
Herder, 1969, p. 47.
l**Balthasar, Glory J_, p. 145; notice that Balthasar does not
equate or identify in any way the theological and philosophical
formal objects. Instead, the theological shines through Being but
is not closely identified with Being as in the transcendental
approach.
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God, the ground and fullness of all being, who is the fullness of 
the transcendental attributes of beauty, goodness, and truth in 
the unity of love, "reveals himself once and for all in a posi­
tive-historical, spatio-temporal form. . . . The mystery of I-
Thou within the Godhead must find its epiphany in an I-Thou 
mystery between God and man; . . .
The "Form" of Gnosis in the Act of Faith 
What Balthasar means by "form" with respect to personal
being is related to the manner in which the mysterious unity and 
uniqueness of the "whole" or "Gestalt" of a person's being is 
sel f-expressed.15(1 It is the self-expressive "form," not the 
ontological form which esse needs to exist. The very nature of 
the transcendental attributes of a "being" is that they are not 
accidents, not categorical attributes, but subsist in the very 
unity of the person's "esse" or act of being. Unity is a tran­
scendental attribute of any "esse" that has a form. Unity is what 
the form gives an existing being. Or, put another way form is 
what reveals the unity of an existing being. But, the ontological 
unity or form permits the transcendental attributes to appear to 
others in their se1f-expressive "form." The self-expressive form 
reveals the beauty, goodness and truth of the existing being. And 
as we will see, it is beauty that constitutes the appearance or 
the perception of the phenomenon of the truth and goodness of
u’lbid., p. 147.
l5tThe following discussion is based on Glory JL, pp.23-34.
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another's being. Because of the unity of being, the transcenden­
tal attributes co-inhere each other. However, the element of 
human freedom in a human being who is also sinful determines 
whether its transcendental qualities of beauty, goodness and 
truth will be expressed. It is the spirit of a person, incarnated 
in their body, which expresses through the body that form (spir­
it-body) which has its origin in God, the pure act of Being. It 
is precisely God's power and most characteristic prerogative to 
confer personal "esse" in its unique individual spirit-body form. 
"Esse" and form need each other as neither can exist without the
other.
This God-given personal form (spirit-body) is destined to 
pour itself out in a chosen life-form that is consistent with its 
personal form which is "image and likeness" of Cod. To the extent 
it does so, it has personal integrity and congruence with the 
reality of its unique personhood. In a sense it manifests and 
becomes what God always intended it to be. It expresses its tran­
scendental attributes of beauty, goodness and truth in the unity 
of personal love. But, it must do this freely, by a choice which 
assumes it knows or perceives, however dimly, its unique identity 
in Christ. Balthasar sees personal "form" as that which we 
perceive nediately when we perceive in another's life-form, their 
self-expression of their personal meaning and significance.
With St. Bonaventure he agrees that the essence of form lies 
not in its being a potential object of sense perception, but 
rather in its intrinsic power to express—whatever mode of 
appearance the expression may take. In the Incarnation God 
essentially express himself in a manner that allows us to
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speak of a divine form, even though the expressing God 
remains hidden within the expressive form.
Here, "whole" or Gestalt cannot mean either that all of God 
has been expressed, or that God's expression of himself has been 
exhausted. It can mean that the fullest expression of God in this 
creation has taken place in Christ.151 What God has revealed 
about himself in Christ is itself, through the medium of human 
reality, formally structured. As Christ's body is a created body, 
so God's "life-form" in this world is created, but is a true 
self-expression of God. The divine form of self-expression in
Christ is that of the kenotic love of the Triune God. The full­
ness of Being and the transcendental attributes are united with 
contingent being. The mysterium paschale, with the Cross as its 
center piece, is the climax of that self-expression and self-
disclosure .
But, not only God is disclosed and expressed. Christ is the 
archetype who reveals that personal integrity and congruence with
l5lLouis Dupre. "The Glory of the Lord: Hans Urs von Balthasar's 
Theological Aesthetic." Communio 16 (Fall, 1989), pp. 384-412, p. 
388.
‘^Balthasar carefully explains what is meant by the fullness 
of the Godhead dwelling in Christ: "Instead of speaking of the 
'form of revelation' we could also, with the same qualifications, 
speak of the 'revelation-body' in view of the fact that, on the one 
hand, 'the whole pleroma of the Godhead dwells corporeally in 
Christ' (somatikos), that is to say, in the way that a spirit 
inhabits a body or that God's Spirit of glory dwells in the old 
temple .... And none of this can be understood in a purely 
figurative sense, since Christ's corporeal body is and remains the 
point of union (Eph. 2.16) while all other 'religion' compared with 
his corporeality remains at best a 'shadow'(Col 2.17)." Balthasar, 
Glory £, p. 433.
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oneself is found only in the "image's" integrity and congruence 
with God. Here, another dimension of the fulfillment of human
freedom in divine infinite freedom is revealed.
But the Christian form is structurally a part of the miracle 
that transfigures and ennobles the whole sphere of being and 
which in itself guarantees that a spiritual form will thrive 
as the greatest of beauties. The image of existence is here 
illuminated by the archetype of Christ, and set to work by 
the free might of the Creator Spirit with all the sovereign­
ty of one who need not destroy the natural in order to 
achieve his supernatural goal. For this reason, however, it 
is clear that in any age--and most especially our own--the 
Christian will realize his mission if he truly becomes this 
form which has been willed and instituted by Christ.
The Objective Nature of Christ's "Form"
As the Archetype, Jesus is the Word, the Image, the Exegesis 
of God. He is God's theology in the flesh. "He is what he ex- 
presses--nameiy, God--but he is not whom he expresses-name1y, the 
Father. This incomparable paradox stands as the fountainhead of 
the Christian aesthetic, and therefore of all aesthetics!"* 15*
Balthasar gives three reasons why God's revelation must pos­
sess an objective form. In the first part of Glory J_ Balthasar 
has established that the subjective experience of the act of 
faith does indeed contain a "gnosis" or an experience of reli­
gious knowing of God in Christ. This subjective experience "finds 
the reason and justification for its existence in an experience- 
able object" and "without this object that experiential ability 
can by no means be demonstrated in its totality nor indeed be
l53Ibid., p. 28.
l5‘lbid., p. 29.
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made comprehensible."1*5 In giving the reasons he first explains 
that our faith object, that is, what is revealed in Christ "can 
be correctly understood only when it has been made visible in it­
self."154 He makes it clear that our object is not "God in Him­
self." Then proceeding on the faith assumption that there is a 
radical difference between God and humanity, the infinite and the 
finite he says:
If God is the infinitely free agent who, in his freedom, 
invents a world and, also in his freedom, creates that 
world; and, if on top of this, he is the triune God who in 
Jesus Christ becomes man, then there are three interconnect­
ed reasons why God's revelation must possess an objective 
form.l5?
First, since God is infinitely free, God's infinite subjec­
tivity "can in no sense be identical with the human religious 
subject." And, "a revelation of God may occur ever so interiorly 
in the subject and, nonetheless, God will remain interior i nt imo 
meo♦" God in His transcendence remains someone who must be
believed and someone to whom one must surrender unconditionally.
"Even the most intimate self-disclosure of Cod in the soul has a 
'form', even if it is spiritual: the form of experiences, sensa­
tions, illuminations, which as such are not the self-disclosing 
God himself."15*
l55Ibid., P- 429
l5<Ibid., P. 429
l”lbid.
l5*Ibid. , P. 430
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Second, "If God has first of all revealed himself as a 
Creator, and if this creation is necessarily ... a manifestation 
of God, it follows that this manifestation takes its form from 
the form of the world itself." He then develops the argument 
that God's divinity is made visible through creation but only in 
an analogous way. The Glory of God which is manifested through 
the creation is not to be identified with the glory or splendor 
of creation itself. It is the difference between the form and
what the form expresses by its form. What is the relationship
between the natural revelation of Creation and the revelation in
Christ?
The revelation of the triune God in Christ is not simply, to 
be sure, the prolongation or the intensification of the 
revelation in the creation; but, in their essence, they are 
so far from contradicting one another that, considered from 
the standpoint of God's ultimate plan, the revelation in the 
creation is seen to have occurred for the sake of the reve­
lation in Christ, serving as the preparation that made it 
possible ,lM
Finally, he develops the arguments to show that the appear­
ance of the revelation of the Triune God requires an objective 
form, a "super-form," especially since God's appearance is not an 
independent image of God, but a unique hypostatic union of the 
Word (the Archetype) and the image (Jesus). The analogy of being, 
which will be discussed in connection with nature and grace, has
to be maintained here also. However similar the transcendental
attributes of beauty, goodness, and truth may be to those attrib-
l”lbid. 
id Ibid., p. 431.
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utes in God's being, God's Transcendental Attributes are infi­
nitely dissimilar. God's Being, as the pure act of kenotic love, 
appears as doxa or "glory," in Christ. This is God's splendor, 
beauty, majesty, the appearance of His Being, in a human-divine 
1 i f e-f orm.111
Beauty and "Form" in the Act of Faith 
God's divine form, expressed in Christ, paradoxically
climaxes in its greatest splendor, beauty, and majesty, in the 
ugliness and tragedy of the Cross. God in the flesh is crucified 
by His creatures precisely because of His love. There could be no 
greater ugliness, tragedy or evil. How can this be beauty? It is 
precisely here that we find God’s revelation renewing the minds 
of his creatures in their understanding of the truth about 
reality, and revealing what the Resurrection unveils. That is, 
that all human reality, even the worst of sin, can be and is 
transfigured and transformed by the love of God in Christ.
There can be no greater example of the descending nature of
“‘ibid., p. 432-433.
“l". . . the glory of Christ unites splendor and radiance with 
solid reality, as we see pre-eminently in the Resurrection and its 
anticipation through faith in Christian life.
As Karl Barth has rightly seen, this law extends to the 
inclusion in Christian beauty of even the Cross and everything else 
which a worldly aesthetics . . . discards as no longer bearable. . 
. . it embraces the most abysmal ugliness of sin and hell by virtue 
of the condescension of divine love, which has brought even sin and 
hell into that divine art for which there is no human analogue." 
Ibid., p. 124.
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Revelation which calls upon creation to view itself in the light 
of Cod's understanding.
Von Balthasar's theology of form plunges its roots more 
deeply in the New Testament than in a philosophical aesthet­
ic. The suffering and death of Christ, far from being the 
exception they would be in a worldly aesthetic, here become 
the model. . . . The entire volume on the New Testament 
(111/2/2) presents the divine glory as essentially consist­
ing in the kenosis of Cod's Word. . . . Cross and damnation 
thereby come to belong to the very essence of divine form. A 
theological aesthetic describes how Cod's perfection becomes 
actually manifest, and Scripture reveals it to consist in 
the "correspondence between obedience and love, between 
self-annihilation in hiddenness and the ascent toward mani­festation" (III/2/2, p. 2<»2).“3
It is precisely here that Balthasar's distinction between 
his theological aesthetics of perceiving the form, as distin­
guished from an aesthetic theology, is most clearly seen. I have 
deferred discussing the relation between "beauty" and "form" 
because of the common difficulty of understanding Balthasar's use 
of it in terms of philosophical or contemporary ideas of it. The 
analogia of the Cross (analogia crucis) reveals clearly the 
limits of the analogy of being, in terms of using natural "beau­
ty" to understand God's beauty, or for that matter, any of the 
other transcendental attributes of personal being. More general­
ly, this is the problem between natural forms as a vehicle for 
supernatural revelation which will be discussed in the section on 
nature and grace. As developed there, nature is taken up into 
grace, and put at the service of grace; human love participates
in the intratrinitarian love for the world. Balthasar
inDupre, p. 389.
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. . . does not deny the relative autonomy of the natural
form, but he assumes this natural aesthetic into an aesthet­
ic of grace which, while fully respecting the autonomy of 
nature, nevertheless in the light of the Christian mysteries 
aesthetically transforms the natural. Revelation itself 
radiates the light in which we see its form. In lumine tuo 
videbimus lumen. "The light of faith stems from the object 
which revealing itself to the subject, draws it out beyond 
itself--into the sphere of the object" (I, 181). God's 
revelation establishes both its content and the believer's 
ability to comprehend it. Christ reveals as the God who ex­
presses, and stands revealed as that which he expresses.IW
Beauty and the Light of Faith
What this implies is that the "glory" of God shining on the 
face of Christ cannot be seen unless our faces are unveiled by
the light of Christ Himself. For,
all of us, with unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the Lord 
as though reflected in a mirror, are being transformed into 
the same image from one degree of glory to another; for this 
comes from the Lord, the Spirit." (2 Cor. 3.18)
Analogy of being finds itself at the very heart of the act of 
faith. One cannot "see" the beauty of the Triune love in Christ 
simply in or through the natural transcendental attributes of His 
human "being." One cannot encounter God's Being and "glory" in 
Him unless one's face is "unveiled" and one is given the light of 
faith with which to "see." "[But] when one turns to the Lord, the 
veil is removed." (2 Cor. 3.16) The light of faith is a partici­
pation in the knowledge and love of God in which God sees Himself 
in Christ, and we in that light of God, see God and ourselves in
Christ.
inDupre, p. 401.
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It is not that we demand grace by virtue of our peculiar 
dynamism; it is grace which both claims and expropriates us. 
The ascendancy of grace in us is what compels us, and it is 
also what bestows absolute authority on God in us. Consid­
ered in this first aspect, fundamental to all others, the 
auctoritas Dei revelantis is revelation as it witnesses to 
itself in us. We never could or should believe an historical 
existent on the basis of divine testimony if we did not 
believe it by virtue of the witness of God's being to itself 
which shines out for us in the interior light of grace. The 
Son of God, who in history witnesses to God and is witnessed
to by God, convinces us only because we have God's witness
16 5in ourselves . . . .
As we see epitomized in the life of Christ, it is in Chris­
t's self-expression in His life-form, which is identical with His 
consciousness of mission, that the truth and goodness of His 
"form" (being) are manifest as "beauty." Beauty is what makes the 
truth and goodness of Christ's being attractive and love-wor­
thy.It is the value and worth of the truth and goodness of 
Christ's being as it shines forth in His life-form. "We are 
confronted simultaneously with both the figure and that which
liJBal thasar, Glory J_, p. 162.
lJ<"The form as it appears to us is beautiful only because the 
delight it arouses in us is founded upon the fact that, in it, the 
truth and goodness of the depths of reality itself are manifested 
and bestowed, . . . The appearance of the form, as a revelation of 
the depths, is an indissoluble union of two things. It is the real 
presence of the depths, of the whole of reality, and it is a real 
pointing beyond itself to these depths. . . . both aspects are 
inseparable from one another, and together they constitute the 
fundamental configuration of Being."
"When it comes to confronting this structure . . . with the 
contents of Christian theology, it should be clear from the outset 
that there can be no univocal transposition and application of 
categories. This must be so because the living God is neither an 
'existent' (subordinate to Being) nor 'Being" itself, as it 
manifests and reveals itself essentially in everything that makes 
its appearance in form." Balthasar, Glory i, p. 119.
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shines forth from the figure, making it into a worthy, a lovewor­
thy thing."* 1 * * **7
Here the unity of the transcendentals is emphasized. In 
Christ, and in us, "esse" is constituted and expressed in the 
unity of love. Love and being are coextensive111, and the truth 
and goodness of our love/being are manifested as beauty. There­
fore, Balthasar can say that "beauty" is the primal phenomenon-- 
that which appears to our consciousness as the reality of anoth- 
er's being. It is the splendor of the goodness and truth of 
their love/being shining forth in the deeds and words that are 
their self-expressive life-form. Since their "form" (love/being) 
is a unity, their life-form, to the extent it expresses that God- 
given "form" manifested in Christ, the archetype and measure of 
all forms, is a unity. The unity of the form shines forth as 
"beauty." In the act of faith, beauty, the light of faith, and 
God's love are different ways of referring to the same reality. 
That means that the only way it can be perceived is as a unity, 
through a synthetic act of the intellect, such as is attributed 
to the intellectus. In what I have read of Balthasar, he does not 
explicitly tie faith perception to this aspect of Thomistic 
psychology. But in his discussion of "The Spiritual Senses,"17’
lt7Bal thasar, Glory J_, p. 20.
l**The idea that love and beauty are co-extensive is unusual and
will be developed in detail in a separate section.
1$,Bal thasar, Glory J_, p. 20.
l7tBal thasar , Glory £, pp. 365-425.
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some type of synthetic operation of the intellect which grasps 
the "whole” intuitively (in an immediate perception), but sensu­
ally, seems to be what he has in mind. He discusses the "Spiritu­
al Senses" as part of the experience of faith. Experience of 
faith is crucial to Balthasar's aesthetics. I will explore this 
later in more depth. But, I point it out here because theological 
aesthetic perception is more than simple intellectus while that 
may also be a constituent dimension of it. Also, in this dis­
cussion Balthasar is very careful to avoid any systematization 
that would seem to suggest that a definitive psychological 
description of how Cod gives the light of faith to the human 
spirit could be given. But he is insistent that it is mediated 
through the senses even in mystical experiences.
Unity of Content and "Form" in the Act of Faith 
Since this primal "form" can only be seen in its unity, it
cannot be broken up critically into its constituent parts nor can 
it be gotten behind and transcended Platonical ly.171 Balthasar 
stresses the necessity to maintain in the hypostatic union, the 
unity between the life-form (Christ's human life) and the content 
(God's se1f-disciosure). This is essential to "the subjective 
unity of faith and vision in the Christian life" which would be 
"incomprehensible if it could not be elucidated in terms of a 
unity in the objective revelation which demands and conditions
m Ibid., pp. 20-21,
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it."in In other words, God's self-expression and disclosure in
Christ's human form is true to God's essence, without itself
being that essence. It is a revelation of God's glory without
being identical to God's glory.
The beauty and glory which are proper to God may be inferred 
and 'read' off from God's epiphany and its incomprehensible 
glory which is worthy of God himself. But in trying to 
perceive God's own beauty and glory from the beauty of his 
manner of appearing, we must neither simply equate the two-- 
since we are to be transported per hunc (Deum visibilem) in 
invisiblium amorem--nor ought we to attempt to discover 
God's beauty by a mere casual inference from the beauty of 
God's epiphany, for such an inference would leave this 
epiphany behind. We must, rather, make good our excessus to 
God himself with a theologia negativa which never detaches 
itself from its basis in a theologia positva: DUM visibi1i t- 
er cognosc imus.173
Here, the analogy to human personal self-expression and 
disclosure helps us to understand. When one honestly self-dis- 
closes there is an integrity or fittingness between the chosen 
form of self-expression and the person who is being expressed in 
the self-expression. What is intended here also is reflected in
natural aesthetic form, wherein there is a fittingness or integ­
rity between the form and what the artist is expressing. Personal 
being, in its self-possession, possesses the truth of its self in 
complete freedom of choice of self-expression. But, a true self- 
expression truly reveals the person in that self-expression. 
However, when we apply this to Christ, the person of the Logos
inIbid., p. 435. 
*”lbid., p. 124.
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revealed in Him, is ever greater in dissimilarity than any 
similarity we can perceive in His life-form.
Balthasar is concerned that this integrity between the form
and its content be preserved so that Christ not become a mere
symbol or sign Platonically pointing beyond himself to some
greater insight or spiritual reality.
And so it is fitting to remember in this context what we 
said earlier when we discussed the question of subjective 
evidence: in relation to the central phenomenon of revela­
tion we can by no means speak of 'signs’ which according to 
their nature, point beyond themselves to something 'signif­
ied'. Jesus the Man, in his visibleness, is not a sign 
pointing beyond himself to an invisible 'Christ of faith’-- 
whether this view is nuanced more in a Platonizing Catholic 
sense or in a criticistic Protestant manner. The image and 
expression of God, according to the Biblical assertion, is 
the indivisible God-man . . . .
If Christ is perceived more in terms of final causes he will no 
longer be seen as God’s self-expression, but as the instrument or 
occasion through which one seeks something deeper. Similarly, if 
in a Platonizing manner, the created human reality through and in 
which God has revealed is seen as concealing the spiritual or 
heavenly, Christ again becomes a means to enlightenment.
For now everything corporeal about Christ is simply regarded 
as an image that still conceals, and which stimulates us to 
seek and understand the spiritual element in him, and both 
things together become an occasion and a springboard from 
which we soar to the divine. Not only everything sacramental 
and institutional about the Church, but Christ's whole 
humanity thus becomes all too clearly something for those 
'simple' Christians who need material
advanced and the perfect can dispense 
spiritual core they have been able to
crutches, while 
with the symbol, 
reach
the
whose
1/5
lMIbid., p. 1*37. 
l”lbid., p. 437-38.
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Unity of Content and "Form" in Theology
Theology then, because its formal object is the "divine 
form" self-expressed by God in the Word made flesh, is "indissol­
ubly united to this visible form," and has therefore a necessary 
aesthetic quality. But, "aesthetic" must have the theological 
objective meaning and ontological grounding Balthasar has expli­
cated, rather than the purely subjective meaning current in the 
culture since the eighteenth century.174 However, the reality to 
the contrary is that theology has moved toward a
rational interpretation of Scripture (exegesis), of nature 
and history (fundamental theology), and of the ecclesiasti­
cal tradition (dogmatic theology). By thus neglecting the 
form of the Incarnation it has failed to do justice to 
revelation itself as Christians have concretely received it. 
The form thereby becomes reduced to a mere sign pointing 
toward a mystery that lies entirely beyond it.* 177
Balthasar seeks to "reintegrate grace and nature, thought 
and feeling, body and mind, culture and theology within a syn­
thetic, comprehensive, theological reflection on form."171 But, 
form is simply the way, through one's life-form, we perceive the 
unity of the transcendental attributes of a personal "being," 
under the appearance of "beauty," if they have lived with true 
integrity. More germane to our subject, it is the way that God's 
presence in Christ is perceived. The mystery of Being is revealed 
in Christ, so philosophy is a necessary part of theology. Thus,
l74Dupre, p. 385-387.
l77Ibid., p. 385-86. 
171 Ibid., p. 386.
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there is the necessity of rediscovering the necessary connection
between metaphysics (meta-anthroplogy) and theology, if we are to
truly perceive and understand Christ. But, this is difficult in a
milieu still colored by the skepticism of the Enlightenment.
It is more difficult because our eyes lose their acumen for 
form and we become accustomed to read things by starting 
from the bottom and working our way up, rather than by 
working from the whole to the parts. Our multi-faceted 
glance is, indeed, suited to the fragmentary and the quanti­
tative: we are the world's and the soul's analysts and no 
longer have the vision for wholeness. For this reason, 
psychology (in the contemporary sense of that term) has 
taken the place of philosophy. For this reason, too, we no 
longer credit man with the ability to achieve form, whether 
metaphysically or ethical ly ,in
Two Essential Dimensions of a Theological Aesthetics 
It is the primal form in Christ that is the formal object of
the act of faith and as we saw earlier, the source of the author­
ity of God which is the motive of faith. If perception of the 
primal form in Christ through his life-form is the object of 
faith, it is also the object of theology. But the kind of percep­
tion of Christ which takes place in seeing this primal form, or 
the object of faith, is not a detached observation. God in Christ 
encounters the believer, and vice versa. One cannot encounter God 
in a detached manner. In our judgment about God's presence in 
Christ, we judge ourselves in the light of God's Word, as the 
Gospel of John carefully points out. In the act of faith, and 
therefore in a theological aesthetics, there are two essential 
dimensions. One is the seeing of the real, the objective presence
inBalthasar, Glory J_, p. 25.
86
of God in Christ. ". . .[A]n object which is actually 'God* but 
God as 'mediated* (per) by the 'sacramental form of the mystery*
J
(mysterium) of the 'enfleshed Word*'* This first perception is 
meant in the sense of taking into oneself, allowing to become 
part of oneself "of something true . . . which is offering . 
itself." The object itself provides through its splendor the 
light in which we see light, and therefore in our seeing we allow 
it to become part of us.111 Ve are not offered something which we 
are "compelled to accept obediently in blind and naked faith 
something hidden" from us. Rather, "something is 'offered* to man 
by God, indeed offered in such a way that man can see it, under­
stand it, make it his own, and live from it in keeping with his 
human nature." This light of faith is God's invisible love; "the 
lux tuae claritatis, is the appearance of God's amor invisibi1- 
is."
The second dimension builds on the first. Our perception of 
God's amor (eros), or God's going out of Himself in Christ, is a 
function of the goodness and truth of God perceived as beauty or 
glory. God's eros stimulates a like eros in us, causing us in 
response to freely go out of ourselves to God. This needs to be 
understood in a strictly theological sense, the theological sense 
of enthusiasm.1*1 "The enthusiasm which is inherent to the Chris­
tian faith is not merely idealistic; it is, rather, an enthusiasm
“’ibid., p. 120. 
“‘ibid., pp. 121-22.
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which derives from and is appropriate to actual, realistic Be-
These two dimensions or phases Balthasar calls the theory of
vision and the theory of rapture. The first he equates with
fundamental theology and its central question as he defined it:
How is God's revelation in Christ perceived? The second he
equates with dogmatic theology. That is, "'aesthetics' as a
theory about the incarnation of God's glory and the consequent
elevation of man to participate in that glory.”
For the object with which we are concerned is man's partici­
pation in God which, from God's perspective, is actualized 
as 'revelation' (culminating in Christ's Godmanhood) and 
which, from man's perspective, is actualized as 'faith' 
(culminating in participation in Christ's Godmanhood). This 
double and reciprocal ekstasis--God’s 'venturing forth’ to 
man and man's to God--constitutes the very content of dogma­
tics, which may thus rightly be presented as a theory of
rapture: the admirable commercium et conubi um between God 111and man in Christ as Head and Body.
As Balthasar points out the methodological implication is 
that fundamental theology and dogmatics are as inseparable as the 
two dimensions of faith from which they flow. Those on the road 
to faith are already moving in the dawn of the light of faith and 
are being drawn by the light of the object of faith as Balthasar 
has defined it. In dogmatics faith continues to grow as a tides 
quarens intellectum.
But this continued growth is not to be thought of as a leap 
from the preambula fidei of fundamental theology and the 
evidence it provides . . . --a leap to pure fiducial faith.
“lIbid., p. 123. 
“’ibid., pp. 125-26.
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Rather, the facts of revelation are perceived initially in 
the light of grace, and faith grows in such a way that it 
allows the se1f-evidence of these facts--an evidence that 
itself was 'enrapturing' from the outset--to continue to 
unfold according to its own laws and principles. . . . Paul,
in the locus classicus of his theological aesthetics, never­
theless speaks of a 'vision of the Lord's splendor with un­
veiled face', through which 'we are transformed into the 
same image' (2 Cor 3.18). Paul thus unites vision and rap­
ture as a single process.lM
The Place of Theological Aesthetics in Theology 
As we have seen Balthasar is insisting against "supernatural
rationalism" that Cod, the formal object of faith, is actually 
encountered and known in Christ's life-form. Despite the abyss of 
dissimilarity between God in Himself and created being, God can 
manifest Himself through created being by means of the hypostatic
union of the divine and human natures in Christ. The act of faith
includes both pistis and gnosis. The trusting self-surrender of 
pistis is to a truly perceived objective vision of God in Christ 
(gnosis), which is a perception of God's kenotic love in Christ. 
The light of faith is God's love to which the only response can 
be love--the love of God for Himself in us through the Holy 
Spirit ("God's love has been poured into our hearts through the 
Holy Spirit that has been given to us" (Rom. 5.5)). At the same 
time he is answering the Protestant extreme that requires faith 
to be a blind leap. For Balthasar is insisting that there is an 
analogy of being which makes faith possible through created 
being. The Protestant view of faith has its Kierkegaardian
th Ibid., pp. 126-27.
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subjective, existential school and its Hegelian idealistic 
school. Against all these views Balthasar is insisting on the 
unity of theology and philosophy, that Being must be allowed to 
reveal God. Or, better, that God must be allowed to reveal 
Himself through and in Being, while retaining his ever greater 
dissimilarity from created Being.115
Balthasar distinguishes theological aesthetics from two 
other ways of reading revelation, the rationalist and the tran­
scendental-personal ist . He describes the rationalist approach
first.
According to the first of these, we may see in it historical 
signs and the manifestations of an acting God. These signs 
are witnesses of the highest personal urgency which of 
themselves prove themselves to be signs of God, and which 
mean to be read and understood as such .... Whoever 
distrusts their demonstration of the divine authority speak­
ing through them would be acting contrary to the laws of 
human discernment, both of theoretical reason (which has 
here received evidence of credibility) and of practical 
reason (which orders that one should entrust oneself to a 
trustworthy witness). Thus understood, the rationality of 
faith rests totally on the persuasive character of the 
revelatory signs, their power to convince man's reason . . .
. This is an anthropological theory of faith which dispenses 
with the philosophical dimension, the faith-theory of posi­
tive theology as developed primarily by the Baroque scholas­
ticism and Neo-Scholasticism of the Jesuits.lM
Theology in this theory of faith proceeds from first principles 
and rationally constructs its system. The object of faith is not 
encountered in Christ, that vision must await the beatific 
vision. There is no continuity between faith's vision now and the
beatific vision.
1<5Balthasar discusses these issues in Glory J., pp. 131-147. 
th Ibid., p. 147-148.
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The second way of reading revelation, the transcendental- 
personalist, does from the beginning focus attention on the 
formal object of faith: "God's eternal truth as he is in himself
and as he witnesses to himself in revelation." But the eternal
truth of who God is in himself is identified with the depths or 
inwardness of absolute Being. The mystery of God's inner life and 
love is manifested in the depths of philosophy's formal object. 
Consequently, this theory of faith "tends to build on the founda­
tion, first, of the spiritual subject's cognitive dynamism and, 
second, on the luminous and illuminating character proper to 
absolute Being." This theory is a form of Alexandrian or Augus­
tinian i 11 umini sm.1,7 The Logos who is the light of Being, shines 
directly into the human spirit in a way that the intellect 
receives the Word "as a kind of grace and revelation . . . ."
What is specifically Christian in revelation is raised above the 
valid object of philosophy. Historical facts simply become part 
of the "final dynamism of cognition." The transition of faith to 
theology from philosophy is made by translating "the general 
philosophical theory of knowledge into the Christian Trinitarian 
mode. . . ." Christ is seen "as the redeeming illuminator of the
mind and revealer of the Father.”lM Faith then is an inchoate
l,7For a good discussion of St. Augustine and iiluminism, see 
Frederick Copleston, S.J. A History of Philosophy, Vol 2. Mediaeval 
Philosophy. Part I. Augustine to Bonaventure. Garden City, NY: 
Image Books, 1962, Chapter IV.
l,,Bal thasar, Glory _I_, p. 1^8.
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beatific vision. Balthasar includes Blondel, Scheuer, Marechal,
and Rousselot with those who
in a moderate way take their departure from the subjective 
dynamism of cognition and act, and who then argue to the 
interior appropriateness and reasonableness of the transcen­
dent faith act, made possible by the light of grace, from 
the 'restless heart' of man, from its need and emptiness 
(Masure), and from unlimited expectat ions .l,)
The advantages of this approach are that extrinicism and 
heteronomy are removed; both the natural and supernatural aspects 
of the act of faith are preserved and grounded objectively upon 
Revelation, and subjectively and existentially on the human 
spirit's dynamic orientation to its formal object. But, whether 
the objective grounding in Revelation is adequate is in question. 
Also, there is the question whether philosophy by the internal 
standards or structures of the human spirit becomes the measure 
of Revelation. Faith tends to move toward immediate mystical 
and interior experience "which half enjoys the light of the 
eschatological visio beats.”
Balthasar sees each of these approaches as attaining only 
"one side of Christian faith, and the insight and vision which 
belongs to it." Both need to be purified from the common defi­
ciency of referring to the historical events of revelation as 
"signs." The rationalist approach treats the signs as pointers to 
God which themselves do not "stand within the light of divine 
Being. The transcendental-personalist approach, by emphasizing
l”lbid., p. 149. 
t« Ibid., p. 149.
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the interior immediacy of revelation, makes the signs "so trans­
parent . . . that in the sign only the signified is of interest, 
and in the historical only that which is valid for eternity."1’1 
The dualism of "ostensive sign and signified interior light . . . 
. can be abolished only by introducing . . . the thought- forms 
and categories of the beautiful." The light of the form as it 
appears in the phenomenon of its beauty does not come from
outside the form but shines out from its interior.
Visible form not only 'points’ to an invisible, unfathomable 
mystery; form is the apparition of this mystery, and reveals 
it while, naturally, at the same time protecting and veiling 
it. . . . The content (Gehalt) does not lie behind the form 
(Gestalt), but within it. Whoever is not capable of seeing 
and 'reading' the form will, by the same token, fail to 
perceive the content. Whoever is not illumined by the form will see no light in the content either.1,1
For Balthasar the perception of the beauty of God's love in 
Christ is crucial to a proper understanding of the truth and 
goodness in Christ's love. Theoretical reason, with truth per se 
as its object, without seeing the splendor of the truth, "remains 
pragmatic and formalistic." Its "only concern . . .will then 
merely be the verification of correct facts and laws . . . ." 
Without seeing the beauty of the good, practical reason "remains 
utilitarian and hedonistic." How it satisfies my good or my needs 
will be the focus. Only the value of the being-for-me will be 
seen, not the desirability of the being-in-itself. For the faith- 
perceiver to go out of himself to God, aesthetic reason must be
in Ibid
p. 150. 
p. 151.• 1
di Ibid.,
93
allowed to be part of the act of faith and the doing of theol-
In the luminous form of the beautiful the being of the 
existent becomes perceivable as nowhere else, and this is 
why an aesthetic element must be associated with all spiri­
tual perception as with all spiritual striving. The quality 
of 'being-in-itself' which belongs to the beautiful, the 
demand the beautiful makes to be allowed to be what it is, 
the demand, therefore, that we renounce our attempts to 
control and manipulate it, in order truly to be able to be 
happy by enjoying it: all of this is, in the natural realm, 
the foundation and foreshadowing of what in the realm of 
revelation and grace will be the attitude of faith.1’*
Revelation and Experience: The Experience of Fai th
Experience Must Be Part of the Act of Faith
The act of faith contains the two related dimensions of a
perceivable object and a response that is part of the perception
of the object. The response is part of the perception because the
light of God's love for Himself is that in which the believer
participates in order to "see."
The eye with which the believer sees God, as Eckhart force­
fully expressed it, is the eye with which God sees himself. 
In modern language, the conditions for the possibility of 
'theological knowledge' are the very conditions that consti­
tute the 'theological' object, with this important restric­
tion that the object itself provides the conditions for its 
knowledge.
193 Ibid., p. 152; Balthasar points out here that aesthetic 
perception is a "fact beyond reasonable doubt." He says: "Nor is it 
now our concern to ask in what (epistemological) manner form is 
perceived--what, for instance, the significance of 'intuition' is 
for human perception. It is enough to accept that the aesthetic 
'seeing the form' is a fact beyond reasonable doubt." Ibid.
lHIbid., p. 153.
1)5Dupre, p. 402.
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The unity of faith and experience are critical to the theological 
standing of Balthasar's theological aesthetics.1 * * * * *’* If the act of 
faith in the perception of the form of God's love in Christ does 
not include in its essence a true mediated experience of God, 
then any claim that there is a true "gnosis” is empty. The "form" 
becomes a mere aesthetic form detached from its content.
A study of theological form then, turns into a branch of 
natural aesthetics . . . wherein the form functions only as
the appearance of a totally different, supernatural reality. 
For von Balthasar, the gnosis of theology grows entirely out 
of the experience of faith and belongs to the same order.1’7 
Balthasar's theology of the experience which is part of the
act of faith is built on the nature of human existence as recep­
tivity and the nature of the grace of the light of faith. To 
perceive God's love in Christ is to see that the essence of 
Christ's love response to the Father is humble and grateful 
obedience. To put one's faith in Christ is to enter into Christ's 
experience. It involves a going out of oneself, a surrender of 
"one's self and knowledge as the norm of experience."1”
l’*For commentary on Balthasar's approach to experience, see in 
addition to Dupre's comments: Christophe Potworowski, "Christian 
Experience in Hans Urs von Balthasar." Communio 20 (Spring, 1993)1:
107-117; Peter Casarella, "Experience as a Theological Category:
"Hans Urs von Balthasar on the Christian Encounter With God's
Image." Communio 20 (Spring, 1993)1: 118-128. Potworowski and
Casarella read these articles at the second meeting of the 
Balthasar Society, held in conjunction with the 1992 Convention of 
the Catholic Theological Society of America. One place Balthasar 
treats the topic at length is in Glory. £, pp. 219-425.
*’7Ibid.
HlPotworowski, p. 113.
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As an attitude, faith is the surrender of one's own experi­
ence to the experience of Christ, and Christ's experience is 
one of kenotic humiliation and self-renunciation, a reality 
which . . . rests on the foundation of Christ's hypostatic
consciousness as Redeemer. For this reason, in 'mysticism' 
[and analogously in Christians everywhere] every deeper 
experience of . . . God will be a deeper entering into . . .
the 'non-experience' of faith, into the loving renunciation 
of experience, all the way into the depths of the 'Dark 
Nights' of John of the Cross, which constitutes the real 
mystical training for the ultimate renunciation.1”
This paradox of faith as an experience of letting go of 
experience as the norm of our knowing of God and His ways, while 
it is a painful surrender of an illusory autonomy, is an entry
into and growth of the infinite freedom and love of the Trinity. 
That love is an obedience to goodness and truth which have their
inexhaustible origin in God, and can only be received in Christ, 
through the power of the Holy Spirit. Such faith is a true entry 
into and growth in participation in the life and "missions" of 
the Trinity, an entry into the obedience of God to His own 
essence and reality, which is kenotic love. Christ is the Trini-
tarian obedience incarnated. He is the immanent life of the
Trinity lived economically in human flesh. Given the infinite 
reciprocal self-renunciation which grounds the infinite recipro­
cal self-gift of the life of the Trinity, this participation can 
only be a gift that is received though the gift of the Holy
l”Bal thasar, Glory J., p. 412-13.
!”"Thus, he must already be obedient even as God, and his human 
obedience unto death must be the epiphany of a divine--that is, 
tr ini tar ian--obedience. In the Son of Man there appears not God 
alone; necessarily, there also appears the inner-trintarian event 
of his procession; there appears the triune God, who, as God, can 
command absolutely and obey absolutely and, as the Spririt of love, 
can be the unity of both." Ibid., p. 479.
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Spirit. Christ's obedience, and ours, are the obedience of 
Trinitarian love.
The kingship of God, who reveals himself as love, is shown 
to us in the humble obedience of the Son to the Father, and 
so we are shown that this obedience is essentially love. It 
is certainly the model for human love before the majesty of 
God, but more than that, it is the supreme image of divine 
love itself appearing. For it is precisely in the Kenosis of 
Christ (and nowhere else) that the inner majesty of God's 
love appears, of God who 'is love' (1 John 4.8) and there­
fore a trinity. The Trinity, though to our reason an unap­
proachable light, is the one hypothesis which clarifies the 
phenomenon of Christ as he is present in Scripture, the 
Church and history, because it is phenomenologically ade­
quate, and does not do violence to the facts. 1
The Christian life-form, in whatever particular vocation it 
may be expressed, is thus a participation in a Trinitarian Theo- 
drammatic, a drama of God's love for His creation, and God’s 
action in it to redeem it for participation in the Trinitarian 
life. Human ontological receptivity is then the natural ground 
for the receptivity of the Trinitarian life, which is in the
economic order the life of Christian faith. Christians are called
to enter by faith into the "begottenness" and the "mission" of
the Son to the world, receiving fully the Father's kenotic life,
and in that reception to live it fully in the Son in the world,
in the power of the Holy Spirit.
This attitude is the loving assumption of the will of the 
loved Father, and in the identical act the Father loves the 
Son and the world, and allows the Son to bring back the 
world to the Father in his self-giving even to the point of 
death. Thus the willingness of the disciple who has been 
called to allow himself to be disposed of is taken up di­
rectly into the universal saving will of God. It is, in 
Jesus' call, the permission to offer one's existence to this
nt Balthasar. Love Alone . 71-72.
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saving will to be disposed of by it. Everything rests on the 
triune iove of the Father: the one who offers himseif turns 
to it as the origin of ali love. And in the free obedience 
of the Son whom the disciple follows, this love of the Father appears to him concretely .in
Experience as the ground of gnosis in the act of faith is, I 
believe, the link which binds fundamental theology to dogmatic 
theology in Balthasar's thought. How we know Christ cannot be 
separated from knowing Christ, except in a theoretical way. The 
knowledge or experience which is at the heart of the act of faith 
is the fountainhead of that knowledge of Christ, and Cod in 
Christ, which is the object of theology. But, there is an addi­
tional dimension of knowing which is anticipated and grounded in 
the act of faith, which is vital to theology and logically 
conditions it. That is the subject of Theo-Drama. the second leg 
of Balthasar’s trilogy. It is there that Balthasar treats at 
length the question of how infinite freedom and finite freedom as 
receptivity can be compatible without dissolving finite autonomy 
into the infinite. As one might suspect from the foregoing, only 
love can provide the answer. I cannot, within the confines of 
this thesis, explore that topic further. I only want to highlight 
the fact that a theological aesthetics as a theology of percep­
tion cannot be separated from the Theo-dramatic life in Christ; 
that is, from the living of the divine life of faith which one 
enters into and continues to live by a perception which is
,lPotworowski , p. 115, fn. 2k, quoting Balthasar, "The Three 
Evangelical Counsels," in Elucidations. translated by John Riches. 
London: SPCK, 1975, 142. Emphasis by Potworowski.
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deepened in that very act of living in it. Balthasar situates his
Theo-drama between his aesthetics and his logic because it is in
fact at the heart of theology.2,3 The three phases, which cannot
be totally separated from each other, are explained by Balthasar
as the following:
Theo-phany = Aesthetics 
Theo-praxy = Dramatic theory 
Theo-logy = Logic
Now we will turn to the nature and grace issues implicit in the 
foregoing discussion, and examine the idea of analogy of being in 
more depth. Briefly put, the question is how in Christ we can 
participate in God's knowledge of himself by grace.
2,3Balthasar explains his plan and its basis in "Dramatic Theory 
Between Aesthetics and Logic," in Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic 
Theory I : Prologomena. trans. Graham Harrison. San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 1988, pp. 15-23.
CHAPTER I I I
THEO-DRAMATICS: LIFE IN CHRIST
The Unity of Reali ty
The Nature of the Problem
Balthasar's views on nature and grace and the unity of 
reality are intrinsically connected to his concept of "the 
analogy of being," which runs like a seam throughout his Christ­
ology and theology. The "new theology" controversy raised again 
in new form the challenge which the Enlightenment had raised with
respect to the possibility of objective revelation by God in 
human historical forms through which human beings could know with 
certainty the cognitive content of that revelation. The thrust of 
Enlightenment thought denied such a possibility. Christians 
affirmed it but struggled to articulate theologically and philo­
sophically the nature of the relationship between God and the 
world which made it possible. The problem was how to maintain the 
unity of reality with respect to God and creation, nature and
grace.
The neo-Platonic Augustinian synthesis which maintained the 
unity of reality had been called into question by the Aristote- 
1ian-Thomistic synthesis which also maintained the unity of 
reality, but with a tension between the realms of faith knowledge
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and that of reason. In the Thomistic synthesis which emphasized
the independence of reason in the realm of nature, philosophy if
misused could take over theology. As Balthasar says:
The most characteristic feature of Thomism is probably its 
strong emphasis on philosophy as something to be employed 
before and within theology. The indivisibility of this 
before and within probably testifies to the historical 
position of Thomas Aquinas better than anything else could. 
Behind him lay the world of the Church Fathers--the one, 
concrete supernatural order where philosophy stood within 
theology. Ahead of him lay the twofold order (natural versus 
supernatural) of modern times, which found its ultimate 
formulation in Vatican I (DZ 1799).
Balthasar sees St. Thomas as a transition figure pointing 
forward to the separation and autonomy of the natural and philo-
J A fsophical sciences from theology. He points out that though the 
three central "tractati" of theology, the Trinity, Christ, and 
the Church," structured and dominated St. Thomas’ thinking, they 
do "not hold a central structuring place in his theology. . . ."
In fact,
Thomistic thought operated emphatically from below up. From 
the world of sense perception and concrete experience it 
moves, through abstraction, to universal concepts and a 
demonstration of the principles contained therein. Here 
again we have a methodology that is predominantly philosoph­
ical; its use in theology is limited. Theology concentrates 
on God, the supreme concrete reality, in whom nothing can be 
abstracted, and insofar as theology examines the Revelation 
of this God in the world, its object is historical, con­
crete, and particular. Aquinas readily admitted this, but he 
went on to point out that particular realities "non perti­
nent ad per feet ionem intel 1 igibi 1 ium."lii
l,>Bal thasar, The Theology of Kar 1 Barth. p. 213. 
H5Ibid., pp. 213-15.
”‘lbid., p. 215.
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In his book on Karl Barth, Balthasar is contrasting St. 
Thomas' method from below with that of Karl Barth which is 
exclusively theological. He points out that Barth’s real concern 
is to ground theology in "concrete singulars and the absolute 
Concrete, where happening and doctrine are embodied in the person 
and activity of Christ." Balthasar agrees that this focus on the 
concrete historical events of Christ's life and on his person 
could "contribute a great deal to . . . renewal in Catholic
theology, even if his conclusions were not adopted.'4’7 Thus 
methodologically, the historical and concrete Christ should be 
the focus of how the unity of divine and human nature could be 
understood. But, the question remains as to how to approach the
union of the divine and the human in Christ.
Balthasar's Approach: Existence as Receptivity 
Theological or Philosophical Anthropology
Here we have a basic question about the essential nature of 
personal being and autonomy, and whether the essence and being of 
the human spirit can in the first place be determined by philo­
sophical anthropology, or whether it must of necessity be part of 
Revelation. Does philosophical anthropology or theological 
anthropology have priority? What is the proper method of ap­
proaching this question, from above or below? Concisely put, what
does Christ's obedience and freedom teach us about the essential
nature of personal being, knowing and loving? Is personal being
iv Ibid., pp. 216-217.
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primarily a quest for infinite knowledge of Being or is it a 
primarily a quest to enter into the infinite Triune freedom of 
God to receive and give love? What is the true nature of personal 
being and autonomy, and how can we know this? It is Balthasar's 
position that the descending nature of God's gift of self to us 
gives the initiative to God both as to the content of the gift 
and the form of its reception. Its form or content cannot be 
deduced philosophically from created reality. Therefore theologi­
cal method has to conform itself to the content and form of
revelation.
At every point the essential thing is this: that which is 
conferred by grace can be understood as being what it is 
[that is, grace], but it can never be logically reconstruct­
ed in retrospect. I cannot say: this is what I have always 
"really" been expecting, or what my mind and heart have 
always been oriented towards, so that only the slightest 
impulse from outside was required to allow my pre-under- 
standing to crystallize into perfect insight. That which 
offers itself with the basic character of free grace can 
never be overtaken rationally without destroying the dis­
tinctive quality of this grace.IM
The self-authenticating character of God's revelation in 
Christ does not permit philosophy to dissolve the mystery into
what can be known of human nature's existential or transcendental
needs. Balthasar uses an argument from St. Anselm of Canterbury 
in the following passage:
Faith must recognize the validity of the claim sufficiently 
in the claim itself to allow of assent. But it would not be 
faith if it were able to work out this validity in a ratio­
nal system and expound it exhaustively. There must always be
4 Werner Loser. "Being Interpreted as Love: Reflections on the 
Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar." Communio 16 (Fall, 1989)3: 
475-490, pp. 487-88, citing "Warum ich noch ein Christ bin."Zwei 
Pladoyers (Munich, 1971), 30.
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something which eludes or obstructs faith when it thinks 
that it is able to see through the conditions for the possi­
bility of the reality that stands before it. When Jesus 
says, "I am the Truth," "I am the Resurrection," he is 
saying that God is present in him. But: Si comprehend!s, non 
est Deus [if you understand it, it is not God]. If God 
interprets himself in Jesus Christ then Anselm's formula for 
God applies to this manifestation too: "id quo majus cogit- 
ari non potest [that than which nothing greater can be 
conceived]. The context makes it clear that this means 
neither exhaustive knowledge--as truth--nor a dynamic-com­
parative knowledge--as though the objective, utter "great­
ness" of God corresponded to a subjective, ever-expanding 
thought in man. It is rather that the majus [the greater] of 
the one who manifests himself takes possession of the cogit- 
atio [the thinking] in such a way that the latter, by ac­
knowledging its being over-mastered, praises the perfect 
victory of the inscrutable truth of God.20’
As previously noted, Balthasar agrees that "man must in 
himself be a search for God, a question posed to him."211 As we 
will see in this discussion of nature and grace, against Barth 
Balthasar will affirm the positivity of the human spirit, and the 
necessity that human beings have some minimum similarity to God 
to allow there to be a relationship. 21
21,Ibid., p. 488, citing "Warum ich noch ein Christ bin," 28ff.
2l#"On the one hand, this God, Creator of the world and of man, 
knows his creature. 'I who have created the eye, do I not see? I 
who have created the ear, do I not hear?' And we add 'I who have 
created language, could I not speak and make myself heard?' And 
this posits a counterpart: to be able to hear and understand the 
auto-revelation of God man must in himself be a search for God, a 
question posed to him. Thus there is no biblical theology without 
a religious philosophy. Human reason must be open to the infinite." 
Balthasar, Resume of My Thought. p. 2.
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Infinite and finite freedom
Any discussion of the human and divine in Christ, and the 
relation of nature and grace, must face the question of the 
relation between infinite and finite freedom.
In all acts of knowledge, including the primal phenomenon 
previously discussed in the section on "I" and "thou," the "I" in 
the consciousness of its presence to itself is aware of its self- 
possession of its own finite freedom. Balthasar points out the 
need to keep in mind the difference between the Thomistic view of 
one's self-awareness and that of the Augustinian school, particu­
larly St. Bonaventure. For St. Thomas the soul's habitual knowl­
edge of its own existence, which precedes any abstraction, is 
"only actualized indirectly, through its powers, which are 
distinct from the soul's essence and are referred to objects." 
Whereas the Augustinian school holds that "the reflex character 
of all intellectual knowledge involves the knower possessing him­
self, especially since Bonaventure makes no real distinction 
between the soul and its powers."211 I cannot enter in depth to 
Balthasar's extensive discussion of the nature of finite freedom, 
I can only set out here his position on the relationship between 
the two.212 The primal experience of this freedom as part of the 
primal phenomenon of "being" includes of necessity the awareness 
of infinite freedom on which it is dependent for its own freedom.
21lTD li, p. 207-208, fn. 2.
212See Ibid., pp. 207-242 for Balthasar's position.
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The awareness of the gift of "being" is also an awareness that 
one has not been given a subsisting "thing,"
but rather, the core of freedom, because in giving being,
God gives himself. In the gift, God himself is present, 
however much he remains hidden, distancing himself from the 
gift in the interest of human freedom .... Thus, the 
'character of existence as gift’ turns out to be the 'nucl­
eus' of ontological difference .... What it means to us 
to be the recipients of this gift is revealed in the encoun­
ter with another human who turns to us. Therefore the saying 
is especially valid today: "The metaphysical question is 
about Thou. As over against the cosmos it seems to be bur­
ied, . . . but it is always about to burst forth" . . . ?13
Balthasar's statement of the Christian task summarizes the
solution to the relationship between finite and infinite freedom:
The Christian task, in the face of the Stoic and Plotinian 
enterprise, is to heighten the formal model into a relation­
ship between freedoms according to which finite freedom can 
only arise out of, and persist within, primal freedom . . .
; it is precisely because it has its origin in freedom that 
it is really free.
I. The Christian answer to the Neoplatonic paradox . .
. is the New Testament doctrine of the Holy Spirit, who, as 
the love of God poured into the hearts of believers, brings 
about two things at the same time: he liberates finite 
freedom so that it may embrace its own, ultimate freedom; 
and he does so by initiating it into a participation in 
infinite freedom.31*
The revelation of the full meaning of finite human freedom 
and the necessity of its dependence on infinite freedom for 
fulfillment is found only in Christ. It is in Christ's exercise 
of his human freedom, in the context of the hypostatic union 
between divine and human natures in one person, that the meaning
of human and divine freedom is revealed. It is in Christ that we * ll
llJBieler, p. 141-42, citations omitted.
ll*Bal thasar, TD _I_I_, p. 230.
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see both the epitome of human freedom and obedience, which is at 
the same time a manifestation of the Son's relationship with the 
Father lived out in the economic order. How can Christ have human
freedom given the oneness of His person in the Word? This is the 
ultimate problem of the analogia entis. I cannot develop here the
manner in which Balthasar demonstrates how this can be worked out 
on the level of Christ’s human consciousness.115 But the fact 
that Christ does have complete human freedom reveals the onto­
logical reality that human freedom can be dependent on infinite 
freedom without being destroyed--rather that dependence assures 
its fulfillment if it is accepted. Existence for Balthasar, in 
its ontological, epistemological and interpersonal dimensions, is 
receptivity. We turn now to how this receptivity allows reality 
divine and human, uncreated and created, to be in unity.
The Problem of "Nature"
Another aspect of St. Thomas' transitional character is 
illustrated by his view of "nature," which is much in dispute in 
the "new theology." St. Thomas "attributes only one end, a 
supernatural one, to the created spirit. Like the Church Fathers 
he sees only one indivisible world order in which nature and 
grace form one unity."2lt While he recognizes a natural end for 
the created spirit it cannot be separated, even hypothetically,
H5Balthasar works out this ultimate problem of "analogia entis" 
in the consciousness of Christ based on his consciousness of 
mission. See TD III, pp. 220ff.
n$Balthasar, The Theology of Kar1 Barth. pp. 217-218.
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from the supernatural end. The Reformers, followed later by Baius 
and Jansen, tried to make the synthesis of nature and grace 
present in Augustine's thought, a matter of right. Baius insisted 
that God could not deny grace to man without destroying his very 
personhood, for grace was necessary for man to be man. This posi­
tion forced the Church to insist on the separation of the natural 
and supernatural orders so as to defend the gratuity of grace and 
God's freedom. In turn gratuity and God's freedom defend the 
distinction between God and creatures. But this defense led to 
the development of a "natural theology" which had as its object 
"nature in the pure state (natura pura)."717
The concept of "nature," Balthasar points out, has been used 
ambiguously in philosophy and theology. The Church in her reac­
tion to Baius was refining the concept of nature so as to protect 
the gratuity of grace. As Chalcedon clarified the patristic 
debate over natures and person in Christ, the period from Trent 
to Vatican I developed the clarification of the whole order of 
grace. In the definition of a twofold order at Vatican I, the 
process started by Baius reached its consummation.711 Balthasar 
sees that the only way to avoid the extremes of a pantheistic 
metaphysics which cannot distinguish between philosophy and 
theology, and a "radically Protestant dialectics" which splits 
the concept of nature, is to use the concept of nature analogous­
ly.
7l7Ibid., pp. 218, 219-221.
7“lbid., pp. 220-221.
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But Balthasar insists that the starting point cannot be a 
philosophical analysis of what human nature is apart from Cod. 
Such an analysis cannot achieve insight into the nature of God o 
how God relates to human nature. Revelation and faith give the
realization that our vocation to the beatific vision can "in no 
way be regarded as deducible from the essence or being of a 
creature." Only God through revelation can give a positive 
definition of grace.
The positive definition of grace can oniy be given through 
grace itself. God himself must reveal what he is within 
himself. The creature cannot delimit himself clearly over 
against this unknown quantity nor can he know exactly what 
distinguishes grace from himself. Only Revelation can clari 
fy the distinction for us.!!i
The de facto real world God created is one in which human beings 
are in fact ordered to a supernatural vocation. But it is "the 
union of two distinguishable and distinct orders that are not 
separable in reality. ”“l The philosopher cannot know by reason 
alone the nature of the relationship between the two orders. But 
"(a]s tides quarens intellectum, faith can distinguish between 
the two realms and probe the structure of this complex reality."
But faith cannot do this by simply taking over the philo­
sophical definition of "nature;" it can do so only by redefining 
the terms used in light of the theological reality. This is 
similar to the process which took place in the definition of the
“’ibid., PP
“‘ibid., PP
“‘ibid., P-
223- 4.
224- 5.
225.
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terms "nature" and "person" used to resolve the christological 
issues in the Councils leading up to Chalcedon. The element of 
mystery in the nature of the relationship between God and humani­
ty must remain, for faith to be faith. Consequently, the concrete 
analogy of being and the conceptual and abstract analogy of 
"nature," "do not neatly coincide with one another."
As one man has no rightful claim to the full self-disclosure 
of another man, so analogously creatures have no right to 
God's self-disclosure in Revelation. Here we have a real 
analogy, because a real analogy exists between the divine 
and human subject. It is only an analogy, however, because
the divine subject is both nearer to, and farther from, theIIIhuman subject than any other human thou is.
Analogy of Being: Nature and Supernature 
Theoretically, it would seem that the way to proceed to
achieve a definition of "nature" would be to deduce it by sub­
traction from all that is supernatural in human nature. But 
Balthasar argues that "the content of the concept of pure nature 
cannot be given exact elucidation." The proper approach is to 
focus only on the real world, "which is the only legitimate 
object of theological thought."113 Balthasar carefully delineates 
the nature-grace relationship as reflecting the fundamental 
reality of the dissimilarity between God and creatures, without
’“ibid., pp. 226-227.
“3Ibid., p. 228; By now Balthasar's basic phenomenological 
approach to theological reality should be clear. His method has 
been called a "theological phenomenology.” Medard Kehl, S.J. "Hans 
Urs von Balthasar: A Portrait," pp. 34-35. But it is a realist 
phenomenology, not limited to the phenomenon of the appearance in 
consciousness.
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denying the similarity. At the same time he emphasizes that 
theology must recognize the "servant status surrounding creat­
ion's relationship to God." Nature is a formal concept which 
represents that minimum which is the condition which makes 
possible any situation
. . . where God might choose to reveal himself to creation;
that minimum can be called the analogy of being. If there is 
to be Revelation, it must move from God to a creation, to a 
creation that does not include the notion of Revelation in 
and of itself. The nature which is presupposed by grace is 
createdness as such.11*
God's freedom is protected in that the decision to create
such a creation to which God will give a participation in the
Triune inner life, is a free one. But,
this decision must take the form of the analogy of being, 
which is grounded in the essence of God himself. Created 
being as such must be nondivine, relative, and dependent, 
but it cannot be wholly dissimilar to its creator. If it is 
a spiritual-inte1lectual being, both its ontic and its 
noetic structures must bear some relation to its creator.
Its thinking process must be affected somehow by the fact 
that it was thought up by the creator?1’
This minimum condition of possibility, which Balthasar calls 
"analogy of being" and on which the "theological contingency" 
depends, is not something into which the theological contingency 
can ultimately be dissolved. "Theology is not a superstructure 
built atop philosophy." With respect to the analogy of being 
referred to here, Balthasar is careful to point out that the 
philosophical does not blend smoothly into the theological. The
“‘ibid., p. 228. 
H5Ibid., p. 229.
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difference between God and creature is qualitative and not simply 
a matter of degree. One cannot move from philosophy to theology 
(from below to above) or from theology to philosophy (from above 
to below), and combine them to form an integrated total. "The two 
movements point towards each other, but they can never meet in a 
total, unifying embrace. This very fact is proof of the differ­
ence between them."114
Again and again, Balthasar stresses in agreement with Barth 
"that being God and being creature are totally dissimilar as 
such." However, this dissimilarity is stressed when we talk about 
nature as the basis of the difference between God and man. On the
other hand, grace stresses the similarity and communion between 
God and man. But what grace does is allow man to know God by the 
Logos taking on "a creaturely shape ('the servant of Yahweh') and 
even in the forma peccati, which is radically dissimilar to 
God. The theological analogy does not complete or abolish the 
philosophical, rather it "sheds definitive light on what the 
philosophical analogy is as such: it shows us what the similarity 
can mean (i.e., participation and sonship) and how far the
J J 1dissimilarity can go (i.e., God's abandonment of himself)."
Balthasar establishes the possibility of distance between
God and the creature "in the infinite distance between the divine
n‘lbid., pp. 229-230. 
111 Ibid. , p. 230 . 
n‘lbid., pp. 230-231.
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J J Apersons within the Trinity itself." Moreover, the distance 
contained in the formal concept of nature is based on Jesus
Christ Himself.
All creation is grounded in the Logos, more precisely, in
Jesus Christ. The possibility of creation being distant from
God derives ultimately from the Son's readiness to empty 
himself, to stand over against his father in a relationship 
of obedience and service. The relationship between the 
necessity of nature's presence and the contingent fact of 
Revelation becomes plain when we realize that the distance 
of formal nature is a real presupposition for the descent of 
the Logos to humanity; that, at the same time, on a higher 
plane, the formal concept of nature presupposes the Son's 
willingness to make this descent.231
Union of Nature and Supernature in Christ
Balthasar's views on nature and grace, his stress on the 
dissimilarity between God and creature while affirming the 
similarity, the relationship between the theological analogy and 
the philosophical, flow directly from a theological analysis of 
the hypostatic union of natures in Christ, the Word made flesh. 
Along with de Lubac, and in conformity with the patristic tradi­
tion, he seeks to reunite nature and grace by enfolding nature 
within grace, but maintaining its distinctness. The key to this
w Ibid., pp. 
between the two 
distance 
roots in
230, 236. 
sub j ects 
that belongs to 
the distance 
the Trinity, and it is 
visible to us and 
Word and faith in
repeat once 
not created 
itself, but
again. The distance 
by grace. It is a 
it has its deepest
"Let us 
here is 
nature
that prevails between the divine persons in
grace which makes this interdivine distance 
makes possible a fruitful interchange between 
the distance that separates God and creature.
Since participation in the Trinitarian persons is the purpose for 
which creaturely personhood and subjectness was provided, it is 
also the thing that grounds and makes possible this natural sub­
strate Ibid. 236.
no Ibid., p. 231.
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is the concrete reality of the hypostatic union. How can God 
become man without dissolving Christ's humanity into His divinity 
as in monophysitism? Or, without losing His divinity in His 
humanity, as in Nestorianism? Balthasar's christocentric perspec­
tive on nature and grace is clear from this passage:
It is in Christ that human nature and its mental faculties 
are located in their true center; it is in him that they 
attain their final truth in the manner in which God, the 
creator of nature, wanted nature to exist from eternity. In 
order to investigate the relation between supernature and 
nature, man does not need to step outside faith; he does not 
need to make himself the mediator between God and the world, 
between revelation and reason; he does not need to cast 
himself in the excessive role of judge over the relation 
between the natural and the supernatural world. All that he 
needs is to understand and believe in "the single mediator 
between God and man, the man Jesus Christ" (1 Tim. 2:5) "in 
whom all things in heaven and earth were created . . . all
through him and for him" (Col. 1:16). Just as Christ did not 
leave the Father when he became man to bring creation in all 
its spheres to fulfillment, so also the Christian does not 
need to step outside the center, Christ, to mediate Christ 
to the world, to understand his relation to the world, to
build the bridge between revelation and nature, between
231philosophy and theology.
To understand the theological positions Balthasar adopts on 
analogy of being we need to explore his understanding of Christ 
as the center of Creation and Revelation, and the self-expression 
of God in a truly human medium.
niHans Urs von Balthasar, "Theology and Sanctity." Explorations 
in Theology I: The Word Made Flesh. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1989, pp. 181-209 at p. 195; retranslation by Angelo Scola, "Nature 
and Grace in Hans Urs von Balthasar." Communio 18 (Summer 1991)2: 
207-26, at 207-8.
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Creation in Christ
It is apparent from the above passage that a key insight 
into the centrality of Christ in creation is the fact that 
everything in creation was made "through Christ and for him."
This includes humanity, and makes the Logos the archetype for 
Christ, the God-man, and therefore for "humanness." Balthasar 
emphasizes the theme of creation in Christ in "the proper, 
absolute, and objective sense."132 Another way of saying this is 
that "humanness" was created precisely for the archetype itself, 
the Son, that he might become the image without ceasing to be the 
archetype. Thus, "the humanity of Christ shows itself to be the 
singular humanity of the Son of God. For this reason it is the 
complete form of the human."232 3
An important consequence of Balthasar's emphasis on the 
theme of creation in and for Christ is the primacy he give« to
God
who always acts first, setting himself in (creational) 
relationship over against all human movements of ascent and 
transcendence. These are by no means devalued, but they 
receive their deepest meaning only from the prior relation­
ship of the creator to humankind. 3*
It also means that human beings must have some minimal similarity 
to God (formal nature, analogy of being) which permits the hypo­
static union without confusion or mingling of natures. This
232 Scola, "Nature and Grace in Hans Urs von Balthasar," p. 211.
233 Ibid., p. 213.
23*Kehl, "A Portrait," p. 21; Kehl notes: "It is precisely this 
primacy that he sees as not wholly preserved in the transcendental 
theology of Marechal and Rahner." Ibid., fn. 55.
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similarity permits Revelation of God through and in creation by a 
"genuine self-representation on his part, a genuine unfolding of 
himself in the worldly stuff of nature, man and history--an event
which in a supereminent sense may be called an 'appearance' or
* • » » "235epiphany .
Why did God create something he did not need? Balthasar says
that the answer to this question can come only from Revelation.
The Christian response is contained in these two fundamental 
dogmas: that of the Trinity and that of the Incarnation. In 
the Trinitarian dogma God is one, good, true, and beautiful 
because he is essentially Love, and Love supposes the one, 
the other, and their unity. And if it is necessary to sup­
pose the Other, the Word, the Son, in God, then the other­
ness of the creation is not a fall, a disgrace, but an image 
of God, even as it is not God.
And as the Son in God is the eternal icon of the Fa­
ther, he can without contradiction assume in himself the 
image that is the creation, purify it, and make it enter 
into the communion of the divine life without dissolving it
. . . . It is here that one must distinguish nature and„U(grace.
Christ the Concrete "Analogia Ent i s"
The tension between dissimilarity/similarity finds its basis 
and its zenith in the hypostatic union of the two natures in
Christ. "Between the divine and the created natures there is an
717essential abyss. It cannot be circumvented." "Analogia entis"
is an all embracing law that
. . . according to the Fourth Lateran Council (against
Joachim of Fiore), . . . must have universal application,
that is, it must extend to the creatures supernatural eleva-
n5Bal thasar, 
*3<Bal thasar, 
n?Bal thasar,
Glory _I_, p. 119.
"A Resume of My Thought," 
TD III. p. 220.
PP. /»-5.
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tion, through grace, to divine sonship; so too, we can 
conclude, it must apply to that highest union between divine 
and created being, in the God-man himself.231
As the ultimate union between divine and created being, "it must 
constitute the final proportion . . . between the two and hence
must be the 'concrete analogia entis' itself." It is crucial that 
it not be misinterpreted in the direction of identity of natures. 
It is only the unity in the person of the Logos that allows 
attribution of qualities of one nature to the other (communicatio 
idiomatum). While the natures are undivided, the unity of natures 
is in the person, and "however close the union, they are 'unconf­
used', 'the properties of each remain unimpaired [sozomenesj’ (DS 
302) . "2”
Diastas i s in the Trinity: Bas i s for Analogy of Being
The dissimilarity between God and creatures must be able to
be maintained within the union, just as, anlagously, the distance
or dissimilarity of persons within the Trinity is maintained in 
unity of nature. In fact, it is the Trinitarian distinction of
persons which grounds both the possibility of a creation and that 
creation's distinctness from its creator.1*1 Why is this? Be­
cause, the difference in persons in the Trinity is a real dis- * 23
23,Ibid., p. 221.
23’lbid., p. 222.
2uIn this Balthasar is following Bonaventure who "affirms that 
a God who is not Trinitarian would not be able to create." 
Bonaventue also says: "God would never have been able to generate 
the creature by his will, if he had not generated the Son by 
nature." Scola, p. 212.
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tinction, not simply a formal or modalistic distinction. Each 
person of the Trinity has a metaphysical personal reality, and as 
seen in the life of Christ, personal freedom. Our human catego­
ries of person and individual are inadequate to fully grasp the 
nature of the real distinction within a unity of one nature, so 
we have to surrender to the mystery. But the reality of real
distinction in God makes the real distinction between esse and
essence, creator and creature possible. If there can be no real 
distinction in God, how can there be any in creation? If there is 
distinction of persons in God then will not creation reflect in 
an analogous way such distinction? Can or would God create 
anything that does not in some way reflect His essence? As 
pointed out earlier, God's essence is the basis for analogy of 
being. And the concept of analogy of being encompasses and sums 
up the double tension between the dissimilarity/similarity 
reflected in the real distinction between esse and essence, 
Creator and creature. The similarity is that both Creator and 
creature have being in a union between being and nature, esse and 
essence. The dissimilarity is that only God can and must "be" 
even without us; we need not "be." Only in God are being and 
essence identical.at The similarity grounds the ability to know 
God through creation and God's Revelation by analogy, but the
211Kehl, "A Portrait," p. 20.
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dissimilarity in the analogy grounds God's incomprehensibility 
even in Revelation itself.* 2*2 
Revelation in Christ
The self-disclosure of the Trinity which takes place in 
Christ2*5 takes place in a totally human way and form, even while 
all Christ's actions are those of the Logos. The modality of 
Revelation in Christ's humanity is and remains itself the Revela­
tion. It is not a sign, or a Platonic symbol of deeper spiritual 
reality or Revelation, it is the Revelation.1^ As Balthasar 
says: "God, who with divine freedom, but also with divine consis­
tency, has fashioned for himself in his creation a body through 
which to reveal his glory."2*5
If the distance and dissimilarity between God and creature 
is to be maintained, the Revelation of God in Christ's humanity
2*2There is the danger that these two dimensions of analogy will 
not both be maintained. The apophatic will swallow the cataphatic. 
This is the danger in the contemporary feminist disputes over God- 
language. When the apophatic swallows the cataphatic, human 
subjectivity projects itself onto God. The historical events of 
Revelation become merely symbolic and instrumental, and the true 
sacramental nature of reality is in jeopardy. For in depth analysis 
see, Francis Martin. "Feminist Theology: A Proposal." Communio 20 
(Summer 1993)2: 334-376.
2*3 *"For the surest thing that can be said of man is that he is 
not God. Thus, he must already be obedient even as God, and his 
human obedience unto death must be the epiphany of a divine--that
is, a trini tarian--obedience. In the Son of Man there appears not 
God alone; necessarily, there also appears the inner-trini tarian 
event of his procession; there appears the triune God, who, as God, 
can command absolutely and obey absolutely and, as the Spirit of 
love, can be the unity of both." Balthasar, Glory 1, p. 479.
2*‘lbid., pp. 437-441.
Ibid., p. 441.
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cannot be identical with God in Himself. Rather, it must be a 
personal self-disclosure which conceals the mystery of God's 
essence both on the level of person and nature. There is a clear 
analogy here to the phenomenal experience of human self-disclo­
sure to others, but there is also an infinitely greater differ­
ence of nature and personhood. The mystery and otherness of God 
are concealed in Christ's humanity. God's greatest possible 
manifestation of Himself in Christ remains an ineffable and
mysterious concealment.
It is manifestness because here God is explained to man by 
no means other than himself ... by his own being and his 
own life. What is most familiar to man is suddenly turned 
for him into a word and a teaching about God: how could he 
not understand! But it is concealment because the transla­
tion of God's absolutely unique, absolute, and infinite 
Being into the ever more dissimilar, almost arbitrary and 
hopelessly relativised reality of one individual man in the 
crowd from the outset appears to be an undertaking condemned 
to failure.l“
Of course, since man has become the language of God's self- 
disclosure, "man is disclosed along with God." A key point here 
is that God (grace) does not use humanness (nature) in an ex­
trinsic way, but a totally immanent way. In a way which does not 
destroy nature or human freedom, but brings it to perfection by 
elevating it to a participation in divine life which it had no 
right to and could not achieve on its own. God is able to dis­
close both Himself and man simultaneously while maintaining the 
integrity of each, precisely because God is the fullness of that
Z*C Ibid., p. 457 .
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Being, of which man is an existent.1’7 Human nature and human 
freedom are enfolded within God's gift of Himself in grace and 
within God's infinite freedom without being absorbed by it, 
because it is precisely that grace and freedom which make human 
being and freedom possible.
The reality of God's concealment in Revelation is seen by 
Balthasar as the apophatic nature of revelation contained within 
the cataphatic. The incomprehensible dissimilar is contained
within the knowable similar. While the "basic form of 'ever- 
greater dissimilarity however great the similarity' (in tanta 
simi1itudine major dissimi1itudo, Dz 432) is irrevocable,"7” it 
does not have to mean that "God's Being remains infinitely hidden 
and unfathomable over and beyond all analogous utterances about 
him . . . ."It can mean that "God 'appears unreservedly and,
therefore, even in his ever-greater incomprehensibility really 
comes into the foreground and into the form that appears." In 
other words, God's incomprehensibility is a positive and integral 
dimension of Revelation which takes place by the modality of a 
self-emptying love within a human "existence determined by sin,
a7Ibid., p. 459.
a,Balthasar notes in TD III, p. 220, fn. 51, in reference to 
E. Przywara, that this text from the Fourth Lateran Council "is 
found in an altered form in the new edition of Denzinger. What he 
[Pryzwara] read was this: 'Inter Creatorem et creaturam non potest 
tanta similitudo notari, quin inter eos maior sit dissimi1itudo 
notanda.' The tanta on which Pryzwara laid such stress ('in tanta 
similitudine maior dissimi1itudo': however great the similarity-- 
even by supernatural agency--the dissimilarity is even greater') is 
no longer there in DS 806."
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corrupted by death and alienated from God."a} In fact, it is 
precisely the quality of God's kenotic love which makes God 
incomprehensible to us. Despite the real grasp of God we will be 
given in the beatific vision God's incomprehensibility will
remain.
It would be ridiculous--and would run in the face of all 
religious experience of God--to interpret the visio facialis 
as a comprehensio (katalepsis) in the sense of worldly 
science or even philosophy: the axiom si comprehendis non 
est Deus is as true in heaven as on earth, only there it is 
transformed from the spes to the res. To see God sicuti est 
means precisely this. . . . the kenosis will emerge to view
as what it is in reality: not as God's self-alienation . . .
, but as the appearance, conditioned by the world's guilt, 
of the God who in himself is incomprehensible in his love 
for the world?511
Balthasar sees in the hypostatic union of divine and human 
natures the concrete analogue for the relationship between nature 
and grace. Nature is seen as within grace, but remaining dis­
tinct. But there is no natural bridge between the human and 
divine natures, or between nature and grace?51 The distance and 
dissimilarity of natures and persons is maintained. God has 
created the world and human beings to be a medium of the self- 
expression and self-gift of his kenotic life and love (glory) in 
Christ even while giving that medium true freedom. It is pre­
cisely through the freedom given that God will express and reveal 
His infinite freedom to love kenotically, and offer us the * 25
a’lbid., pp. 461-462. 
15,Ibid., p. 462.
25lIbid., p. 442-443.
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opportunity to participate in God's infinite freedom so as to 
bring our own freedom to a perfect fulfillment it could not 
achieve by its own self-perfection. The form of God's revelation
in concealment reflects
. . . a threefold tension: (1) the inner-worldly tension
between the manifestness of the body and the hiddenness of 
the spirit; (2) the tension, rooted in creation, between the 
cosmos (as image and expression of a free God who in no way 
is compelled to create) and God himself; and (3) the ten­
sion, rooted in the order of grace and redemption, between 
the sinner who has turned away from God and the God who 
reveals himself as redeemer in the concealment of the 
Cross .
Analogy of Being and Barth's Analogy of Faith
Balthasar's stress on dissimilarity becomes more understand­
able if we realize that he is in dialogue with Barth, who after 
moving beyond total opposition between God's nature and human 
nature (pure dialectics), took the position that "analogy of 
faith" was first of all God's action on man's being; it was an 
action taken by God in creating and redeeming us. The only way 
to describe the action taken by God is through the concept of 
analogy, but it was not a similarity in being as far as Barth was 
concerned. Barth's formulation of analogy was as follows:
In man's profession of faith, God's Word becomes man's 
thought and man's word. The dissimilarity is total, but 
there is not a total strangeness between them. The human 
counterpart of the divine prototype is a real counterpart
inIbid., p. 441.
253Balthasar traces this evolution in the section of his work 
on Barth entitled, "The Shift to Analogy," pp. 73-100.
2UIbid., p. 95, citing Zwischen den Zeiten 1: 254.
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Secondly, for Barth, "Creation's likeness to God is a one-way 
street. It is fashioned from above by the Word, which lays hold 
of creation. It is the action of God upon creation." Analogy of 
faith is grounded not in similarity of being but in the fact that 
God has acted on creation in Revelation in such a way as to 
establish communion between God and man, which communion cannot 
be due to some law of nature. The truth communicated about God by 
God in human terms and concepts is present only because God has 
sovereignly chosen to "make our truth an expression of his 
truth."*55 Baltha sar, while also stressing God's dissimilarity 
retains the positivity of the created order as required by the 
very nature of God's creative act and the fact of the Incarna­
tion. For Balthasar there must be commonality between God and 
creation for sin and redemption, love and communion to be possi­
ble. Balthasar agrees with Barth that in the concrete order of 
salvation, where man is a sinner Barth's form of analogy is the 
"final form" of the relationship intended by God from the begin­
ning. But Balthasar insists "that in this relationship the 
presupposed relationship of creation is permanently elevated and 
brought to its perfect ion. "*5<
Analogy of Being and "Pure Nature"
Looking at the dissimilarity from the human viewpoint, the 
distance between God and creature cannot be preserved effectively 
by a concept of "pure nature." This concept "is probably the
*55Ibid., pp. 95-96.
in Kehl, "A Portrait," pp. 23-2^.
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price that had to be paid to rationalism" in its attempts to 
defend the gratuity of grace and protect "the concept of nature 
from Protestant subversion.The formal concept of nature 
(analogy of being) reveals that "everything touched by grace 
retains its natural side: grace is always in a nature and for a 
nature."As a matter of actual fact human nature as created "has 
only one end, a supernatural one." There is no such thing as 
"pure nature" in the real world.151 Consequently, the only thing 
one can do is respect the mystery of grace given to that real 
nature which actually exists and explore it reverently. The realm 
of nature cannot be given precise and clear definition. "Its 
lower limit will be the formal concept of nature .... Nature 
fundamentally is creation as such; in terms of the hearer of
2 c aRevelation . . . , it is the conscious, free subject."
In brief, Balthasar believes with de Lubac that the concept
of "pure nature" is not a useful theological concept. Balthasar 
contends that a "formal concept of nature" which is the "analogy 
of being" is the best way to deal with the distance or dissimi­
larity of God's being from that of the creature. God's freedom is 
protected in the act of creating a creature whom he desires and 
intends to give a share in the life of the Trinity, but within
Ibid., p. 233. 
Ibid., p. 232.
Ibid., p. 235.
25?
251
25,
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the context of a drama of infinite freedom and the finite freedom
of the human subject.
Balthasar respects the meaning of Humani Gener i s with re­
spect to the necessity of a two-fold gratuity. There is a "two­
fold gratuitous act of God inherent in the gift of creation.
When the word of God goes forth, the creature is given 
insight into God's purpose in creation and realizes some­
thing entirely new: God undertook that first communication 
of this being, whereby finite, self-aware, free beings were 
created, with a view to a "second" act of freedom whereby he 
would initiate them into the mysteries of his own life and 
freely fulfill the promise latent in the infinite act that 
realizes Being. This "second" act does not need to be tempo­
rally distinct from the first: the final cause, since it is 
the first and all embracing cause, includes all the articu­
lations of the efficient cause--that is, the world's coming- 
to-be and God's becoming man. To that extent, any "claim" 
the creature might make on God (assuming the word has any 
meaning) would always come too late, in view of the total 
gift alreadv made and the response expected, namely, total 
grati tude.M
Extrincism or Immanentism? The Third Way of Love
From the human viewpoint, what is the positive content of 
the human subject's similarity to God (image and likeness or 
formal nature) which permits God to freely give us a share in the 
Trinitarian life, without that positive content requiring God to 
do so? Or, without God's gift of grace amounting to the self- 
perfection of humanity in Christ? Here we meet directly the 
problem of extrincism versus immanentism. It is the problem faced 
by essentialist or rationalistic christologies which risk extrin­
cism. It also is the problem faced by consciousness or degree
u,Scola, "Nature and Grace in Hans Urs von Balthasar," p. 210. 
z<lBal thasar , TD I 1 . pp. 400-401.
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Christologies which run the risk of immanent ism. With respect to
an immanentist approach through religious philosophy or human
existence, Balthasar says:
Christianity is destroyed if it lets itself be reduced to 
transcendental presuppositions of a man's self-understanding 
whether in thought or in life, in knowledge or in action. So 
it would seem at first that the extrinsic and historical 
approach of recent apologetics must be the only other way. .
Is there then no way between the Scylla of extrincism 
and the Charybdis of immanentism?1*1
Balthasar suggests that there are two approaches which do 
avoid these polarities, the personalist and the aesthetic "form." 
These two approaches converge into one, to form Balthasar's 
"Third Way of Love," which is the title to Chapter III of Love 
Alone. In Love Alone. Balthasar sketches the basic pattern of his
seven volume work, The Glory of the Lord. It is, he says,
. . . a theological aesthetic in the dual sense of a study
of perception, and a study of the objective self-expression 
of divine glory; it will try to demonstrate that this theo­
logical approach, far from being a dispensable theological 
by-road, is in fact the one possible approach to the heart 
of theoiogy--the cosmic world-historical approach, and the 
path of anthropological verification, being secondary as­
pects, complementary to it.
Consequently 'aesthetics' has for us a purely theologi­
cal sense: the perception in faith of the self-authenticat­
ing glory of God's utterly free gift of love?*3
Balthasar is using 'aesthetic' in a very precise theological way. 
He is not using it
. . . in the subjective sense which the new theory of beau­
tiful form, characteristically called aesthetics (i.e., 
science of perception), acquired in the eighteenth centu­
ry....For when that term began to be used for referring to a
luBalthasar, Love Alone. p. 43. 
2(3 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
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theory of beautiful form, it shifted the meaning from the 
form itself to a particular mode of perceiving: the human 
subject achieves a temporary harmony with the perceived 
object by endowing it with its own inferiority. i44 
For Balthasar, Kenotic Love, the pure act of God's Being, is
perceived in its appearance in Christ in the "form" of beauty or 
glory. The beauty of the Trinity's kenotic love is objectively 
present in the person, Cross and Resurrection of Christ, not in 
our faith perception of them. Our faith perception receives what 
is actually present in them. "Beauty, as a transcendental quality 
belongs to Being itself and is, indeed, its primary manifes­
tation."145 For him the ontological culminates in the theologi­
cal. The transcendental properties of created being, more pre­
cisely personal being, are the means the Trinity uses to reveal 
itself as Kenotic Love in Christ. However, the analogy of being 
must be preserved so that the transcendental attributes which are 
the medium of Revelation are not simply identified with the 
fullness of Love, beauty, goodness and truth found in the Trini­
ty. Beauty is the form of Love's appearing in Christ, the arche­
type of human being and icon of God's personal Being.
Being itself here unveils its final countenance, which for 
us receives the name of trinitarian love; only with this 
final mystery does light fall at last on that other mystery: 
Why there is Being at all and why it enters our horizon as 
light and truth and goodness and beauty.144
l44Dupre. "The Glory of the Lord," pp. 386-387. 
245Ibid., p. 387.
Z44Glory £, p. 158.
128
Balthasar views the anthropological approach to the justification
of the demands of faith as
methodologically in error: the framework of God's message to 
man in Christ cannot be tied to the world in general, nor to 
man in particular; God's message is theological, or better 
theo-pragmatic. It is an act of God on man; an act done for 
and on behalf of man--and only then to man, and in him. It 
is of this act that we must say: it is credible only as 
love--and here we mean God's own love, the manifestation of 
which is the manifestation of the glory of God.
Christian self-understanding (and so theology) is found 
neither in a wisdom superior to that of the world's reli­
gions, based on divine information . . . ; nor on the defin­
itive fulfillment of man as a personal and social being 
through the realization of the effects of revelation and 
redemption . . . ; but solely in the self-glorification of 
divine love. . . . 2<?
Being as co-extensive with love
The identification of Being and Love as co-extensive i s
uncommon and requires some expli cat ion. 11 is grounded, as was
Balthasar 's view on nature and grace, in the persons and love of
the Trinity as revealed in Christ, culminating in His Cross and 
Resurrection. Personal being, human or divine, in its self- 
possession, possesses the truth of its personal being in complete 
freedom of choice of self-expression. Personal being is possessed 
only in relation to other persons, but in the freedom of its own 
truth. In human terms this means language is an integral part of 
human being and relationships. The freely chosen self-expression 
or self-gift of another in love can only be received as "wholly-
247Bal thasar, Love Alone. pp. 7-8; the immanent aspect of how 
human being and speech can be a revelation of both the personal 
being of God and the ultimate reality of created being as love is 
explicated in "God Speaks as Man," in Explorations in Theology I: 
The Word Made Flesh. pp. 80-93.
2<*Loser. "Being Interpreted as Love," pp. 475-6.
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other". Applied to God's love in Christ: "A love so boundless 
. . . undreamed of by man or the world, can only be perceived and
received as the Wholly Other."27’ That Being and Love are co­
extensive is based strictly on the theological reality of the 
Incarnation, Cross, and Resurrection of Christ, and the revela­
tion of the Trinitarian kenotic love contained therein.271
And so it is not the ascent of religious man to the absolute
One but rather the descent of the trinitarian God of love to 
man that is the departure point of the theology of von 
Balthasar. The corresponding attitude in man to this event 
is the (Marian) attitude of disponibi1ity, the (Ignatian) 
attitude of indi f ferencia.111
The myster ium paschale is the central redemptive reality 
that reveals that kenotic love is the pure act of God's intraper­
sonal Being, and that therefore all being is co-extensive with 
love. In the light of this love the full reality of the nature of 
all being, epitomized in personal being, is revealed. Individual 
existents in their individual acts of esse are participations in 
the pure and full act of Personal Being, who is love. The idea of 
human beings as the "image and likeness"273 of God is seen in its
2t,Bal thasar , "God Speaks as Man," pp. 80- 85.
270Balthasar . Love Alone. P- 8.
27lLoser, "Being Interpreted as Love," PP- 483-85.
272 Ibid., p. 485.
273 Balthasar discusses in some detail the idea of
likeness" in TD 11 . pp. 316-334; this discussion is an "Excursus" 
in the context of "grace" and infinite and finite freedom, pp. 312- 
16. In essence, finite freedom is sustained continuously by 
infinite freedom and through grace is offered the only way human 
finite freedom can transcend and realize itself. That is, by union 
with infinite freedom in Christ.
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full ontological reality. The nature and essence of human being 
and personal freedom, grounded in the infinite freedom of inter- 
Trinitarian kenotic love, finds its fullest expression in Christ­
's love. "The absolute Thou that meets man, says von Balthasar,
is not a Someone who happens to have the property of love 
but rather is the One who is constituted as such by love.
The trinitarian, personal process is love. And this is true 
neither as an abstraction nor as a collective but as some­
thing inconceivably personal: the one God (Father) sends me 
(us) his 'only Son' in order to fill me (us) with his Holy 
Spirit of love. In response to such an event the created
person can find not even a half-way or moderately credible
answer based on his own power. Even if the person is struck
to the core ... he can offer nothing in return. The answer
can only be to let God be God in the person, to keep for God 
all space which he has claimed for his love. 'Behold, I am 
the handmaid of the Lord.' The answer made possible by grace 
can therefore only be the greatest possible disponibi1ity .
. . . This is not something merely negative, a resigned
lassitude--because one has nothing to offer of one's own, as 
if one could give God permission to take what he wants and 
needs on one's own power. Rather it is something positive; 
it is a generous indifference, which is indistinguishable 
from the highest form of joy. It surrenders everything, 
almost as if one were possessed, gladly doing whatever the
divine majesty might demand simply because that is its own *ii n 2 7gracious will.
"Openness" of human nature as the human basis for grace 
As this passage makes clear "indifference" is one' 
and free identification of God's will to good with one' 
of a desire to be, in Christ, one with God's love. One'
positive
own, out
own
s
s
s
freedom to love kenotically is perfected only through free but
obedient union with and surrender to God's infinite freedom. The
total dependence of human freedom's fulfillment on surrender to
2?lLoser, pp. 485-86, citing "Der Zugang zur Wirklichkeit 
Gottes", in Mysterium Salutis. vol II, edited by J. Feiner and M. 
Lohrer (Einsiedeln, 1967), 15-45, at 36ff.
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love could not be clearer. Jesus is the one who reveals that the
interpersonal infinite freedom of the persons of the Trinity is 
expressed in the obedience and surrender of the Son to the 
Father, in the love of the Holy Spirit. This "indifferent and 
loving obedience" of the Son "is the foundational act of Jesus 
Christ's whole existence."* 2” And this is precisely because he is 
living out as a man, the immanent life of the Trinitarian love in
the economic order. There is a simultaneous revelation of the
nature of divine and human freedom, and their compatibility.
With respect to the personalist dimension of the appearance
of personal Being he says:
No I has the possibility or the right to master intellectu­
ally the Thou who encounters him in his own freedom, nor can 
he understand or deduce his attitude prior to their meeting. 
For love granted to me can only be "understood" as a mira­
cle; I can never account for it, either empirically or 
transcendentally--not even from a knowledge of our common 
human 'nature'. A Thou meets me as an Other.2”
Love and beauty
But how can the love of another even on the human level be
perceived? How can it manifest itself as a whole to us? As 
previously pointed out 'aesthetics' is a theological concept, 
which, building on the philosophical idea of aesthetics as seeing 
the form of objective beauty, is the "perception in faith of the
2”lbid., pp. 486-87.
2”lbid., p. 44; in fn. 1 Balthasar explains "understood": "The 
moment I think that I have understood the love of another person 
for me--for instance, on the basis of laws of human nature or 
because of something in me--then this love is radically misused and 
inadequate, and there is no possibility of a response. True love is 
always incomprehensible, and only so is it gratuitous."
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self-authenticating glory of God's utterly free gift of love."
(my emphasis) How does it appear to us except as something
beautiful, wonderful and glorious?
. . . just as in love I encounter the other as the other in 
all his freedom, and am confronted by something which I 
cannot dominate in any sense, so in the aesthetic sphere, it 
is impossible to attribute the form which presents itself to 
a fiction of my imagination. In both cases the 'understand­
ing' of that which reveals itself cannot be subsumed under 
categories of knowledge which imply control. Neither love in 
the freedom of its gratuitousness, nor beauty, since it is 
disinterested, are 'products'--1 east of all of some person's 
need.111
The personalist and aesthetic dimensions of Being converge
even in nature where
eros is the chosen place of beauty. The object we love . . .
always appears wonderful and glorious to us . . . The two
related poles were surpassed in Revelation where the divine 
Logos descends to manifest and interpret himself as love, as 
agape, and therein as the Glory.1,1
The positive content of the human, because of the free 
nature of personal love and the form of its se1f-presentation, 
cannot anticipate or derive from itself by way of existential 
need or self-perfection, the gift of God's love in Christ. The 
positive content of the human is simply its openness to the 
totally free act of God's love.* 2” Or, as developed above, its 
disponibi1ity, or Ignatian indifference. The problem of extrinc- 
ism or immanent ism (or Transcendance and immanence) cannot be 
solved on the purely ontological level, it must be solved on the
2”lbid., p. 45.
2”lbid.
27,Kehl, "A Portrait," p. 22.
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interpersonal level in the way that free persons love and receive 
love. The ontological difference between Cod's being and our 
being must remain, but can be bridged by the similarity of both 
being personal intelligent spiritual beings capable of kenotic 
love. Gratuity is founded both in the dissimilarity of Creator 
and creature by nature or being, and in the nature of interper­
sonal love or self-gift and the manner of its presentation. 
Additionally, of course, in the case of grace, God must provide 
the gift of faith by grace which enables the gift of God's love 
in Christ to be perceived and received.
Potentia obedientalis
The compatibility of divine and human freedom in the person 
of Christ is the foundation for the theological and philosophical 
position of the created spirit as receptivity. If human nature 
receives in Christ union with the divine nature, and that re­
flects the reality of Christ's eternally receiving himself from 
the Father in complete distinction of person and freedom, then an
ontology of receptivity is grounded in the Trinity itself. This 
ontology of receptivity is then worked out philosophically in 
terms of the phenomenon of the human "thou" awakening the "I" in 
another. "Truth" is a transcendental attribute of the "being" 
which is received in the infant's early encounter with its 
mother. Both with respect to the "truth" which is an attribute of 
created being and of Revelation which uses created being as its 
medium, human beings are in a posture of openness, disponibi1ity,
or obedience. We have touched on this earlier with respect to the
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positive content of human nature to the reception of grace. This
is Balthasar's interpretation of potentia obediental i s’.
The infinitely open and unfinished character of truth, whose 
essence is to be constantly open to something greater, 
clearly appears to the creature only when it accepts in its 
depth its created condition, adopting without reservation 
the attitude of obedience and availability (potentia obedi- 
entalis) in the face of divine truth?’11
This receptivity is not a pure passivity but "rather a 
capacity whereby I allow another to dwell within me." The experi­
ence of the fullness of being and freedom cannot come autonomous­
ly but only in relationship to the ultimate other. This reflects 
the reality that we initially receive our primal experience of 
our "I" and possess our "I" in the fullness of freedom only in 
relationship to a "thou." Only God can be a self-sufficient being 
and experience Himself as such. Receiving into ourselves the 
"being" of others is not an impoverishment but an enrichment. 
However, it depends on our consent.
In other words: to a greater power of self-determination, 
there corresponds a greater possibility and capacity to 
allow oneself to be determined by another. The passivity 
which must then be admitted depends on the deepest freedom 
of the spirit which accepts, in all the freedom of love, to 
be freely determined in love.”1
It is important to note that potentia obedientalis, though it is
not pure passivity, is also not a natural power or a disposition 
of the human subject to attain God or even receive God's Revela-
’’’christophe Potworowski. "Christian Experience in Hans Urs von 
Balthasar." Communio 20 (Spring, 1993)1: 107-117, at 109, citing 
Theologik. Vol. I. Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1985, 13.
IllIbid., p. 110, citing Theologik. Vol. I, p.40-41.
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tion. It is an ontological receptivity which must be empowered by 
God's grace. I will return to this later.
In contrast to the transcendental Thomist approach, the 
ontological character of receptivity moves the emphasis from the 
knowing subject to the reception of being, to being "informed" 
rather than co-constituting.
Balthasar situates his position on knowing, more specifical­
ly on the respective places of the subject and the object, 
between naive realism and the transcendental critique of 
knowledge. Human subjectivity is dependent on the world of 
objects and on the world of the other, by whose revelation 
it awakens to the world and to itself. Through this depen­
dency on the other, human subjectivity is indissolubly tied 
to the principle of intersubjectivity, which for Balthasar 
is a privileged exper ience J12
The primal experience between mother and child can only be 
understood as a response of love to love, a response of an "I" to 
a "thou." It cannot be reduced to the "I." This experience cannot 
be satisfactorily explained
on the basis of the 'formal structure' of the human spirit, 
from 'sensible impressions' which would trigger a constitu­
tive process of categories, which itself would be ordained 
to a dynamism affirming 'being-in-general' and an objectif­
ication or thematization of beings, concretely given.m
Des ider i um naturale visionis; "freedom in quest of Freedom"
For Balthasar, "esse" is in the first place "the mystery of 
the openness of finite freedom to infinite freedom."21* In the 
primal experience of being, there are four differences which are
2l2Ibid., p. 110. 
mIbid., p. 111.
!llMarc Ouellet. "Paradox and/or Supernatural Existential." 
Communio 18 (Summer, 1991 )2: 259-280, at 262.
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part of the experience which can be isolated on reflection. The
difference between "I" and "thou," the difference between an
existent "being" and the "act of being" (Being) shared in common
with other beings, the consequent difference between essence and
existence, and finally, the difference between the act of being
(esse) and the "'subsistent freedom of the absolute being (Sein),
which is God' (H III, 1, 954-55)."l,J It is divine freedom which
explains the infinity of "esse's" participations and particularly
explains the individual finite experience of freedom. It is the
experience of the autonomy of "esse" which points back to an
infinite freedom. One's consciousness of the "givenness," finit-
ude, and contingency of one's "esse" grounds the desire for
"esse" as an object of the intellect and will. Balthasar sees
this consciousness as the real basis for intimacy with God.
It is precisely here that a new kind of intimacy of God in 
the creature becomes clear, an intimacy which is only made 
possible by the distinction between God and esse. Allowing 
natures to participate in reality--God's most proper prerog­
ative . . . must be seen positively as posited and deter­
mined by God's omnipotent freedom and therefore are grounded 
in the unique love of God. ... it is precisely when the 
creature feels itself to be separate in being from God that 
it knows itself to be the most immediate object of God's 
love and concern; and it is precisely when its essential 
finitude shows it to be something quite different from God 
that it knows that, as a real being, it has had bestowed 
upon it that most extravagant gift--participation in the 
real being of God.u<
usBieler, p. 138-139.
Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord. A Theological 
Aesthetics IV: The Realm of Metaphysics in Antiquity, trans, by 
Brian McNeil, C.R.V., Andrew Louth, John Saward, Rowan Williams and 
Oliver Davies. Edited by John Riches. San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1989, pp. 403-404.
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Balthasar interprets personal finite freedom as the desider- 
ium naturale visionis, "freedom in quest of Freedom." But, he
does not include a supernatural element in that desire. He points
to St. Thomas and Henri de Lubac as the formulators of "the 
paradox of man."
Just as man is referred to the free openness of another man 
in order to be himself, so too, we can simply say, he (he, 
that is, who is directed and oriented towards the absolutes 
of the True and the Good) is also referred to the free 
openness of God, without being able to postulate it on his 
own. This paradox precedes all discussion on the subject of 
the "supernatural existential," even if and whatever may be 
the truth of the fact that nature was created in view of the 
Supernatural, in view of the incarnation of God; even if and 
whatever may be the truth of the fact that the paradox of 
nature finds its ultimate explication only owing to the 
supernatural order (to which there can thus also belong 
something like a "supernatural existential"). But the para­
dox remains inscribed in the original fact of the conscious­
ness of self, insofar as consciousness knows itself at the 
same time as given, and, through this, as an image. This is 
why de Lubac rightly emphasizes that in the natural desider- 
ium visionis, in the aspiration to know God as he is in 
himself, there is no need to have any supernatural element; 
this can (and should) be affirmed wholly independent of the 
fact that God has for all time already made something of his 
intimacy known, and desires to make men capable of under­
standing it.2,7
Balthasar will go no further than allowing the human spirit in
have a desire for Infinite Freedom, which
satisfy or even to receive, without grace, 
has no capacity to "establish a 'personal'
it knows from its own freedom that God who
19 9t take the initiative.
its created freedom to
it has no potential to
from within itself. It
relation with God" and
is infinitely free mus
2,70uellet, p. 264, citing Theodramat ik III: Die Hand 1ung. 
Einsiedeln: Johannesverlag, 1980, p. 130.
211 Ibid., p. 265.
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Potentia obedientali s and "supernatural existential"
We have to return now to the question of the potentia 
obedientai is. The human spirit in its finite freedom desires 
Infinite Freedom, but does it have a "natural disposition" to 
receive what it desires and has been created to have? Previously 
we have seen that Balthasar viewed the potentia obedientalis as 
an openness, a disponibi1ty, a readiness to receive, an "attitude 
of obedience and availability." But it is quite clear that if the 
term is to be used theologically it must be seen as a gift of 
God's grace which elevates the natural ontological receptivity of 
the human spirit. He says:
But it is precisely this potency of being called (as in the 
case between human subjects) that man does not at all pos­
sess in the face of the divine call. If he is in spite of 
everything capable of perceiving and responding to the call 
of God--a call which issues from no natural created order, 
but from the depths of the eternal and the Absolute--then 
this capacity must be conferred on him at the same time as 
the call; only the divine word of grace confers on him the 
grace of response. We can in this case speak of obediential 
potency, but we must remain conscious that the transnatural 
potency to which we refer in the word potentia is absolutely 
not the creature's own potency . . . , but rather a potency
belonging solely to the Creator. The power of God is so 
great that his creature will obey him even when it finds in 
its own being neither the disposition, nor the tendency, nor 
the possibility for such obedience
Here Balthasar is distinguishing himself from Rahner, whom 
he sees as tending to transform obediential potency and the 
natural desire for God by the supernatural existential into the 
creature's natural disposition to receive God's offer of Himself.
n,Ibid., p. 266, citing Balthasar, "L'Acces a Dieu," Mys ter i um 
Salutis V(French ed.), p. 48.
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Rahner has moved everything back to the act of creation, from the 
creature's side as well as God's. Balthasar speaks directly to
the issue:
Obediential potency designates in philosophy a recognized 
and integral availability (relativity), ontic and noetic, of 
the creature towards the principium et finis. But it does 
not designate the (theological) anticipation of the (poten­
tial) Word and of the (real) silence of God. The creature 
does not hear a silence of God, unless it is with the "su­
pernatural" ears of faith (or unbelief) before the God of 
grace (or of anger). If we do not maintain this limit, the 
critique of Barth on the "point of anchorage" (Ankniipfung- 
spunkte) can be justified. 511
Balthasar is insisting that God's gift of Himself in Revelation 
and the grace to receive that gift are intrinsically connected
and cannot be separated because of their nature as personal call
from an infinite God. The grace to receive Revelation is an
integral constituent of the human historical reality in which it 
is imbedded. In Christ, God truly enters human history and grace 
becomes an integral part of that history in a way that it had not 
been. The analogy of being allows the creature to have only the 
minimum necessary for a freely chosen relation with God if God so 
gives Himself. This minimum is the creature's dialogical nature 
and its desire for and openness to Infinite Freedom. The only 
"supernatural existential" that Balthasar will allow is on God's 
side. God's freely issues a call to the human spirit which if 
accepted, kindles in that open but powerless spirit, not a desire
n#Ibid., p. 267, citing Balthasar, "Analogie und Natur: Zur 
Klarung der theologischen Prinzipienlehre Karl Barths," in Divus 
Thomas (Fribourg 23, 1945), pp. 43-44.
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which is already there, but a capacity to listen and freely
7 91respond to the personal invitation."
Christ the concrete measure of anthropology: reversal of perspec
five
Balthasar's Christocentric approach to the issues of nature 
and grace by way of the Christological "analogy of being" make 
Christ the concrete measure "between God and man, between grace 
and nature, between faith and reason." In doing so, he has 
concretized an abstract problem, and reversed the perspective or 
approach to it. The traditional emphasis and method was to 
approach the problem from an ascending perspective of the perfec 
tion or fulfillment of human nature. By considering the problem 
from the viewpoint of the hypostatic union of two natures in 
Christ, there is a reversal of perspective because Balthasar
shows that it is the divine nature which takes human nature into
its service of love, but by human consent. "Nature, then, is 
perfected by being made the vessel and expression of the divine. 
It gives itself over to become this expression." Thus, nature 
is transcended not simply by being open to its own greatest 
possibilities but to the possibilities of God, who takes nature
mIbid., p. 268.
mBalthasar, "Characteristics of Christianity." The Word Mad 
Flesh. pp. 161-180, at 177; the following discussion is based o 
Ouellet, pp. 273-280.
in Ibid., p. 178.
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into the service of the life of the Trinity as it is lived out 
economically in the life of Christ.
His humanity is the expression and instrument of the divini­
ty, and by no means is the divinity the expression and 
instrument of the humanity. In every respect, the humanity 
is fulfilled in that it sees itself, with ail its upward 
strirrings, brought into the service of God's revelation, 
into the downward movement of his grace and love.lH 
The human esse in its similarity within ever greater dissim­
ilarity to God, in its desire for Infinite Freedom and its 
openness or receptivity to the Infinite, is that minimum condi­
tion of the possibility of God's freely choosing to take it up 
into the life of the Trinity. This inversion of perspective on 
nature and grace is thus grounded in two personal freedoms, human 
and divine, rather than in ontological necessity by reason of 
some compatibility of natures.
. . . the meaning of human existence receives its ultimate
and unhoped for determination from the fact that it is 
absorbed and engaged in the service of God's engagement with 
the world, and thus in the service of the trinitarian ex­
change in Christo.1^
Summary of Balthasar's Nature and Grace Methodology 
From the above exposition of Balthasar's position on nature
and grace one can see that his methodology starts from within 
faith with the reality of the Creator/creature distinction, the 
hypostatic union of divine and human natures in Christ, and the 
distance between the persons of the Trinity, expressed in the
mIbid., p. 162-63. 
J,50uellet, p. 278.
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Logos becoming man and living a life of obedience and service to 
the Father, even to the point of ultimate abandonment on the 
cross. His methodology then is a descending one which follows the 
theological order and a truly theological concept of creation. 
Such an approach leads to a true metaphysics (meta-anthropology) 
of concrete Being in its actual transcendental attributes, rather 
than abstract Being. It is concrete in that he focuses on the 
human reality of Christ as the God-man, the fullness of Being 
united with contingent human being. The fullness of beauty, truth 
and goodness, united with and revealed in and through the human 
transcendentals. His philosophical positions are derived from the 
implications of the most fundamental doctrines of faith: Cre­
ation, Trinity, Incarnation, Redemption. In reflecting philosoph­
ically on these doctrines, his ordering theological principle is 
that of the Fourth Lateran Council: the dissimilarity between 
created and divine natures is always greater than the similarity. 
Or as he puts it: "Between the divine and the created natures 
there is an essential abyss. It cannot be circumvented.With 
respect to the relationship between theology and philosophy, and 
faith and reason, he does not first explore natural reality with 
the power of reason and then bring that knowledge to theology. 
Rather, he looks at natural reality to find there how it reveals 
the created basis for what God has revealed through faith, 
without expecting creation to demonstrate the inevitability or 
necessity of Revelation. Theology encompasses philosophy without
Balthasar, TD III, p. 220.
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destroying its distinctiveness. But, as pointed out earlier, the 
two simply point towards each other rather than merging smoothly 
together. His philosophical positions on the issue of nature and 
grace reflect his metaphysics of infinite and finite being, or 
better, a meta-anthropology.
CHAPTER IV
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Search for Foundations for Fai th
In his work, Foundational Theology: Jesus and the Church , 
Francis Schussler Fiorenza contends that since the Reformation, 
Protestant and Catholic theology has been on a quest for the 
original sources of faith. In the search for the foundations of 
faith, three basic methods emerged: the historical-theological, 
the historical-critical, and the transcendental.
An Epistemology of Faith Knowing
In Chapter I, I have tried to trace this quest in terms of 
the search for an epistemology, or theological theory of how we 
know Christ, and God in Christ, in the act of faith. Assuming the 
historical and ontological reality of Jesus the Christ, how can 
he be known by us in what we call the act of faith? In this act, 
we claim to know the formal object of our faith, God in Christ.
If we are to know God in Christ, then two things are necessary. 
Christ, in his personal ontological reality, must be able to be 
present to us in some way, and we must be able to encounter him
in a personal way which is a true affirmation of his reality.
i,7New York: Crossroad, 1984.
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Without this, faith is reduced to doctrines about Christ and 
conceptual verification of Christ's reality through divine evi­
dence illumined by grace, and becomes more akin to religious 
ideology. As we have seen, Balthasar describes the attempts to 
found the act of faith on rational evidence as supernatural 
rationalism. In the section entitled "The Nature of the Act of 
Faith: Seeing the Form," I discussed Balthasar's approach to the 
act of faith and to theology.
Faith Knowing, and Faith Concepts and Language 
In our knowing and affirmation of Christ's personal reality,
and the reality of the Triune God in him, there must be some 
correspondence between the knowledge we have of Christ, and the 
concepts, symbols, and language used to express that knowledge. 
But what kind of correspondence? Do we receive the knowledge of 
Christ's meaning and significance from Christ through the Word 
and the Spirit in our experiences? Or do we, through our subjec­
tive intellectual structures, dynamically determine Christ's 
meaning and significance through our experience and then express 
it in thought, language and ritual? Is Christ's meaning and sig­
nificance intrinsic to his personal reality and does it inform 
our consciousness in our experiences? Is our knowledge of Christ 
through a true encountering of Christ mediated by historical 
reality and the Spirit? Or, is Christ's meaning and significance 
something we arrive at as a prudential judgment of, and insight 
into, the meaning and significance of our experiences and/or
philosophical anthropology? Is conversion a matter of encounter
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or insight? Insight is, of course, part of any personal encoun­
ter, but there can also be insight without personal encounter.
Faith Knowing by Encounter
I think it is clear that for Balthasar the act of faith and
true conversion is a matter of personal encounter of Christ
through his "legible form" as presented to us by the Spirit
through the Scriptures and the Church. This encounter is the
foundation of divine faith, rather than any objective scientific
sources or transcendental correlation. More precisely, it is
through the perception of the beauty of God's kenotic love in
Christ that one truly encounters Christ, and God in Christ.lM
St. Paul, in his letter to the Romans puts it this way:
. . . we are justified by faith, we have peace with God
through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom we have obtained 
access to this grace in which we stand; and we boast in our 
hope of sharing the glory of God. . . . and hope does not
disappoint us, because God's love has been poured into our 
hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us. 
(Rom. 5:1-2, 5)
Through the Word and the Spirit Christ's personal reality is 
present for acceptance or rejection, just as truly as his person­
al reality was present in Palestine. But, on some minimal level 
the beauty of God's love in Christ must be encountered in the act 
of divine faith, if any true surrender to God in Christ is made 
in that act. As we have seen, it is Balthasar's view that it is 
precisely in the encountering of God's love in Christ, that one 
encounters the authority of God which is the basis of divine
in Supra, p. 68 and following.
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299faith as distinguished from natural faith. One could, I sup­
pose, perceive the goodness and truth in the Church’s doctrine 
about Christ and perhaps even assent to it based on natural 
faith, without truly encountering the personal reality of God’s 
love in Christ, and therefore God's author i ty.5,4 1 say personal 
reality, to distinguish it from physical presence which is a 
different matter. As a Eucharistic community Catholics affirm not 
only the mediated presence of Christ through Word and Spirit but 
the transformed physical presence of Christ. True encounter with 
Christ's personal and physical reality is what we celebrate. Just 
as during his earthly existence, those who follow Christ most 
closely in discipleship know his personal reality most deeply and 
surely. Insight or understanding of Christ's personal reality is 
the fruit of faith and an entering into the life of Christ. Many 
who know the Scriptures and much about Christ, like the Scribes 
and Pharisees, may not know his personal reality as his disciples
do.
Certitude in Knowing Christ
This brings us to the central epistemological question of
the last three centuries. Can the human intellect know noumenal
299 Supra, p. 68 and following.
3,#See Urdanoz, p. 798: "Divine faith cannot exist as reserved 
to the strictly natural order, although it is possible to assent to 
divine and revealed truth for merely natural and human reasons, but 
acquired and natural faith of this kind is not formally, but only 
materially, divine, as would be the faith professed by a rational­
ist or a formal heretic." I will return to the nature of this act 
of faith shortly.
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reality with any certainty in the act of faith? As Christians, we 
believe we know the personal noumenal reality of Christ with the 
certitude of divine faith. That certitude is based on God's 
authority encountered in God's love in Christ, and is therefore 
divine faith as distinguished from a natural faith based on the 
intrinsic plausibility or rationality of the evidence. The human 
will moves the intellect in a genuine act of divine faith because 
of trust in God who has been encountered. Nonetheless, the
affective or fiducial surrender and commitment which is based on
the trustworthiness of the One encountered, has an intellectual 
dimension. The intellect, moved by the will, is persuaded of real 
truth based on the trustworthiness of God, encountered in Chr­
ist’s witness of God's love. The intellectual assent is made for. 
moral rather than strictly logical or intellectual reasons. The 
perception of God's authority or trustworthiness is the motive of 
the act of faith. Certitude flows from the judgment which recog­
nizes Cod in Christ in the act of divine faith. But, that percep­
tion and judgment is a consequence of encountering the overwhelm­
ing kenotic love of God for us in Christ. If God's love is not 
poured out in our hearts through our encounter with Christ, how 
could we know God as trustworthy? How could we have certitude? Or 
as St. Paul points out by reverse implication in the passage 
quoted above, how could we hope in God if God's love had not been 
poured out in our hearts?
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Certitude by Faith or by Reason
In emphasizing the necessity of the subjective recognition 
and judgment of God's love in Christ as the motive for faith, 
personal surrender and certitude (tides qua), there is the danger 
of minimizing the objective (tides quae) dimension of what it is 
that is believed.341 Of course, to recognize and judge that 
Christ is God through the perception of God's kenotic love in 
Christ is a subjective judgment of ontological truth. As dis­
cussed in the section "The Objective Nature of Christ's 'Form'," 
the subjective experience of faith contains a "gnosis" of "an 
experiencable object," an objective " super - form. " 341
On the other hand, in emphasizing the objective dimension of 
what is believed there is the danger of seeking certitude about 
one's faith in the intrinsic rationality of what is believed 
rather than in the divine motive for faith, which is the encoun­
ter with God in God's love in Christ. Where certitude for faith 
is sought also can determine the starting point for one's theo­
logical methodology. If one is seeking certitude for one’s faith 
in theology, one must start from below with rational evidence, 
with philosophical anthropology, or with some subject-bound
34lBalthasar uses the greek term pistis to name the choice to 
surrender to God, and gnosis to name the choice to perceive the 
objective reality of God's love in Christ. I believe that gnosis is 
still part of the tides qua. Balthasar's point is that the tides 
qua is a mediated knowing of God as formal object, as well as a 
personal surrender. This knowing can be formally separated from 
that of the tides quae, which embraces all that God teaches on his 
authority, but existentially no separation is possible.
302 Supra, p. 73 and following.
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approach. If one is secure in one's faith, then one could start
either from above or below and be led by faith. This is what
Balthasar says St. Thomas did with philosophy; in using it before
and within theology he started from below.3 *’5 The methodological
danger of starting from below is that Revelation can become an
extrinsic norm for theology, even for one who is secure in their
faith, rather than being integrated into theology. In fact,
according to Yves Congar, while St. Thomas held that "by grace,
faith in us is a divine knowing, a definite communication of
God's knowledge. . . . this communication is rather imperfect and
the human spirit naturally desires a fuller grasp of the objects
revealed."3” This fuller grasp could be sought by contemplation
or mysticism or by the use of reason. But it is the use of reason
alone, working from the first principles of Revelation contained
in the articles of faith or the creed, which is in fact, the task
of theology according to St. Thomas.3GS Thus began the rational,
logical, scientific construction of doctrine from revealed first
principles. Congar sums up his conclusions:
. . .theology, as St. Thomas understood and practiced it,
appears to us as a rational and scientific consideration of 
the revealed datum, striving to procure for the believing 
human spirit a certain understanding of the datum. It is, if 
you will, a scientifically elaborated copy of the faith.
What objects of simple adherence the faith delivers, theol­
ogy develops in a line of humanly constructed knowledge, 
seeking the reason for facts; in short, reconstructing and
3’3Supra, p. 100.
Yves Congar, A History of Theology, trans, and ed. by Hunter 
Guthrie, S.J. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968, p. 93.
3t5For discussion see Congar, pp. 92-103.
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elaborating in the form of human science the data received 
by faith from the science of Cod Who created all things.
Thus through his spirit directed by faith, man arrives at a 
strictly human understanding of the mysteries, utilizing 
their connection or their harmony with his world of natural knowledge J**
Balthasar points out that in fact, this is what happened to the 
mainstream of post-Vatican I Catholic theology.* 1*7 If one seeks 
certitude or foundations for faith through the historical-theo­
logical, historical-critical, or transcendental methodologies, 
one is seeking certitude in objective rational evidence or 
philosophical anthropology. Revelation becomes an extrinsic norm 
for human insight and is not an integral part of theology. 
Certitude is being sought through natural faith, and philosophy 
tends to take over theology and shape it according to its presup­
positions. Historically, this may have happened for reasons of 
apologetics. But as Balthasar argues, apologetics is in methodo­
logical error in seeking to bring others to faith or to defend
the faith on foundations which are not the foundation of faith.
Philosophical or other rational arguments to remove obstacles to 
faith can only complement and support a proclamation or presenta­
tion of the faith based on the appearance of God in God's love in 
Christ. While the formal object of philosophy and theology are 
the same, philosophy can only point to God as revealed in Christ, 
it cannot make that Revelation necessary by an apologetics of 
immanence. It cannot justify God's love and grace in Christ.
I b id . , p. 102.
1*7Supra, p. 66 and following.
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Conversion must come by encounter with that love in Christ and 
not by rational insight. Hence, the title of Balthasar's book
Love Alone. The kind of foundationalism which Balthasar has 
criticized has also been severely critiqued by the hermeneutical 
theologians, particularly Francis Schussler Fiorenza.
Form and Content, and Analogy of Being
In emphasizing that the certitude of the act of faith is 
based on God's authority as perceived in the love of God in 
Christ, Balthasar stresses the necessity to maintain in the 
hypostatic union, the unity between the life-form (Christ's human 
life) and the content (God's self-disclosure). God as formal 
object, while differing in an ever greater way from his 'legible 
form' in Christ, was in fact present in Christ in the person of 
the Word, and was expressed and experienced as such.
It is important in applying the analogy of being to the 
knowledge of God disclosed in Christ, that the analogical differ­
ence not be understood in a way that contradicts or empties the 
similarity of its real content. This similarity is the only basis 
we have for a truly historical Revelation of God in and through 
the person of Christ. Without it the Incarnation becomes a 
charade, an acting as if, which can only point to or be a sign of 
God's reality and presence in Christ. Then Revelation must occur 
directly to the human consciousness by an illumination which uses 
the person of Jesus as the instrument stimulating the insight.
The via negativa must not be allowed to diminish the true knowl-
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edge of God available through the via positiva. Rather, as Balth­
asar points out God's incomprehensibility is present in the very 
knowledge we have of God in his love in Christ. God as knowable 
is incomprehensible, and always will be even in the beatific 
vision. In other words, the difference is a positive difference 
which emphasizes that whatever human perfection is the vehicle 
for God's se1f-disclosure and our encounter and knowledge of him 
in Christ, the fullness of this perfection in God is ever great­
er, not simply by degrees, but by God's unlimited, uncreated
nature.
The unity of form and content is essential to "the subjec­
tive unity of faith and vision in the Christian life" which would 
be "incomprehensible if it could not be elucidated in terms of a 
unity in the objective revelation which demands and conditions 
it."311 God is truly present and encountered in Christ's life- 
form, both by the Apostles and us. I believe we can say that 
God's love in Christ has an objective ontological reality which, 
while distinct from God in himself, truly is God's presence and 
can be perceived and therefore experienced in Christ's "super- 
form." It is ontological truth (veritas in essendo), identical 
with reality, by which God, the formal object of the act of 
divine faith, reveals himself to be encountered by us. It is not 
simply logical truth (veritas in cognoscendo), identical with 
intellectual knowledge, or moral truth (veritas in dicendo) which
nt Supra, p. 81 and following
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is the conformity of proposition to known truth.We cannot 
separate the reality of God as formal object of faith from God's 
love in Christ, except by abstraction. It is, of course, subject 
to the analogy of being. We do not experience God as he is in 
himself, but as he expresses himself in Christ. This is why 
Balthasar emphasizes that an experience of and knowing of God is 
part of the act of divine faith.
As previously discussed, the transcendentalist-personalist 
way of reading revelation does not adequately maintain the unity 
of form and content.111 As Balthasar points out, it builds on the 
Augustinian-Neo-platonic tradition and is a form of Augustinian 
illuminism. Rather than the Logos, who is the light of Being, 
shining forth on the face of Christ in a way that informs and 
illuminates the human consciousness he shines directly into the 
human spirit in a way that the intellect receives the Word "as a 
kind of grace and revelation . . . ." Historical facts simply
become part of the "final dynamism of cognition." The transition 
of faith from philosophy to theology is made by translating "the 
general philosophical theory of knowledge into the Christian 
Trinitarian mode. . . ." Christ is seen "as the redeeming illumi­
nator of the mind and revealer of the Father. * 3..311
For these distinctions see Urdanoz, p. 798.
3ltSupra, p. 90 and following.
3llSupra, fn. 188; and see pp. 98-100 for Balthasar's further 
critique and the role of theological aesthetics in correcting the 
perceived deficiencies.
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Knowledge of God in Christ Through Analogy
Analogy in St. Thomas Aquinas
Augustine and the Fathers, given their Neoplatonic view of 
reality, had no need of an explicit doctrine of analogy, since 
intellectual knowledge does not arise from the sensible world.112 
Such a Neoplatonic view of created reality and our knowledge of 
it, obviously supported a more subjective, mystical approach to 
knowledge of Revelation.
Aquinas, on the other hand, develops and uses analogy more 
than any previous theologian.111 Since the sensible world, 
through abstraction and reason, did provide a basis for knowledge 
of the created world, the question now is what is the relation­
ship between "being" and God; and, knowledge of "being" and God 
through reason, and knowledge of God and "being" through faith? 
Analogy became the key to the relationship or correspondence 
between these realities. Analogy as a concept speaks to the 
nature of the relationship between the perfections in two or more 
subjects.11* But, the debate quickly moved to whether there can 
be real correspondence between created "being" and God, or put
3l2G.P. Klubertanz. "Analogy." New Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 
1. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 461-^65, at p. ^61.
lllIbid.
ll*Ibid. "Analogy, a technical, philosophical, and theological 
term, commonly designates a kind of predication midway between 
univocation and equivocation. Thus it denotes a perfection (the 
'analogon') that, though found similar in two or more subjects 
called 'analogates, ’ is neither simply the same nor simply 
different."
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differently do we have real or true knowledge of God by reason 
through analogy? Or, can we know God only through faith? Or, is 
analogy the basis of knowledge both by faith and by reason? If 
so, what kind of knowledge do we have through analogy?
Aquinas' view was that the relationship between created 
"being" and God was neither univocal nor equivocal, and therefore 
the perfections in each were "partly the same, partly different." 
"A consequence of this is that there is no single clear meaning 
for an analogous predicate (ST la, 13.5 ad 1)." Where a perfec­
tion is truly found in both analogates, it is intrinsic, where 
imposed on one by the mind, it is extrinsic.115 Created "being" 
and God are related by causality and participation. Perfections 
in creatures are present by reason of God as exemplary cause and 
by reason of participation in being.
After the existence of God is known and His nature as pure 
act is apprehended, then His causal eminence in regard to 
His creatures is seen to consist in this, that He is being, 
goodness, and other similar perfections by His essence and 
therefore infinitely; whereas creatures both are and are 
what they are by participation (ST la, 14.6, 25.2 ad 2,
45.5, 57.2, 79.4, 93.2 ad 1 and 4; In Dion de div. nom. 1.3, 
2.4). Inasmuch as the being-by-essence is simple and self­
identical, the analogy of participation in being is neces­
sarily an intrinsic analogy. Hence, whatever is predicated 
of God according to this analogy is truly a knowledge of 
God, even though it remains a knowledge of Him through His 
creatures. Because God is the cause of the world through 
intellect and will (ST la, 44.3), He is the exemplar of all 
things; and created things are related to Him as images (ST 
la, 3.3 ad 2, 35.1 ad 1, 93.1; In X Cor. 11.10, as represen­
tations (ST la, 45.7), and as similar to Him (De pot. 7.7 ad 
4 in contrar ium; ST la, 4.3 ad 4). At the same time, created 
beings as individuals are seen to be related to each other
315 Ibid., p. 463.
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as diverse participants in the One Being that is being by 
essence.31*
Aquinas identified three kinds of correspondence by analogy: 
attributive, metaphorical, and proportional. Attributive and 
metaphorical analogies give knowledge of God's dynamic perfect­
ions. Proportional (and also attributive) give knowledge about 
God's nature as it is in itself. Proportional analogies predicate 
a perfection "properly and intrinsically of each analogate." * 317 
God's love in Christ's human presence and actions, through which 
God reveals his presence in Christ, would seem to be such an 
analogy. But the reality of the unity of form and content in the 
hypostatic union makes this a unique situation, in that the 
fullness of personal being is now united with concrete human 
being in the person of the Word. Christ is not simply any human 
being expressing God's love, but is God loving us in Christ. 
Christ as concrete analogy is unique. The doctrine of the Incar­
nation affirms that created nature in a human being, as "image 
and likeness" of God, permits God to unite himself to it in the 
person of the Word. Is also permits Christ to live out the 
immanent life of the Trinity economically, in a way that is truly 
expressive and se1f-disclosive of both the divine and human
natures. Nothing else in creation can be as perfect an analogy 
because nothing else is united to God hypostatical 1y. It is as
3l‘lbid., p. 465.
3l7B. Mondin. "Analogy, Theological Use of." New Cathol ic 
Encyclopedia. Vol. 1. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 465-468, 
at p. 466.
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univocal analogy as is possible given the distinction between 
Creator and creature, and the necessity that God in himself be 
ever greater and dissimilar than any analogical similarity.
The transcendentals, unity, beauty, goodness, and truth, 
include a mode of participation and "are the concern of both 
natural theology and revealed theology." The only way we can know 
the meaning of affirmative statements about God based on the 
perfections of creatures or on Revelation is by analogy.31* But 
the question remains as to what kind of knowledge of God we can 
have through analogy, and particularly of God in Christ, the 
concrete analogy. St. Thomas held to the view that in addition to 
knowledge of God possible by negative affirmations (via negat- 
iva), we could have a positive knowledge of God by analogies (via 
positiva). For example, if we say that God is wise, or good, 
the analogy describes something in God that is "partly the same" 
as it is in created reality. ". . . St. Thomas insists that when 
affirmative predicates are predicated of God, they are predicated 
of the divine nature or substance."11* On the other hand since 
God as an object of our intellect in this life can be known only 
imperfectly through created reality, our concepts and words share
n*Klubertanz, p. 465.
319 The following discussion is based primarily on Frederick 
Copieston, S.J. A History of Philosophy. Vol. 2. Mediaeval 
Philosophy. Part I I. Albert the Great to Duns Scotus. Garden City, 
N.Y.: Image Books, 1962, Chapter Thirty-five, "St. Thomas Aquinas 
V: God's Nature."
HI Ibid., p. 70.
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in that imperfection. Our knowledge is real but imperfect, and so 
our concepts and terms must be vague and uncertain in meaning. 
They cannot be fuily univocal, but neither are they equivocal.31 
But there is still the difficulty of the positive content of the 
concept as applied to God. Is the similarity purely logical 
(veritas in cognoscendo) or is it ontological (veritas in essen- 
do)? If we abstract the essence of "wise” or "intelligent" or 
"loving" and apply it to God, is that not a univocal application?
It was for this reason that Duns Scotus later insisted that we
can form univocal concepts applicable to both God and creatures, 
though there is no univocity in the real order in respect of God 
and creatures."* 322 Of course, this view of Scotus depends on a 
particular definition of univocal which ignores the distinction 
between finite and infinite perfection. This conclusion by Scotus 
would pull the ontological rug out from under analogy and make it 
into a purely logical concept. Therefore, the concepts and words 
used of God would yield no real knowledge of God's reality in
Himse1f.
In fact, St. Thomas' epistemology would seem at first sight 
to be at odds with his natural theology of analogy. 323 For Thomas 
held that the active and passive intellect depended on phantasms
32tIbid., p. 70-71.
322 Ibid., p. 77-78.
323This discussion is based primarily on Copleston, Mediaeval 
Philosophy. Part I I. Chapter Thirty-eight, "St. Thomas Aquinas 
VIII: Knowledge."
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or sensory images for abstraction of universals, and ultimately 
for all knowledge of created reality or of God, apart from 
revelation or mysticism. If this is the case, how could the 
intellect have any real knowledge of immaterial substances, 
particularly God? Can there be any metaphysical knowledge or any 
knowledge which transcends the senses? St. Thomas answer is based 
on the fact that intellect as such is the faculty of apprehending 
being, and has as its primary object the apprehension of being. 
The active power of the intellect is the key to his position. For
it enables the intellect to abstract what is universal in all
particular reality, that is first of all "being" and secondarily 
essence. Implicit in this operation is cognition of the relation 
of immaterial being to sensible being. Sensitive cognition is the 
material cause of intellectual cognition which extends beyond 
material being. Therefore the intellect can know immaterial 
objects but only by analogy.32* With respect to whether the posi­
tive content of the analogy must be either univocal (Scotus) or 
equivocal, St. Thomas answers neither. Copieston sums up his 
views this way:
To demand that the content of analogical ideas should be 
perfectly clear and expressible, so that they could be 
understood perfectly in terms of human experience, would be 
to misunderstand altogether the nature of analogy. St.
Thomas was no rationalist, though he allowed that we can 
attain to aliqualis cognito Dei. The infinity of the object, 
God, means that the finite human mind can attain no adequate 
and perfect idea of God's nature; but it does not mean that
31k Ibid., p. 113-14.
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it cannot attain an imperfect and inadequate notion of God's 
nature .325
Revelation can extend our knowledge of God without any contradic­
tion between theology and philosophy, as when we know by faith 
that God is triune.326
Analogy and Knowledge of God in the Franciscan School 
An indication that Aquinas' insights, though profound and
helpful, were not the final solution was the fact that the 
Franciscan school, especially St. Bonaventure, maintained the 
spirit of Augustine in the more mystical orientation of Bonavent- 
ure's doctrine. With respect to faith and reason, simply put St.
Bonaventure and St. Thomas differed over whether reason had its
own intrinsic light or needed the light of faith to attain any 
true knowledge, at least with respect to transcendent realities. 
Their differing views of Aristotle followed on this differ­
ence.* 322 For St. Thomas, theology, while rooted in Revelation and 
grace, and developing under God's providence, "is strictly a 
rational construction." For St. Bonaventure theology involves a 
dynamic synthesis of faith and reason; it is a perception or a 
type of seeing of the depths of the revealed truth using the 
infused gifts of the Holy Spirit. It is more of a recognizing 
God's order and the intelligibility of reality in the light of
325 Ibid., p. 116.
324 1 bid.
322Copleston, Medieval Phi losophy. Part I I . pp. 36-40. ". . .
it is not right to exaggerate their difference of outlook." Ibid., 
p. 38.
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faith, than a rational construction by the human spirit.311 St. 
Bonaventure's emphasis was on the will and love of God as the key 
to true perception and the integration of reason into faith. 
Theology is more of an affective, moral, experiential or reli­
gious mode of reflection or contemplation guided by the Holy 
Spirit. While Bonaventure used Aristotle, he did not have confi­
dence in reason on its own as a means to come to deeper under­
standing of the faith, or as a means to knowing truth about 
transcendent reality. He held to a reciprocal relationship 
between theology and philosophy, but taught that theology ful­
fills philosophy and assures that it will not fall into error.
Without theology philosophy cannot attain to the full truth about
reality. For example, a philosopher might by reason come to know
God is the exemplary cause of all being, but he could never know 
without theology that the divine Word is the exemplary cause of 
all things.* 330
But, Bonaventure's emphasis also had its dangers. Though 
Bonaventure had a strong doctrine of exemplarism and analogy 
based on a metaphysics, his emphasis on the mystical and contem­
plative could be the basis for denying any true natural theology 
and basing all real knowledge of God on Revelation. John Duns 
Scotus is generally known for preparing the way for Ockham and
3i,Congar, pp. 119-20
q j ft P. de Letter, "Theology, History of. New Catholic Encyclope­
dia. Vol. 14. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 49-58, at p. 52- 
53.
330Copleston, Mediaeval Phi losophy. Part J_, pp. 288-89.
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Nominalism - the critical theology of the fourteenth century. 
While there is a definite sense in which this is true, taken 
alone it is a distortion.531
Yves Congar points out that Scotus was reacting to two 
issues of the time. First, consistent with the Augustinian 
tradition he was reacting to Albert-Thomistic philosophical 
"naturalism." Secondly, he was trying to refute incipient Nomin­
alism.331 * 3 In reaction particularly to the second, he went even 
further than St. Thomas in affirming the objectivity of human 
knowledge. He insisted that the primary object of the intellect 
was ail that is intelligible, or being as being. In his view this 
was necessary if metaphysics was to be possible for the human 
mind. But he also affirms that all human knowledge comes 
through the senses and that the intellect simply has an intrinsic 
capacity to know without any innate ideas or principles.33* In 
addition to the intellect's ability to abstract universals Scotus 
held that the intellect could apprehend the individual thing by a 
confused primary intuition, contra St. Thomas. This he believed 
was essential to maintain the objectivity of human knowledge. 
Interestingly, he repudiates St. Thomas' view "on the ground that 
the Apostles believed that a certain visible, palpable, individu­
al human being was God." Thomas' view was adequate for scientific
331Copleston, Mediaeval Phi losophy. Part I I . pp. 204-209.
333Congar, p. 127.
333Copleston, Mediaeval Phi losophy. Part 11 . pp. 210-213.
33*Ibid. , pp. 219-221.
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knowledge of essences or universals but not for knowledge of the 
individuality of a thing. Since, a singular thing is intelligible 
in itself, an intellect in theory should be able to know a thing 
in itself, but in this life because the intellect does not know a 
thing in itself directly, the intellect can have only a confused 
primary intuition of the thing as existent. If we say that the 
intellect can have no intuition of the individual thing as 
existent we destroy the objectivity of knowledge.335 He defended 
St. Thomas' idea that the intellect has its own natural light and
had no need of divine illumination to reach certitude from the
first principles of Revelation. His theories of the univocity of 
being, individuation, and formal distinction (distinctio formalis 
a parte rei) all had the purpose of protecting the objectivity of 
knowledge .33<
Scotus' teaching that we can know the individuality of a 
thing, I believe, is an important contribution to an epistemology 
of revelation in Christ, and therefore to our ability to under­
stand what we know when we know a person relationally and intu- 33 * * * * * * * * * * *
33 5 Copleston. Mediaeval Philosophy, Part II, pp. 214-217; Scotus
distinguishes intuitive knowledge from abstractive knowledge. "The
difference between intuitive knowledge and abstractive knowledge is
not, then, that the former is knowledge of an existent object, the
latter of a non-existent object, but rather that the former is
knowledge of an object as existent and actually present, that is,
in intuition properly speaking, whereas the latter is knowledge of
the essence of an object considered in abstraction from existence,
whether the object actually exists or not." Ibid., p. 221. One can
also have imperfect intuitive knowledge of an existent object as
existing in the past.
nt Ibid., pp. 207-208, 224-31, 231-34, 239-40.
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itively. St. Thomas' epistemology, as pointed out above, is built 
on knowledge of universals abstracted from sensory phantasms and 
denies we can know a thing in its individuality. And it would 
seem, we could not perceive the "whoness" of a person as opposed 
to "whatness." The Triune God revealed in Christ, the "object" of 
our faith, could not be personally encountered and recognized in 
this life through the transmission of his historical life-form in 
Scripture and Tradition, and the power of the Holy Spirit. All we 
have are the truths of faith, authenticated by miracles, espe­
cially the Resurrection. Those truths validate the existence, and 
reality of God and point to fulfillment in the beatific vision of 
the object of our faith, but don't really present that object 
through created forms for even imperfect encounter and recogni­
tion now. Grace becomes a created form given to the soul.
The more contemporary view of grace as being the actual
personal presence of God, and the self-communication of God the 
"object" of our faith, mediated by created forms and the Holy 
Spirit, seems inconsistent with such a rationalistic conception 
of Revelation. It would seem that all participation in grace is a 
finite participation in God's own life and knowing of Himself.337
337 This definitely seems to be Balthasar's view. The act of 
divine faith is a participation in God's own knowledge and love of 
himself, as revealed in Christ's "life-form." For more on the 
contemporary theories of the nature of the union between the human 
and divine which seek to explain the way in which God's presence is 
mediated to the human soul, see: E.M. Burke, "Grace." New Catholic 
Encyclopedia. Vol. 6. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 658-672, 
at p. 669, col. 1; and, M.3. Redle, "Beatific Vision." New Catholic 
Encyclopedia. Vol. 2. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967-79, pp. 186-193, 
at p. 191-192.
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Based on my limited exposure to Balthasar's writings it 
seems to me that his thought about analogy is, in part, a synthe­
sis of the thought of Thomas, Bonaventure and Scotus. From Thomas 
he takes the insistence on knowledge of God through the sensual 
and according to analogy while rejecting a rationalistic inter­
pretation of the way that knowledge is arrived at. From Bonavent­
ure he takes the intuitive, mystical faith emphasis on the mode 
of knowing God in Christ, but rejects any hint of illuminism and 
insists on the objectivity of that knowledge through Christ's 
"super-form" or life-form. With Scotus, I believe he would affirm 
the ability of the intellect to have a synthetic, intuitive 
knowing of the personal individual presence of God in Christ.
But, he would differ from Scotus in insisting that the knowledge 
by analogy is of ontological truth and not simply logical truth. 
The remaining question is how a person, divine or human, self­
expresses or communicates the truth of their being to another. 
And, how do we as that other, perceive and know the truth of the 
other which they are communicating?
Christ the Concrete Analogy
It is important to note that St. Thomas even defines "per­
son" in terms of "whatness," in terms of an individual rational 
substance, or a subsistent being with a rational nature. He 
defines it primarily ontologically rather than functionally or 
relationally. It is not that St. Thomas did not have a dynamic
Hl Summae Theologiae: A Cone i se Translat ion, e d. T i mo thy
McDermott. Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1989, p. 68-71.
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notion of being. He did. He saw personal being as the most 
perfect expression of what it meant to be, and as intrinsically 
active and self-communicating. But historically, there was a need 
to distinguish between person and nature, with respect to the 
persons of the Trinity, and in relation to the person of the Word 
in Christ. St.Thomas never fully drew out the implications of his 
thought about the relational nature of the persons in the Trini­
ty. With respect to the human person, he returned to the defini­
tion of Boethius noted above.33’ This is inadequate in terms of 
describing what positive content is constitutive of the personal 
uniqueness of an individual rational substance. It defines what 
constitutes ontic individuality but not personal reality. It is 
personal reality which God is se1f-disclosing and communicating
in Christ. Esse and essence or even substance and form do not
seem to be completely adequate to explain one’s unique personal 
reality. This creates a real problem when transferred to the 
three persons in God, or when used to try to explain how the Word 
is the person of Christ and yet Christ is fully human. When 
transferred to the Trinity, one ends up with three ontic individ­
uals, unless in the transposition one qualifies the human concept 
of personal individuality by stripping it of ontic individuality. 
While this is necessary in moving analogically from creatures to 
God, one is then left with a very confused idea of the nature of
33,See, W. Norris Clarke, "Person, Being and St. Thomas." 
Communio 19 (Winter 1992)4: 601-18, at pp. 601-5; Clarke draws out 
the implications of Thomas' thought.
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the divine persons. With respect to Christ, if person is an 
individual rational substance and Christ is fuiiy human how can 
one avoid ending up with two persons in Christ? This definition 
has led to the idea in contemporary thought that person is 
synonymous with individual consciousness and freedom, or individ­
uality, which in turn has brought true incarnation of the Word 
into question, if the full humanity of Christ is to be preserved.
Thomas' solution was that the humanity of Christ subsisted 
in the act of being of the Word. The persons of the Trinity were 
described relationally. Scotus solved the problem by making a 
distinction between human individualized nature and human person­
ality. Scotus defines "personality" as one's independent, in­
alienable existence. "In the case of Christ, existential indepen­
dence was given to Jesus, not by virtue of his human individuali­
ty, but by the divine power of the Word." For him, in Christ 
there is no "assumed man" but only an "assumed nature," which "is 
concretized, individualized, in its human factuaiity . . . , and
personalized, made independent, given subsistence, in the divine 
Person of the Word."3*0 Scotus' view continued the Franciscan 
emphasis on the humanity of Christ. It preserves Christ's full 
humanity, determines what is essential to it and what is not, and 
then shows how Incarnation of the person of the Word is possible. 
More recent approaches, using Lonergan's idea that consciousness 
is a quality of a person or subject, rather than of nature or
3UGeorge Tavard, Images of the Christ: An Enqu i rv Into 
Christology. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1982, p. 55.
169
faculty such as intellect or will has provided a better solu­
tion.* 3*1 But this too is an ontological solution, and does not 
address the question of what constitutes a unique personal 
reality or how the truth of the personal reality is communicated. 
Personal reality is intrinsically unique by nature and cannot be 
defined by terms and concepts which express universality rather 
than uniqueness. One can experience another person's unique 
reality only by encountering them in some way. Their personal 
reality as experienced can be communicated and related to others 
in terms of their unique life-form, as Jesus is described in the 
Scriptures.3*3 The essence of one's personhood, whether ours or 
Christ's, can never be known di rectly in this life and defined.
It can only be known and experienced by encounter. The essence of 
personhood can be defined only in terms of the nature of rela­
tionships, that is in terms of the functional meaning and signif­
icance of persons to one another.3*3
Certainly, what we mean by recognizing God present in 
Christ, can only be known and expressed in terms of who this
3*lRoch A. Kereszty, 0. Cist. Jesus Chr i st: Fundamentals of 
Christology. New York: Alba House, 1991, p. 308-312.
3*3A clear implication of this is that one is on some level 
conscious of one's unique reality. If so, Jesus was conscious of 
his personal reality as God or he could not have communicated it 
through his words and actions.
For further discussion of the idea that relativity towards 
another constitutes the human person, see: Joseph Ratzinger, 
"Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology." Communio 17 (Fall 
1990)3: ^37-45^; Hans Urs von Balthasar, "On the Concept of 
Person." Communio 13 (Spring 1986)1: 18-26; and, W. Norris Clarke. 
"Person, Being and St. Thomas," cited above.
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other is for us. The very idea of a personal God is relational, 
rather than ontological in the sense that we somehow perceive and 
abstract the essence of the other. God as idea or concept is the 
recognition of an ultimate relational reality between creature 
and Creator. It is the personal reality of God in Christ, as 
revealed by the quality of God's kenotic love and miraculous 
deeds, that God communicates to us. God's ontological and meta­
physical nature can only be secondarily derived from the nature 
of God's communicated personal reality, or from the purely 
rational sources of philosophy. As pointed out in the section on 
grace and nature, that problematic can be solved best on the 
level of the interpersonal or relational, rather than on the 
level of difference in natures. God's personal reality cannot be 
a universal abstraction of anything we know. Even Absolute Being 
is a concept which universalizes what we know of Being; it is not 
an ontic entity, or God himself.
Balthasar's emphasis on knowing God as formal object in 
Christ through the experience of God's love, exemplifies his view 
that one must see the essence of personhood in a Trinitarian 
light and in the nature of the relationship, rather than individ­
uality as such. One is most fully a person, when one lives one's 
life in Christ, in a life of love (mission).Further, I be­
lieve his theological aesthetics provides the only adequate way 
to understand how the personal reality of God in Christ is 
expressed and communicated analogically, first to the Apostles
n*See, Balthasar, "On the Concept of Person," pp.23-26.
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and now to us. Personal reality, God's in Christ, or any personal 
reality, can only be expressed, communicated and known, intu­
itively and synthetically, in and through a "life-form" which 
reveals the meaning and significance of another for us. Analogy 
as applied to God's personal reality in Christ the concrete 
analogy, is not the rational and intellectual extension of human 
perfections to an infinite degree. Nor is it the philosophical 
use of reason to examine analogically the attributes of God as 
the fullness of perfections found in the created order. Rather, 
it is an analogical personal encounter with God in Christ, in 
which an intuitive, synthetic judgment of God's personal reality 
is made under the influence of the light of God's love shining on 
the face of Christ, through Christ's words and actions. One is 
free to choose to accept or reject that light, to see or not to
see.
The unique way in which a person, uses the "stuff" of 
created being (the transcendentals), to express their personal 
reality through words and deeds, actions or inactions, reveals
who they are for us. It is not a revelation of their ontological 
essence, but a revelation of their personal reality. That reality 
has a "life-form" which can be perceived only aesthetically and 
personally, if one is to know the person's significance and 
meaning for them, as distinguished from the simple truth and 
goodness of their actions. Love alone reveals the true and unique 
personal significance of the other for us, and that personal and
unique love can be perceived only as beauty. As Balthasar's has
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contended, only God's love can reveal his unique personal and 
divine reality, which is the basis for our experience of his 
authority and the motive for the act of divine faith.
To sum up then, analogy in the realm of faith knowing of 
God, through God in Christ, is analogy by personal encounter. The 
medium of the analogy is not a concept or idea, but Christ's 
"super-form" or "life-form." It is a graced, aesthetic, intuitive 
and synthetic judgment of God's personal reality. Analogy in the 
realm of natural theology or philosophy, is a purely rational 
judgment and a purely natural knowing of God's metaphysical 
reality based on the intrinsic principles of natural knowing 
through universals. It can shed no light on God's personal 
reality which can be known only in encountering Christ's personal 
reality.
Subjective and Objective Knowledge in the Act of Faith 
Further, I do not think that Balthasar's approach is "a
purely subjective explanation of the nature of faith." In his
article on "Faith," T. Urdanoz says:
A purely subjective explanation of the nature of faith based 
on psychological analysis and phenomenological description 
of the act of believing is likely to lead, if the method is 
exclusive, to antidogmatic positions such as are implied by 
one or another of the following: (1) the purely affective 
commitment proposed since the time of Martin Luther by many 
Protestant writers who wished to dissociate themselves from 
the concept of faith-assent of Catholic theology; (2) a 
philosophical, rationalist concept of faith based on the 
criticism of I. Kant; (3) the semirationalist theory of 
faith proposed by L.E. Hermes and A. Gunther and condemned 
by Vatican Council I; (4) the fideist concept of faith 
proposed by L.E. Bautain, or A. Bonnetty's traditionalist 
concept, both of which were also condemned by Vatican Coun­
cil I; (5) the Modernist and immanentist concepts of faith;
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(6) the existentialist faith affirmed by S. Kierkegaard and 
Karl Barth.
As Urdanoz says Catholic theology has stressed as primary, the 
objective content of Revelation (God as Formal Object and First 
Truth, both in dicendo and in cognoscendo) and those truths 
believed with divine faith on God's authority.1** 3 4 The subjective 
dimension has been considered secondary and derivative. I think 
that Balthasar's approach says that form (Christ's life-form) and 
content (God in Christ and in himself as formal object) in the 
act of divine faith cannot really be separated. The subjective- 
objective dichotomy is not that helpful in understanding the 
nature of the act of faith. If subjective means simply that the 
objective is experienced and judged subjectively, it adds little
to understanding. If subjective refers to the choice to believe 
God and God's Revelation in Christ, and to surrender and commit 
oneself to God (tides qua), then I don't see how that is second­
ary and derivative. That seems to be fundamental and essential.
It might be better to say that the act of faith has two constitu­
tive elements, tides qua and tides quae, both of which are
3*5Urdanoz, p. 798.
3**The integral object of faith "includes all that God has 
revealed. Everything to which the formal motive of faith extends 
must be embraced by the integral object. The formal reason for 
believing is the authority of God, and this exists equally with 
respect to anything and everything that God has in fact revealed.
'By divine and catholic faith, ail those things must be believed 
which are contained in the written word of God and in tradition, 
and those which are proposed by the Church, either by way of solemn 
pronouncement or through the exercise of her ordinary and universal
teaching power, to be believed as divinely revealed. (Denz 3011)'." 
Urdanoz, p. 799.
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integral to a genuine act of divine faith. It is true that 
logically and formally the choice to surrender and commit oneself 
to God follows the judgment that God has been encountered, but 
one might ask whether the latter judgment is also a free choice 
which implicitly contains the willingness to surrender to God, 
and to believe what God is revealing as truth. This simply 
illustrates the impossibility of assigning greater importance to
one of these two elements in an actual act of divine faith.
In addition there are, I believe, two types of objectivity 
involved in the act of faith. There is the subjective encounter 
with the objective reality of God in Christ through Christ’s 
"super-form" in the analogical manner described above.3*7 Then 
there is the conceptual and rational way in which that objective 
content is articulated and expressed. On the existential level 
these two types of objectivity are inseparable. Doctrines and 
creeds must be humanly congruent with the reality encountered and 
known. But, the foundation of the latter dimension of the act of
divine faith is the objectivity of the encounter with Christ.
That faith encounter, available in all ages, makes the identity 
and continuity in faith through levels of doctrinal development 
possible. If the objective reality of the subjective encounter 
with God in Christ is not the same from age to age, then contin­
uity in doctrine and creed is not possible. Put philosophically, 
following Balthasar, Christ's personal ontological reality as God
U7Balthasar's pistis and gnosis, which are part of the fides
qua.
175
was communicated through the personal reality of his "life-form." 
That personal and ontological reality was self-expressed, re­
ceived and transmitted in the historical-cultural forms of the
context in which he communicated himself. I believe that this is
the only way to explain how true historical continuity and 
identity of doctrine is possible, unless God communicates Christ­
's reality in each generation non-historically by direct inspir­
ation. This latter view would be consistent with a more immanent-
ist and illuminist perspective with respect to human conscious­
ness. But it is subject to all the dangers of a subject-bound 
epistemology. This brings us to the hermeneutical question of the 
transposition of the knowledge of personal reality of Christ in 
different concepts and language, and the question of the depen­
dency of truth and meaning on context. Given the restrictions of 
this thesis, 1 cannot treat this at length, but I want to comment
on a few issues.
Christ in Context
Francis Schussler Fiorenza's views, as previously noted, 
reflect the modern critique of "foundational ism." It holds that 
the search for foundations is futile. I think Balthasar, would be 
willing to agree to this view, if it were limited to a search for 
indisputable foundational tenets which would justify the knowl­
edge we have by faith. As we have seen31*, Balthasar holds that 
fundamental theology has been stunted for the past hundred years.
3U Supra, p. 60.
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Instead of asking the central question, "How does God's revela­
tion confront man in history? How is it perceived?", fundamental 
theology has sought verification by reason of Christ's claims. 
This is the kind of foundationalism against which the modern 
critique, epitomized by Fiorenza, has been mounted.
The idealist and rationalist approaches were but two of the 
consequences of the "turn to the subject." Theology sought to 
meet Idealism and Deism on its own ground by locating the source
of certitude about Revelation within the structure of the con-
liftsciousness of the human subject. As Fiorenza points out there 
was a radical shift to a new starting point for theology in orde 
to provide certitude for Revelation. The new starting point was 
philosophical anthropology. Hermes, Gunther, Drey and others 
sought to find certitude for Revelation in its correlation with
human consciousness.
But, Fiorenza sees the transcendental approach as also a
foundationalist approach. Fiorenza contends that the transcenden 
tai approach "operates with a coherence and disclosure theory of 
truth. It seeks to show the correlation between present human 
experience and belief statements."551 More specifically, it seeks 
a critical correlation in two basic steps, between a phenomeno­
logical, transcendental or existential analysis of religious 
experience, and Christian faith, or Revelation.551 He sees David
n,Fiorenza, pp. 260-62.
ISO.Florenza, p. 270, and 276 ff
5511 bid. , p. 276.
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Tracy's attempts to correlate the "Situation and Message" as
basically part of the same attempt.
The truth of the religious tradition consists in its ability 
to disclose what coheres with the religious dimension of 
human experience. This disclosure-coherence model of truth 
underlies all these diverse conceptions of correlation 
irrespective of whether the disclosure is seen as actualiza­
tion, explici tation, or intensification and manifestation. 
Such a model tends to view the Christian tradition primarily 
as specification of what is universally experienced as 
religious. The historical particularity of the tradition as 
well as the force of its conflict with experience tends to 
be minimized in such a model.352
In contrast to this Balthasar, I believe, sees the Christian 
tradition as a specification of what is uniquely experienced in 
the personal encounter of Christ in the act of divine faith. That 
experience of Christ challenges and calls for conversion and 
surrender to a new way of seeing and living reality, which finds 
its apogee in the cross of Christ. It is the encounter of the 
personal reality of God in Christ that is the foundation of the 
act of divine faith, of creed, doctrine, and theology. The 
reciprocal correlation to be made is between faith and revela­
tion, which then illumines the nature of the human condition, or 
anthropology. The process of hermeneutics becomes one of under­
standing the language and concepts in which the personal and 
ontological reality of Christ is transmitted from age to age, so 
that his reality may challenge, convert and transform the pres­
ent. In this Balthasar shares the pre-critical view of the 
patristic tradition which saw faith as a true knowledge of God,
3SZ Ibid., p. 283.
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conferred by God's grace.111 The foundat ional i sm critiqued by 
Balthasar and Fiorenza is the fruit of the critical period in 
theology.
The immediate source of the search for an unshakable founda­
tion for all human knowledge, which has been termed "Carte­
sian anxiety," is itself but a reflection of the search for 
certitudo in the period immediately following the Catholic- 
Protestant split. The whole of the critical era has been 
preoccupied with establishing the foundation for knowledge 
and has sought to place it, one way or another, within the 
human mind conceived as an isolated "subject." Being does 
not cooperate in the act by which it is known; it is rather 
a passive unknowable whose intelligibility is determined by 
the access allowed to it through the activity of the condi- 
tioned subject.
I cannot take the space to analyze Fiorenza's hermeneutical 
solution to foundationa1ism. But, his reconstructive hermeneutics 
with its emphasis on context-dependent truth and meaning, seems 
to me to so reiativize ontological truth and being, and the 
connection between the two, that he too ends up in a subject- 
bound position. The only difference is that human experience, 
tested by communal reflective judgment, becomes the norm substi­
tuted for reason.
St. Thomas did emphasize that personal being in particular 
is active and dynamic in its se1f-communication. This thought has 
been developed by Balthasar to explain the manner in which God in 
Christ communicates his personal reality and being to us. I 
believe no personal being, and in particular the personal being
353 I am using pre-critical, critical and post-critical in the 
senses defined by Francis Martin in his article "Feminist Theology: 
A Proposal," Communio 20 (Summer 1993)2: 334-376, at pp.336-39.
35» Ibid., p. 344.
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of God in Christ, can be "a passive unknowable whose intelligi­
bility is determined by the access allowed to it through the 
activity of the conditioned subject." 555 We can only receive 
another personal being and be informed and enriched by them. I 
believe that post-critical thought, if it is to remain in conti­
nuity with the Tradition, will have to find its foundation on the 
active, dynamic and communicative nature of personal being, which 
can only be received. In a sense, the old paradigm transposed, 
will be the new paradigm. It seems fitting to conclude with a 
passage from St. Paul:
For no one can lay any foundation other than the one that 
has been laid; that foundation is Jesus Christ. Now if 
anyone builds on the foundation with gold, silver, precious 
stones, wood, hay, straw--the work of each builder will 
become visible, for the Day will disclose it, because it 
will be revealed with fire, and the fire will test what sort 
of work each has done. If what has been built on the founda­
tion survives, the builder will receive a reward. If the 
work is burned up, the builder will suffer a loss; the 
builder will be saved, but only as through fire. (1 Cor. 
3.11-15)
355 Ibid.
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